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Abstract. 
 
This thesis concerns the early work of Jean-Paul Sartre. It reconstructs the groundwork for the 
abandoned first ethics of ‘authenticity’, taking an unusual focus on his account of knowledge and the 
nature of temporality – especially the present. In other words, it focuses on the peculiar nature of 
time, knowledge and action as they allow us to make sense of an early Sartrean ethics. It suggests 
that existing accounts of bad faith as running off belief and lax standards of evidence become far 
more intelligible and less problematic when we see knowledge as intuitive, a matter of the 
(temporally) complicated presence of the object to the world. This unusual focus gives it its novelty; 
the aim is to show how these issues can take centre stage in our understanding of Sartre and lead to 
an original exegesis and reconstruction of his system. It also holds that this yields a reading which we 
can definitively say supports ethical considerations. Along the way, it also engages with 
contemporary discussions about the status of character in Sartre, reaffirming the importance of 
views on that topic which are currently moving out of fashion. It defends the idea that, in order to 
have a strong notion of a Sartrean ethics, we must defend the idea that character is retrospective 
and lacks any (semi) causal power over our actions. 
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Introduction. 
 
This thesis describes the possibility of early Sartrean ethics, the ethics of “authenticity” promised at 
the end of Being and Nothingness1, with a view to showing that it can supply the grounds for a 
concrete, practical account of ethical action.  
 
Sartrean ethics has received much attention in the modern Anglophone scholarship; one reason is 
that whichever period we consider, it was never truly, formally finished. Neither the early ethics, 
which finds its culmination in the Notebooks for an Ethics2, nor the later ethics which was promised 
by the Search for a Method3 and worked toward in earnest in the Critique(s) of Dialectical Reason4, 
was ever finished. Unfinished, too, was the final theory, which according to Anderson exists only in 
lost interview tapes5. Each theory, though unsatisfactory, was intended to be more concrete and 
material than the last, and in this sense represent an advance over its predecessor. In Anderson’s 
introduction to Sartre’s Two Ethics, he makes the point that each ethics was intended to still be 
grounded on the last,6 which entails an interesting point: if all of the later ethics stand in a transitive 
relation to the first, then establishing that the earliest system works is vital. His early work is 
systematic to the point where it is often seen as Cartesian, coming out of the fixed, apodictic point 
of the intentionality thesis towards the ethics promised in Being and Nothingness. Yet other 
commentators have already given this topic considerable attention: writing in 1988, Detmer asked if 
there was a “need for yet another exposition of Sartre”.7 So at the outset, it is helpful to set out the 
reasons why a(nother) commentary on Sartre, specifically on the possibility of a Sartrean ethics, is 
valuable now. 
 
                                                          
1 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E 
Barnes. Routledge: London and New York, 2003. Hereafter referenced as BN. 
2 Notebooks for an Ethics. Translated by David Pellauer. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 
1992. p. 474. Hereafter referenced as Notebooks. 
3 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Search for a Method. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. Vintage: New York, 1968. 
4 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Critique of Dialectical Reason (Vol.1.). Translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith. Verso: London, 
2004. 
5 Anderson, Thomas C., Sartre’s Two Ethics. Open Court: Peru, Illinois, 1993, p.1. 
6 Ibid., p.3 
7 Detmer, David. Freedom as a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre. Open Court: La Salle, 
Ilinois, 1988. p.1. 
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In the first place, there is a longstanding importance in being able to ground our concrete, practical 
ethics. Insofar as we intuit that there is such a thing as ethics, being able to back up that idea and 
knowing how to follow through on it is critical.  We don’t need to come up with an abstract 
philosophy to show us we have to make meaningful decisions; our everyday lives, all lives, present 
us with those opportunities all on their own. Sartre was deeply committed to engaging with the 
ethical, with the difficult decisions that we all face; he had no intention of just producing an abstract 
theory which would never leave the classroom. Yet without a sturdy system framing it, we can open 
ourselves to endless charges of subjectivism or relativity; one key benefit of Sartre’s system is its 
pseudo-Cartesian starting point in intentionality, and the way that unpacks and flows towards the 
ethical. It offers us a vital, solid foundation as we move to answer those questions which we are all 
presented with: how should we act, how should we organise our society, right through to the 
mundane like whether we should take his hand or not. His novels show all too well the difficulties 
life can present us with, the challenges to our ethical sense that both our everyday lives and larger 
threats like the wars and instability of the 20th century present. Although we are not faced with 
instability in the same way as he was, we remain consistently implicated in moral crises of a global 
scale, which make demands on us to accept or reject our complicity or not. Our responsibility for the 
world, a key Sartrean theme, is perennial. Being able to understand, rather than assert, this 
responsibility is vital. 
 
Secondly, if Sartre is noteworthy for one non-intellectual aspect of his work, it’s the obscurity of his 
texts, the lack of favours that he does to the reader and his own system. Identifying a common 
thread in his arguments and his system is a key strategy to bring his views into focus; Detmer set out 
the importance of freedom as a value in his book of the same title. More recently, Webber8 gave us 
a unified reading of (early) Sartre focused around the importance of character in Being and 
Nothingness. By unifying their accounts around a particular, key theme or point, they both aimed to 
resolve the unclearness of the text and the system as a whole. This thesis, for similar reasons, 
focuses on the peculiar nature of time, knowledge and action as they allow us to make sense of an 
early Sartrean ethics. In particular, it contends that accounts of bad faith as running off belief and lax 
standards of evidence become far more intelligible and less problematic when we see knowledge as 
intuitive, a matter of the (temporally) complicated presence of the object to the world. Whilst all of 
these issues have been dealt with separately before, the aim is to show how they can take centre 
stage in our understanding of Sartre and lead to a novel reading of his system, a reading which can 
                                                          
8 Webber, Jonathan, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Routledge: New York, 2009. 
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properly support an ethics.  
 
Thirdly, a modern obsession with self-identity and character was a large part of what inspired this 
work; over the last 20 years many stories have appeared in the popular press about narcissism, 
sociopathy, and other toxic relations to one’s own identity at the cost of others. Accusations along 
these lines are common: President Trump is a narcissist, that private citizens contribute to the 
decline of society via their narcissism, even that (Hillary) Clinton is part of a narcissistic ‘caring class’ 
prophesied by Lasch in 1994.9 Popular intellectual books along these lines, such as What About 
Me?10 and studies like Why We Love Sociopaths 11 were popular from 2006-14. The running thread 
here is an obsession with self-identity and its (im)moral connotations. Sartre, who gave us literary 
and stage accounts of self-deception and self-obsession’s effects such as Erostratus,12 presents us 
with an ideal starting point for understanding how to properly ground, or how to immanently 
unseat, these kinds of accounts. We are, as in Sartre’s time, faced with a period of crisis, although 
mercifully a much less bloody one. If we would seek to understand it through the lens of individual 
and collective self-deception, we must be prepared to defend a conception of ethics which makes 
self-deception central. Sartre’s system, insofar as it does that, is a natural one to turn to. 
 
Since this thesis concerns itself with “early Sartre”, it will be helpful to the reader to explain that 
description. Broadly speaking, I mean pre-1960, although the most extensively used texts in what 
follows all came from 1948 or before. However, like any shorthand, this is slightly misleading; a 
common focus on temporality, presence, and knowledge also lends these works a thematic unity 
that guided their selection. 
 
This thematic unity is twofold: firstly, the strongest visible influences in the texts used here are 
Husserlian and/or Schelerian, which is another way of saying their focus is on value theory, the 
lifeworld, and their impacts on ontology and ethics.  Those texts will be The Transcendence of the 
Ego, Being and Nothingness, Truth and Existence, and Notebooks for an Ethics. Secondly, these 
works deal with presence in a meaningful way, with how the world is present to us as subjects. After 
the short piece Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology, Sartre’s published 
work up to 1948 turns on a specific general thesis about the way the world is present to us: the 
                                                          
9 See Lasch, Christopher, The Revolt of the Elites. V.W Norton & Co.: New York, 1995. His description (Chapter 
Five) of how a misread ideal of tolerance damages society is one of the best formulations of that line of social 
criticism. 
10 Verhaeghe, Paul, What About Me? Scribe: London, 2014. 
11 Kotsko, Adam, Why We Love Sociopaths. Zero Books: Winchester, 2012. 
12 Sartre, Jean-Paul, “Erostratus” in Intimacy [translator unspecified]. Panther: London, 1968. 
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titular intentionality thesis.  Later pieces, such as the Search for a Method, lean far more heavily on 
Marx and on (the understanding of) history, eschewing concerns about post-Husserlian value theory. 
Both its primary inspiration and its concerns suggest a clean break with Sartre’s work up to 1948. 
 
Without pre-empting the argument too much, we can trace a natural progression from IHP as an 
“Eureka!” moment about presence to Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness as an 
evolved and substantial consideration of intentionality and presence. The former deals with self-
presence and the nature of the self; the latter, far more wide ranging, covers the consequences of 
the intentionality thesis further. Being and Nothingness also gives us the first consideration of 
presence being connected to both knowledge and temporality, and promises a later ethical work 
which builds on its foundation. That ethical work, it strongly hints, is connected to self-deception 
and ignorance insofar as ‘bad faith’ is introduced far before it is necessary and explored using 
examples that suggest social criticism rather than dry, minimalist situations.  Finished (yet not 
published) in 1947, Truth and Existence focuses almost exclusively on the links between knowledge, 
truths, and presence, and connects this explicitly to an ethical dimension. Colourful examples like 
the wilful ignorance of a “distinguished carnivore” who represses the bloody history of his 
chateaubriand13 to downplay his role in animal suffering reprise the theme of deliberate ignorance 
or evasion of knowledge. More dryly, Sartre’s suggestion that our projects demand we unveil the 
world, i.e., that they make that unveiling necessarily valuable to us, does the same work in a more 
theoretical and explicit way. The Notebooks for an Ethics, also finished in 1948 but unpublished, 
similarly contain reference to the unveiling of the world (through presence) as an imperative and to 
the ethical import of (not) avoiding uncertainty. Although fragmentary, they offer much that is a 
development of this thought process, such as material on the ethical significance of tolerating 
ambiguity.  
 
The keen-eyed reader will notice that Existentialism and Humanism and Anti-Semite and Jew are 
missing from this list, which might be surprising. Both texts are explicitly ethical and were written 
before 1960. More detailed reasoning will be supplied as the texts become relevant, but for the 
reader’s benefit I will sketch here why the two were largely passed over. Firstly, Anti-Semite and Jew 
is primarily a work of mass psychoanalysis concerning anti-Semites. It assumes, rather than 
expounds, an ethics, and attempts to provide concrete action for French citizens to take against anti-
Semitism. As such, an exploration of how the ethics is meant to be generated or defended gains little 
from the text, save one part: its characterisation of authenticity. The formulation it gives for 
                                                          
13 T&E, p. 34. 
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authenticity is hugely important since these are sparse in the Sartrean canon. As a statement of 
intent and framework for reconstructing the ethical, it is invaluable, even if the rest of the book is 
somewhat irrelevant to purpose and of a fairly low quality as a sociological-psychoanalytic text. 
When it comes to Existentialism and Humanism, there are two reasons why I will not treat it as 
overly significant. The first, and weakest, is that it was never intended as part of the canon, but was 
a popular lecture whose publication Sartre later regarded as a mistake. More strongly, its argument 
does not sit snugly in the arc of progression in Sartre’s thought I have sketched; it is not concerned 
with presence and knowledge as the source of the ethical per se.  While it supplies a reason to value 
(the freedom of) the Other absolutely, which is useful for reconstructing authenticity, the same 
premise can be generated purely using the material on intersubjective relations in Being and 
Nothingness. Why would we want to bypass it in this way? Because, as we will see, Existentialism 
and Humanism directly contradicts the need, in the Notebooks, for all freedom to be respected 
insofar as it is a concrete, specific freedom in situation. Since the Notebooks better fit the arc of 
Sartre’s theoretical progression far better, their claims will override Existentialism and Humanism in 
this thesis. 
 
This arc or consistent theme is also why the title mentions “temporality” as well as ethics; the 
account of knowledge we find in Truth and Existence and Being and Nothingness would be 
impossible without Sartre’s corresponding accounts of temporality and presence.  “Presence and 
Ethics in Early Sartre” or “Knowledge and Ethics in Early Sartre” were serious contenders for the 
present work’s title,14 so why did “temporality” win out?  
Temporality is vital to explaining Sartrean self-deception on my reading; I maintain that the 
ambiguity self-deception plays on is basically about time. Temporality, which helps us to the notion 
of the ambiguous future, is by corollary vital to the idea of understanding authenticity and the 
ethical. As the text progresses, several classic issues in Sartre scholarship, like the potential 
gratuitousness of radical project change, the (true) origin of anguish, and the nature of character will 
all be addressed with solutions which emphasise the role of time. The need to constantly verify our 
projects is behind the ability (and obligation) to refine our knowledge of the world, to consistently 
employ better concepts in an authentic life, which is vital to the account that follows. None of this 
would be possible without seeing the thread of temporal ambiguity going through Sartre’s account. 
                                                          
14 The latter might have been a little confusing: Sartre both rails against the primacy of knowledge and makes 
knowledge, in a different sense, central to ethics in Truth and Existence. 
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In sum, without keeping temporality and time in mind, it is very difficult indeed to justify how 
knowledge, in Sartre’s specialised sense, is crucial to understanding the possibility of ethics.  
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Outline. 
 
Practically speaking, this thesis appears in six parts, with a brief introduction at the start of each part 
describing the overall question of each chapter and the questions that will be asked and answered 
there. Although these introductions are not absolutely comprehensive, they are intended to help the 
reader follow what is happening at any given point. Methodologically, this text is reconstructive and 
teleologically moves towards the ethics given in Chapter Five and shored up in Chapter Six. What this 
means is that the text will progressively supply the reader with understandings of various Sartrean 
themes needed to make sense of a reconstructed Sartrean ethics.  
The first chapter introduces some foundational Sartrean themes, starting from the intentionality 
thesis and moving onto the in-itself/for-itself distinction, as well as covering the derivation of the 
pre-reflective consciousness and translucency of consciousness. This chapter, based largely on his 
essay on Husserl’s intentionality thesis, is mostly exegetical.  
The second chapter gives an account of freedom in Sartre as a ground for the later understanding of 
bad faith, inauthenticity, good faith, and authenticity. Exegetically, it introduces the key ideas of 
nothingness, value and lack which flow out of Sartre’s account of the for-itself and in-itself 
distinction, which are essential for going forward. It also covers the standard account of the 
motif/mobile/end structure of action and shows that all three can be collapsed into one another or 
are different ways of looking at the same thing. This includes the first engagement with Sartrean 
temporality to fill out his account of action and motivation, and shore up the plausibility of radical 
freedom. One element of apparent chance or randomness in action is left behind: the strangeness of 
the present, of the apparent moment when we take action. This chapter also gives the first 
introduction of the fundamental project and anguish, the primary motor of motivated self-
deception. The uncertainty of the moment of action later gives us the idea that anguish can be 
before the present, and by extension that it is a kind of fear of the effort required in long-term 
action, the need to pursue an “undertaking” in the words of the Notebooks. 
Next, the third chapter considers Sartre’s conception of the self and of knowledge, suggesting the 
connection between knowledge and the account of temporality given in the previous chapter. It 
casts the self as built up over time, as a trace of our actual behaviour which is built up of evidence. 
Our character, on this picture, is not identical with consciousness, but accumulates as consciousness 
takes action and can be the subject of error and recasting. The accompanying account of knowledge 
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shows how Sartre has a presence based or intuitive picture in which we directly ‘see’ the world and 
gain knowledge of it in that way. The point of actual content with the world, however, is vanishing, 
and so we constantly ‘verify’ the world and our projects, laying down a picture of the world that 
maps onto our ideas of the (non-apodictic) truth. In the sense that all knowledge and truth is being 
constantly tested, we see an unusually strong case for the Sartrean dictum that all knowledge is in 
fact what we would normally call belief. Another important consequence of this account is the proof 
that all error in consciousness has to be reflective, which is hugely important to self-deception later. 
 
Chapter Four describes the self-deception or ‘bad faith’, taking a line inspired by Catalano and 
Santoni, that it is basically about evidence, about poor standards of evidence for our self-image in 
character. However, the needed premise that all knowledge is belief is much stronger than normal 
for the earlier chapter’s insights taken from Truth and Existence. In order to preserve our character 
as an eternal entity, we appeal to the future or the past as continuing on forever, and the appeal we 
make at any given time is basically irrelevant to the overall structure. So too are crises resulting from 
the translucency of consciousness, which are there by design where bad faith becomes a way of life 
in inauthenticity. Moreover, we see how bad faith is a necessarily social phenomenon insofar as the 
other can directly modify our projects and insofar as many if not all characters are socially mediated. 
 
In Chapter Five, we will see how we can reconstruct authenticity without falling prey to charges of 
subjectivism. This will be done by reinforcing the classical statement in Anti-Semite and Jew about 
authenticity, adding more detail until charges like the “authentic torturer” example drop out. This 
account will draw from the previous chapters, understanding authenticity is a kind of solidarity with 
oneself despite the evolving nature of knowledge and evidence, and the uncertainties involved with 
long-term undertakings and our freedom to abandon them. In this reconstruction, the point 
originally made by Detmer, that freedom is the ultimate value, will be central but I will read it 
through the specific claims of the previous chapters. In the final modifications, we will show how 
practical and ontological freedom are linked in a way that forces us to respect the concrete goals of 
the other as much as the value of their apparently abstract freedom, showing that this system of 
ethics can both regulate our relations with others and enforce a respect for the objective and/or 
material conditions of their lives. 
 
Lastly, Chapter Six ties up some loose ends in the system, adding several pieces of reinforcement to 
the story so far. Firstly, an account of how it is possible to be forced into bad faith which does not 
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depend on anguish per se, in order to dispel the doubt that “mere” anguish is a strong enough 
incentive towards an inauthentic lifestyle. This will trace the possibility that the Other can disrupt 
our projects entirely, (coming close to) destroying the normal operation of consciousness and under 
that threat enforcing bad faith on us. It also reinforces the way we can link bad faith and 
inauthenticity to the material, by looking at the Sartrean account of possession and tracing how that 
can lead to an inauthenticity based on the concrete, objective and/or material circumstances of our 
lives. It then moves on to how we can positively assist one another with our projects, and how that 
assistance can be blocked by an ignorance imposed from outside.  
 
So why this structure? Broadly speaking, introducing Sartre’s most basic methodological and 
theoretical concerns is a necessary first step. When writing this text, the idea that ethics would 
concern self-knowledge and knowledge more generally was never in doubt, which demands the 
reader first understand the nature of the self, knowledge, and self-knowledge. Understanding one’s 
self, it turns out, requires an understanding of character, which itself requires an understanding of 
the structure of action. Only with all of this in place can we start to understand the basic format of 
self-deception and its relation to the ethical. All of us lets us see the structure as produced by chains 
of “in order to understand Y we have to understand X”. 
 
 The only exception is in considering inter and intrasubjective bad faith and authenticity separately, 
but this is more of a pedagogical point than anything else. In these cases I ruled that it would be 
easier to introduce the basic concept by explaining it as if it were purely intrasubjective, and then 
immediately moving on to the intersubjective (full) version. In any case, in examples like explaining 
intrasubjective self-deception through character, which turns out to be intersubjective, the 
contradictions immediately become apparent and demand the full picture. I do not wish to suggest 
that there is some kind of Hegelian structure of immanent unfolding going on in Sartre more 
generally (in the sense that that is irrelevant to the discussion, not that we should deny such a 
claim). Nor is the suggestion that there is anything as complex as the structure of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit or the Logic at play in the current text. The idea is as simple as it is 
sometimes easiest to sell a more abstract, intrasubjective idea about, e.g., deception or character 
and then move on once it is clear that picture falls apart. 
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List of Abbreviations. 
 
Throughout this text, the titles of some works by Sartre will sometimes be abbreviated for the sake 
of brevity (especially when referencing). Those abbreviations are as follows: 
 
 
ASJ:  Anti-Semite and Jew 
 
BN:  Being and Nothingness 
EH: Existentialism and Humanism 
IHP:  Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology 
Notebooks: Notebooks for an Ethics 
 
Sketch: Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions 
 
T&E:  Truth and Existence 
 
TE: Transcendence of the Ego 
 
 
 
It is also worth nothing here that throughout, double quotation marks (“”) will indicate quotations or 
engagement with a hypothetical interlocutor, and single quotation marks (‘’) as used as scare marks 
for technical or unusual (uses of) vocabulary. 
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Chapter One – The Intentionality Thesis 
and (Self) Awareness. 
 
This chapter will lay out some introductory concerns within Being and Nothingness, looking to make 
sure Sartre’s basic observations and principles are in place ready for a later reading of his more 
involved positions. Most of this will amount to an unpacking of the dense material in his 
introduction, which is confusingly written in many places and full of appeals to special terminology, 
as well as some context from other early works.  The goal of this chapter is to show how Sartre 
derives the famous in-itself and for-itself distinction that underpins the rest of the work through his 
extension of Husserl’s intentionality thesis and a rejection of non-phenomenological starting points 
for ontology. In particular, Sartre objects to those positions he calls “digestive philosophy” and/or 
identifies as being an unsustainable representationalism. This will take the form of four main 
sections, the first looking at Sartre’s characterisation of the intentionality thesis, the second looking 
at self-awareness, the third arriving at the in-itself/for-itself distinction focusing on the for-itself, and 
finally a few brief remarks on Sartre’s overall project leading into a discussion of the nature of the in-
itself.  
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Section One: The Intentionality Thesis. 
 
Sartre owes a huge debt to Husserl for the concept of ‘intentionality’, which is the key to 
understanding his system. Indeed, there is good reason to believe (as the progress of this argument 
should help confirm) that starting with intentionality is what lets him reach the ethical.15 In 
Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology16, Sartre defines intentionality in the 
following way: “[the] necessity for consciousness to exist as consciousness of something other than 
itself”.17 Against what he terms digestive philosophy, Sartre says that there are no such things as 
mental objects or contents of consciousness such as a mental picture or components of (inner) 
experience. When he (somewhat flippantly) compares a digestive consciousness to a “spidery mind” 
that traps objects in its web and digests them like a real spider might a cocooned fly, the key 
assertion is that such a mind is “reducing them to its own substance”.18 By this I take him to mean 
that the experience we have of the world is transformed from appearance into the mental and 
either preserved whole or reconstructed on demand from the pieces that make it up.  In a more 
modern spin, in visual perception this is like the process of photogrammetry being used to create 
special effects for TV, cinema, or video games, where special photographic techniques allow a 1:1 
replication of an actor or object within a computer graphics engine; the object, formerly [only] 
outside, is now reproduced within the equipment as a piece of code. The points of view that make 
this claim intelligible are, on the idealist end of things, that external objects are possible to take out 
of the world into media of storage and remain those objects, or alternatively that in encountering 
features of the objective world, replicas are created within storage media and subjects deal 
exclusively with them. The additional premise that makes digestive philosophy possible is that 
consciousness is one such medium. Sartre’s primary argument against this model of conscious 
experience is that can’t explain a properly described first-person account of our encounters with the 
world. His general method here is to describe the structure of awareness through minimal 
presuppositions about what that awareness is and how it is constituted; a proper description will 
reveal an account of the structure of appearances and their appearing. Even though appearances are 
                                                          
15 For an argument to this effect, see Poellner, Peter, “Early Heidegger and Sartre on Authenticity” in 
Mcmanus, Denis (ed.) Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self. Routledge: London and New York, 2015. pp.243-
263. 
16 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology, pp.257-60 in “Critical 
Assessments of Leading Philosophers: Edmund Husserl” (Vol. I), ed. Bernet, R., Welton, D., and Zavota, G. 
Routledge: New York, 2005.  
17 IHP, p. 259. 
18 Ibid., p. 257. 
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separate from the way they appear, i.e. the structure of appearances is not immediately given when 
they appear to us, Sartre holds that the correct investigative attitude will reveal that structure to us. 
Morris refers to this kind of approach as a “re-amazement”, a reacquaintance with the aspects of 
our experience that are usually passed by and seen as unremarkable, but can be revelatory of the 
structures underpinning our encounters with the world19. Describing an everyday, normal encounter 
with the world, Sartre says: 
You see this tree, to be sure. But you see it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the 
dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles from the Mediterranean coast20 
There are two closely related senses of “you see it just where it is…” here; first, you see the object 
that is the tree as in its actual place independently and outside of consciousness. Second, it is 
surrounded in its objective location by a halo of other properties like the miasma and the heat haze. 
On a naïve reading of the first equivocation, the point is that we do not experience objects of the 
world as coextensive with us; there isn’t a ‘mine-ness’ to the tree trunk that there would be to my 
hand,21 for instance. This difference between my self-awareness and the awareness of the tree is 
meant to show that appearing things are given to us as separate from ourselves, thus giving us a 
reason to posit that consciousness must be separate from its object.22 Whatever the grounds (which 
are not particularly important here), I experience myself with a distinctive sense that it is my self, 
which is missing in the case of the tree – it is “just where it is”. If we pay attention to our experience, 
we see that this tree is experienced as outer – “[y]ou certainly knew that the tree was not you”23. 
We might object here that we can and do experience objects as parts of ourselves – think of the old 
swashbuckling tales about fencing masters whose swords became extensions of their bodies. 
However, even if we grant that this is true (i.e. that the weapon has become a part of the maestro) it 
does not need to be a problem. There is still a meaningful difference in the way he experiences a foil 
in his hand and the sabre on the wall. This is the same kind of difference as between my experience 
of the tree and of my arm, and if I could experience the tree like that, the story runs that it would be 
a part of me.  
                                                          
19  Morris, Katherine, Sartre. Blackwell: Oxford, 2008. pp 27-8. 
20 IHP, p.258, emphasis mine. 
21 More exactly, my self-identification with the hand is with my hand-as-lived-body, although my hand 
considered as an object, what Sartre later will call the ‘body-for-others’ is in a different category, that of the 
“in-itself”, which we will come to and define soon. 
22 Or to be much more quick and dirty about it, we can also refer to the impossibility of having a thought with 
no theme or ‘subject’, going closer to contemporary analytic approaches to intentionality as the “aboutness” 
of thought. 
23 Ibid., p. 258. 
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Secondly, the tree is given to us in relation to other natural phenomena24 right from the start – it is 
that specific tree, which is surrounded by Mediterranean dust and bathed in heat, it is inherently 
given as related to all of them25 and these relations trace out different ways we could 
explicitly/thematically apprehend the tree, for instance the tree that dances in the heat haze or the 
tree that is obscured by dust.  These different aspects trace out what Husserl would call a horizon, 
and when we consider that there are always aspects of the object that are hidden, there are always 
infinite perspectives afforded by it. If I were to approach the tree from the North, its southern face 
would be hidden from me; were I to approach from the South, its northern face would not be visible. 
In principle, we could make infinitely many infinitely small changes in location to give us an infinite 
number of perspectives – even before figuring in the different relational aspects of the object. This is 
to say that the object is in some sense made up of infinitely many parts and is infinitely complex – or 
at least that, in Sartre’s initially confusing vocabulary, an infinitely long process would be necessary 
to give the object immediately, in its entirety. This gives us a way to connect the story in IHP about 
experiencing the tree to Sartre’s (brief) argument against mental objects in Being and Nothingness, 
making one extended argument: there he claims “it would require an infinite process to inventory 
the total contents of a thing”.26  The idea would be that mental objects are collected within 
consciousness and made available on demand for its use, in analogy with the way I can keep parts in 
a cupboard and move them to my workbench when they are needed.  In Sartre’s more bizarre 
analogy, it’s the same way that a spider’s meal is first trapped on the web, where it is later 
unwrapped from its silk to be eaten on the spider’s whim.  The relevant question is how we cash out 
the analogue of being in the box or trapped in the web for a mental object; it’s tempting to talk 
about consciousness functioning like physical space, but Sartre clearly wants to deny the analogy. 
 
If we imagine an actual case of interacting with a physical object in storage to achieve an end, such 
as my getting out a knife to prepare a meal, we can cash that out in a way that shows Sartre’s 
intended disanalogy with consciousness.  The almost painfully basic case is that I have a drawer 
                                                          
24 Which shouldn’t be confused with phenomena in the technical sense. 
25 This also amounts to the observation that the world is given to us all at once, not as individual pieces.  In his 
paper “Pre-reflective Self-consciousness and the Autobiographical Ego” Kenneth Williford holds that this 
description is vital to establishing the world as ‘always already’ unified synchronically (i.e. instantaneously as 
opposed to across time) which observation is an important part of the argument against a real ego in 
Transcendence of the Ego. The paper can be found as “Pre- Reflective Self- Consciousness and the 
Autobiographical Ego”, in Webber, J. (ed.) Reading Sartre (ed.). Routledge: Abingdon, 2011, pp. 195-211. 
26BN, p.7. 
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acting as a container for lots of different knives; I pick one out and it goes from being in storage to 
being available for use, and I get to work chopping onions. However, described more fully, I have a 
whole host of knives in the drawer, cook’s knives, carving knives, paring knives, each of which might 
be subclassed as sharp or dull, Germanic or Japanese pattern. What marks each individual knife out 
as being that particular knife is the unity of its features, the length of the blade and the tang, the 
material the handle is made from, whether it is intended to chop in virtue of heft or sharpness, and 
so on. This kind of description is purely cold and analytical; all of them will also hold some kind of 
‘affective’27 charge. They might be the one I am wary of for dulling easily, or one that brings a 
nostalgia for when I bought and learned to use it. They also have relational features that we can 
encounter independently of understanding them mechanically – “good for chopping onions” is 
relevantly independent of “about 4 ½” long and cuts with sharpness not weight”. Being affectively 
neutral is an affective charge; the mundane £12 Ikea knife that merely does its job stands out 
because it doesn’t stand out as being particularly good or bad. This unity of aspects of encountering 
a given knife is instantaneous or ‘synchronic’, only characterising the knife as it is at one moment. 
Then there is the diachronic unity, unity over time, that accounts for the knife being re-identifiable 
instead of leaving us in a slideshow with no recurring characters.  Between the incredibly large 
(Sartre posits countably infinitely large)28 number of aspects united in the synchronic and the 
infinitely large number of times we could encounter it across, the number of appearances that can 
be identified as the object is itself infinite.  Nonetheless, when I take one knife out of the drawer it is 
encountered as one possible appearance of the knife, it is that exact knife in context of the time, the 
lighting, my intentions in using it, and so on – it appears as a finite appearance that, although it 
refers to the infinite other appearances that could be re-identified as the knife, is specific and 
limited.  
 
Hence, in order for an object to be literally contained within consciousness, even in the capacity of 
representation, that consciousness would have to contain an infinite number of representations of 
the object under its infinite possible aspects, and would have to either have the capacity to unite 
those representations having encountered or inferred them, or on an idealist representationalist 
story it would absorb the object all at once as a transcendent object made up of those infinite parts. 
Given the brevity of his remarks, I think Sartre sees these alternatives as absurd – the question being 
                                                          
27 Roughly, we can say this means emotional for now although that is an oversimplification. 
28 The infinite appearances are countably so because they are related to an infinite division of (apparent) space 
and time, although there is neither indication that he deals with different infinities nor does the argument 
require engagement with them. 
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what it would mean for consciousness to have this infinitely large storage capacity and how any 
semblance of the order we take to be in appearances could obtain. The second point concerns 
questions like how the knife as it is in my kitchen when I am 25 and making dinner with it is kept 
separate from the knife as it was when I was younger and learning to use it. The knife, as it is 
encountered and related to the other knives and its container, is qua appearance always finite, but I 
take Sartre to be arguing that the idea that it could fit into consciousness presupposes that the 
whole (transcendent) knife is similarly finite, which is a category error. Once we try and make explicit 
the consequences of having mental objects, the account rapidly unpacks into one that holds that 
objects are made up of a simultaneously present series of infinite aspects, which is not compatible 
with our experience of having one finite experience at a time.29 Sartre’s remarks about the being of 
appearances show us that his enquiry is not concerned with any metaphysical question such as how 
an infinite knife fits into physical space; his explicit project is unpacking appearances and how they 
relate to (a consciousness) they appear to. Encountering appearances in this way is what he would 
call a contingency, something that just is and which we have to accept – because of the scope of 
phenomenology, exploring something like duration or presence of infinite objects in finite space is 
either going to be some kind of later regional ontology which has its own, different scope, or out of 
bounds. Hence we can find a logical conceivability argument against the idea of objects in 
consciousness/mental objects quite apart from those arguments that live and die by our raw 
experience of the world. We can still take a singular perspective on the tree, however, such as when 
I might go to photograph the way the hot air swirls around it, but this will always be the-tree-as-
surrounded-by-hot-air and not the tree. 
 
All of this brings us full circle back to the first definition of intentionality – consciousness of the world 
is not given to us as being of something within ourselves, so we can say that consciousness of inner 
objects is in the first place missing. Secondly, the infinity of profiles under which objects of the world 
can be apprehended means that having mental objects is impossible. Thirdly, consciousness having 
‘inner objects’ is not necessary for there to be consciousness30 – instead it is possible for the being of 
consciousness “to fly out into the world”,31 for consciousness to just be the process of its own 
reaching out to the world beyond itself. Since Being and Nothingness spells out what the being of 
                                                          
29 Although “at a time” here implies objective time; as we will later see, for Sartre pace Husserl subjective time 
is not made up of a series of presents to be occupied but is always a unity of parts engaged with the past, 
present, and future. 
30 This structural triad of lack of necessity, impossibility, and de facto absence, although something of a 
reconstruction here, mirrors the one explicitly found in Sartre’s arguments in Transcendence of the Ego. 
31 IHP, p.259. 
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consciousness is with this as its start, the coherence of the rest of the account is itself (intended to 
be) an argument for this intentionality thesis.  Here, the question becomes how specifically 
consciousness is aware of itself and the world, given this general structure of being necessarily 
“consciousness of something”. After all, despite a little unpacking, the intentionality thesis has still 
given us an extremely minimal picture of consciousness.32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Ibid., p.259. 
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Section Two: Self-Awareness, Reflection Theory, and Pre-reflective Self-Awareness. 
 
One intuitive approach here would have self-awareness or self-knowledge grounded in a theory of 
reflection modelled on (visual) perception.33  On this kind of account, self-awareness is only possible 
when we ‘look inside’ to find ourselves; consciousness has to always reflect on itself in order to be 
self-aware. Borrowing from Manfred Frank, Zahavi calls this the “reflection theory” of self-
awareness, and I think it is exactly this kind of account Sartre has in mind when he criticises the 
alleged primacy of self-knowledge over self-awareness.34  A premise of the account is that in order 
for reflection to be possible, there has to be a pair of distinct terms in the act of reflection: the 
reflected-on and the reflecting, or the object and subject of reflection. If we are naively thinking of 
reflection as something like inner sight or inner perception then we can draw a parallel with vision; 
in any case where I see my dog there is a necessary distinction between myself as the seeing and the 
dog as the seen; vision is always mediated.  A case where I reflect on myself or ‘see’ myself is not 
much different; in order to reflect on myself I have to create a difference between the reflected and 
the reflected-on, by making myself a[n] (separate) object for myself. There is always a difference 
between the seen and the seeing, and between the reflected and the reflecting, but if the goal is to 
achieve self-awareness through reflection then reflection somehow also works to collapse this 
difference. If we are to achieve reflective self-awareness, reflection somehow has to be the same, 
but at the same time separate and different from, pre-reflective consciousness.  As Zahavi35 rightly 
points out, the sense of identical here cannot be numerical identity.  If reflective and pre-reflective 
consciousness were numerically identical, there would be no difference between the two of them, 
so there would be no reflection going on at all. Instead, the reflecting and reflected-on are posited as 
being in the same stream of consciousness. They are the same consciousness insofar as it would be 
impossible to actually separate them without destroying the whole conscious system – and even 
phrasing it like that understates the closeness of their relationship. However, this implies that the 
reflecting consciousness carries with it some kind of capacity or propensity to discriminate between 
what is the same as itself and what is different – which in turn implies a kind of prior self-awareness. 
In order to tell apart components of its stream and other streams [of consciousness], the reflecting 
consciousness must already be relevantly self-aware. Here is where the real problem starts: if all 
                                                          
33 The following account of reflection theories in general draws on Zahavi, “Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-
reflective Self-awareness” in Welton, Don. (ed.), The New Husserl. Indiana University Press: Bloomington, IN., 
2003, pp. 157-80. p.159. 
34 BN, p.8. 
35 Zahavi, “Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-reflective Self-awareness”, p.159. 
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self-awareness comes from reflection, this implies that a further second-order reflecting 
consciousness is responsible for the self-awareness of the first-order reflecting consciousness. And 
this second-order consciousness needs self-awareness as well, which means that must rely on a 
third-order consciousness, which relies on a fourth, and so on into infinity. Or we can put the 
problem this way: for any given self-reflecting consciousness, it must be self-aware to be self-
reflecting, which presupposes that the goal of the self-reflection has been met in the first place – it 
implies that to reach the self-awareness we are aiming at, there has to be a foundational self-
awareness. This leaves us with two options/responses: 
 
a) Reject the account on the basis of infinite regress. 
b) Reject the account because it implies and requires a fundamental self-awareness that violates its 
own premises, i.e. because it is self-undermining. 
 
If we pick option b) above, then we end up rejecting the starting premise that all self-awareness is 
reflective, and by extension we lose the premise that self-awareness requires a distinction between 
the self that is aware and the self of which it is aware, and this is more or less where Sartre ends up. 
With regard to knowledge, the intentionality thesis tells us that the knowing consciousness must 
stand apart from and posit the known object; the object that is known must be outside of 
consciousness. However, Sartre points out that whilst this is necessary for us to have knowledge,36 it 
is not sufficient – there is also a need for an awareness of being that which has the knowledge in 
order for us to have knowledge at all. If I have knowledge, but I am unaware of having that 
knowledge, I cannot engage with it, yet the very idea of knowledge involves or contains our being 
able to engage with the topics we have knowledge of. If I am not aware of my knowing 
consciousness, this amounts to the same thing as not having that consciousness in the first place; to 
me, that knowledge would not be present. Hence there is a further condition for knowledge, that 
something secures and grounds my consciousness of knowledge. Nonetheless, Sartre sees that we 
can easily be misled here by the intuitions that add up to the ‘primacy of knowledge’37 – it is 
                                                          
36 “Knowledge” here has a wider sense than what we would now appeal to through justified true belief or 
something similar – it includes judgment. 
37 A tendency to equate all understanding with knowledge and to model all our access to the world as an 
acquisition of various types of knowledge, which leads us into reflection theories of self-awareness.  
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tempting to think of this consciousness of consciousness as some kind of knowledge of knowledge, 
and on the face of it claiming that we have to know what we know is based on a reasonable 
assumption. This assumption is that knowledge is the primary structure of awareness, which gives us 
the formula attributed to Alain: “[t]o know is to know that one knows”.38 However, this account 
immediately falls foul of the general problems with a reflection theory of self-awareness; as Sartre 
retells it, it at least implicitly suggests an inner look or looking inside ourselves structure to self-
awareness. On a strong reading, it is is explicitly such an account. In looking to knowledge to explain 
the self-awareness that itself is supposed to ground knowledge, we are “introducing into 
consciousness the subject-object dualism”,39 which is to say we are positing the known and the 
knowing as separate terms. However, in order for the knowledge and knowledge-of-knowledge to 
contain that they belong to the same subject, we have to posit that they are identical as a part of the 
same stream of consciousness. We are blocked off from using numerical identity because they were 
introduced as separate moments in the structure of consciousness. Hence, a further act of knowing 
reflection is needed to posit the two as identical (as being within the same flow of consciousness), 
and a fourth term will need to be added to posit the first three as identical, and a fifth for the same 
reasons, and on and on until an infinite number of terms of knowing reflection is needed so that the 
first could be guaranteed to begin with. The only alternative is, as we saw earlier, to conclude that 
this kind of account is self-undermining, and that the idea of knowledge grounding knowledge is 
incoherent.  Instead, there must be a final term that is not couched in knowledge to explain any 
knowing consciousness, which amounts to a rejection of the primacy of knowledge to our own 
awareness (of the world) which is immanent to the logic of the primacy of knowledge itself.40  This 
final term is what Sartre will call a non-positional or pre-reflective consciousness; it cannot posit an 
object because the thesis of intentionality shows us this would be to separate itself from that object, 
which would bring us back to endorsing a reflection theory of self-awareness.41 
What kind of consciousness is this? What is it like? In order to guarantee reflection, it has to be 
numerically identical to that reflection, always given as present alongside any and all reflective acts 
of consciousness. All that this consciousness is is the bare minimum of being turned toward the 
world (outside) and it does not contain a reflective stance42 on the world, “[i]t does not know my 
perception”. Nonetheless, it has to be the foundation of my conscious/knowing awareness of the 
                                                          
38 BN, p.8. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Later, we will relate this result back to the project and method of phenomenology itself. 
41 Or reveal to us that we identified the term we called the final, non-positional awareness incorrectly, and 
that a different consciousness is the guarantor in the chain of reflection.                                                                                                                
42 Although we will see later that it can very well contain a valuational stance toward the world. 
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world or else we are right back in the reflection theory. In his most famous example, Sartre describes 
counting cigarettes, and coming to know that there are twelve without ever having 
reflective/positional awareness of having counted them. He never thinks to himself that he is 
counting cigarettes, yet if someone were to ask what he was doing, he would be instantly capable of 
answering that he was counting cigarettes - with no difficulty at all.  The general point here is that 
we have an action that is not being done reflectively/I am not thinking43 about the action, but I am 
still acting, and when I do reflect on it I find I had an awareness that grounds my (reflectively) 
conscious ability to know I was counting cigarettes – my consciousness of counting them is 
explanatory of my (positional) consciousness that I am counting them.  
 
We might ask what it’s like to experience the world like this; the idea of non-conceptual content,44 
defined very broadly, can help. At a gloss, we can see it as a way of experiencing the world as just 
unfolding in front of us, where we are aware of what is happening but not spelling it out to ourselves 
in theoretical terms. Imagine some drama where a spy has a secret that he is looking to trade, a 
piece of strategic intelligence that will be swapped for material aid he needs. He lives in a world 
where there is a permanent risk of backstabbing and betrayal; at a meeting he finds himself lying 
about what he knows, feeling a creeping sense of unease that he can’t quite pinpoint. Colloquially 
we might ascribe this to all kinds of things: somewhere in the back of his mind a connection is 
forming that means he doesn’t need the information; some expression on his contact’s face wasn’t 
quite right; the danger is suddenly too much. In the debriefing later he might tell his handler exactly 
these reasons in the same way I can say I am counting cigarettes in retrospect, but in the moment 
they are only there as a feeling to the world, something that is lived through and experienced, 
engaged with practically but not looked at and examined. Indeed, this kind of absorption and focus 
characterises most of our engagements with the world; we live through our lives for the most part 
rather than taking a reflective stance on them as they are happening.  
 
                                                          
43 In the commonsense/conversational meaning of the word. 
44 The idea that non-thetic/non-positional consciousness is linked to non-conceptual content can be seen in 
detail in Poellner, Peter, “Non-Conceptual Content, Experience, and the Self”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
Vol. 9 no. 2 (2003), pp 32-57. A briefer account which helped popularise the idea was first published by 
Jonathan Webber as “Motivated Aversion: Non-Thetic Awareness in Bad Faith” in Sartre Studies International 
vol. 8, no. 1 (2002), pp.80-114.  
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However, this analogy can be accused of inaccuracy. The claim would be that in this case and others 
like it, the problem can be framed as an ambiguity in our perception of objects (which is in principle 
open to being cleared up) whereas the pre-reflective self-awareness we have is necessarily 
ambiguous. In the case of the spy, what is manifested to him as a feeling or sense about the world is 
the objective45 danger present in revealing too much to someone who is unreliable, but having 
intelligence from other agents could tell him either way if it is safe, or some kind of training in 
decoding people’s body language might make him feel certain enough to put him at ease. This is, on 
the face of it, true: in the case of an ambiguity about something out in an objective world, that 
ambiguity is intuitively reducible to a lack of appropriate evidence and/or the ability to use whatever 
evidence we do have.  Nonetheless, the case of a single event (the meeting) is not equivalent to the 
permanent status of consciousness, and that is where the disanalogy comes in. If we change the 
example and say that there was adequate evidence for our spy to know he was not in danger, there 
is still an affective/emotional charge to his world, a feeling about how the world is, even if that is just 
some kind of flat boredom – and this too is lived through rather than judged/known. If this boredom 
is brought to reflective awareness, there is still going to be some kind of sense of how the world is to 
him that isn’t explicit; surrounding every single explicit sense we have of the world is an implicit one; 
we can always pull another feeling about the world from behind our explicit awareness of our 
situation, like a magician pulling out handkerchief after handkerchief, forever.  These implicit 
feelings trace out a horizon around our explicit awarenesses, and we can draw an analogy here with 
vision; there is always a sector of the visual field in focus and out of focus. If I am looking at my dog, I 
will see his rug in the background; if I look at the rug, the dog will be the background instead. No 
matter how many times I switch focus, in principle there will always be something hazy and 
indistinct as well as the clearly visible. Whilst in these visual examples we are focusing on our object 
and getting it in greater clarity, self-awareness is a different thing entirely: in Transcendence of the 
Ego Sartre claims that the self qua Ego is “never seen except out of the corner of one’s eye”;46 our 
self-awareness is only given to us undistorted when we do not focus on it/grasp it reflectively. Even 
this is not quite accurate, though: in the visual case, there is always something that is the centre of 
the field which is seen differently from the rest, but our awareness of the world can be entirely lived 
through pre-reflectively. When I get up in the morning, for instance, it is very rare indeed that I 
conceptualise what I am doing – I more or less automatically put the kettle on, line up cans of dog 
food for the day, and so on, and it is only in cases of Heideggerian equipmental breakdown that 
                                                          
45 At least objective in the sense that anyone with his constellation of goals will always face the potential 
consequences of the action as endangering. 
46 Sartre, Jean-Paul, The Transcendence of the Ego. Translated by Sarah Richmond. Routledge: Abingdon 2004. 
p. 40. Hereafter referenced as TE. 
 31 
 
anything conceptual comes into it such as explicitly thinking about which shops will be open to buy 
more pet food at 0830 or being fully aware of my guilt that the dog will go hungry until lunch. If that 
routine remains undisturbed, then there is nothing thematised in the stream of consciousness. 
 
A consequence of this that will be very important later is the thesis of the ‘translucency’ of 
consciousness. If all reflective consciousness is dependent on/grounded by a pre-reflective self-
awareness, then there is no room for an unconscious in the sense of some part of the unified stream 
of consciousness that is there but which is not present to the conscious subject. Reflective 
consciousness is only possible against the backdrop of pre-reflective consciousness; the very 
condition of a reflective/positional awareness of an object47 is a pre-reflective awareness of oneself 
as aware of that object. As discussed above, this awareness is not explicit but rather implicit or “lived 
through”, but is always in principle available to become the subject of a reflective awareness. The 
theoretical differences between the unconscious and a pre-reflective consciousness will become 
significant later, but for now we can say that the main difference is in the mode of presentation and 
possibility of access; for Sartre there is nothing in principle that completely prevents access to 
something in consciousness48 because the whole stream is always being accessed, and this is a 
structural necessity of consciousness.  The pattern of access we have accounts for the description 
being “translucent” and not transparent; the presence of a necessarily indistinct ground of 
awareness rules out a parallel in vision with something clear like pure glass. 
 
So far we have imagined that Sartre is asking after the nature of consciousness and what it is to be 
conscious, getting the answer that it is founded on a non-positional self-awareness that is always 
there, that to be conscious is to be non-positionally conscious of being conscious of an object. 
However, this story does not yet say anything about what it is we are conscious of, about what it is 
to have something like a tree or the dust outside of consciousness; we have to ask how we relate to 
that external object to see how Sartre derives the categories of the in-itself and the for-itself. 
 
                                                          
47 “Object” in the wider sense of that which thought is directed towards, as opposed to “physical thing” in the 
sense that a tray is an object but a set of Enlightenment values is not. 
48 I.e. a part of the stream, not literally a “content”. 
 32 
 
Section Three: Appearances, the For-Itself, and the In-Itself. 
 
A key step towards the derivation of the for-itself and in-itself as categories is the collapse of any 
kind of appearance/reality or phenomenon/noumenon style distinction: “the dualism of being and 
appearance is no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy”.49 Rejecting this distinction 
immediately leads to the idea that phenomena can be revelatory, rather than always looking past 
them toward some hidden truth. When we talk about appearances and reality colloquially we 
assume that for something to appear implies doubt or uncertainty – for instance, if I am looking far 
out to sea and someone asks me what I can see, I might reply “there appears to be a ship on the 
horizon” by way of expressing the potential confusion with a cloud or a fog-bank. If the ship is only 
forty feet away, I could say “there is a ship in the bay”, giving up talk of appearances because of my 
certainty. In the first case, I am trying to track something about reality – the presence of the ship – 
but because there is reasonable doubt about that perception I speak of an appearance; if there is 
instead a cloud against the horizon, I will not be tracking the object that underlies what I see. In the 
second case, forty feet of clear air offers me no such doubts about perceiving an object as large as a 
tanker, hence when I say of my experience “I see a ship” I am confident I am tracking the thing 
underpinning that experience, i.e., the vessel.  If this kind of distinction does not really work,50 we 
have to ask where we end up if we reject it. This is what Sartre is asking here: “If the essence of the 
appearance is an “appearing” which is no longer opposed to any being, there arises a legitimate 
problem concerning the being of this appearing.”51 After this, his moves become very quick, to the 
point of being unclear.  
 
Rather than a distinction between appearance and reality, he proposes a distinction between the 
infinite and the finite aspect of appearances that are given to us, those that are given immediately 
and completely to us (finite) and those that always have further aspects hidden behind the one(s) 
given to us, like the potentially infinite aspects of the tree mentioned above.  Any one given 
appearance of the tree is finite and singular, it is just that appearing of a tree in profile at half three 
on a lazy afternoon walk, and yet it depends on the infinite series of ways the tree could appear to 
us – the tree itself as that which can appear is the unity of an infinite series of possible experiences 
                                                          
49 BN, p.1. 
50 Although the initial argument is so short as to make it feel like a premise we just have to accept. 
51 Ibid., p.4. 
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of the tree. Because the tree appears to a subject which is itself undergoing constant change52, then 
the tree as something that can reappear to us must be constituted by an (infinite) series of 
appearances. A similar point is made evocatively in the short story “Funes, the Memorious” by 
Borges53 where the title character suffers from a perfect memory that leads him to see the world 
through instantaneous glimpses: “it bothered him that the dog at three fourteen (seen from the 
front) should have the same name as the dog seen at three fifteen (from the side)”. Clearly those of 
us with a normal relation to the world would see through both of these one dog which we are seeing 
through different aspects as time passes, yet Funes sees, or is starting to see, each finite appearance 
as being a full object, which can appear only once and never again.  Through the course of the story 
we see how he progresses towards a kind of madness through this tendency, considering the 
invention of a language in which every single finite experience has its own name or referent and 
sinking into melancholia when he realises that autobiography is impossible because each successful 
act of categorisation adds another item that needs to be categorised. The appearance of the same 
dog at three fourteen and at three fifteen makes no sense to him because he is losing his ability to 
grasp appearances as going beyond the immediately given; to someone with normal faculties, there 
are always innumerable other profiles or aspects to the same dog that are not currently visible, and 
for the dog at three fifteen one of these is the dog at three fourteen and vice versa. This is why 
Sartre calls such experiences transcendent – there are infinitely many ways to go 
beyond/’dépasser’/’transcend’ a given appearance towards the total set of which it is a member, 
towards the (transcendent) object of Funes’s dog or the genius of Proust or whatever else.  
It is in this context that he introduces the secondary/derivative distinction between “the being of the 
phenomenon” and “the phenomenon of being”,54 and as a first rough pass we can understand the 
distinction as being between the singular access to something that appears, the “phenomenon of 
being” and the ground on which this appearance is possible, “the being of the phenomenon”. The 
account of the “phenomenon of being” is what leads us to our account of what consciousness is; 
consciousness is that to which the phenomenon, the appearing, appears. Insofar as we take the 
thesis of intentionality to heart, we posit that “all consciousness is consciousness of something”, 
which we can turn on its head and say that all consciousness/awareness of something is 
consciousness/awareness. Put more simply: because there is an appearance, there has to be 
something it appears to. This is where the discussion of the conditions of self-awareness comes in. If 
we are to avoid the reflection theory and the problems it has, we have to account for a self-
                                                          
52 What kind of change this is and why constant change necessarily implies infinitude is not argued for in IHP, 
but this remark is shored up by Sartre’s theory of presence from BN on. 
53 In Borges, Jorge, Labyrinths. Ed. D.A. Yates and J.E. Irby. Penguin: New York, 1970. 
54 BN, p. 4. 
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awareness grounding any consciousness; if we want to posit awareness, it turns out we need to 
posit self-awareness, and moreover we need to posit a non-positional or pre-reflective self-
awareness. One way of reframing this is that every appearance is necessarily self-aware as being 
that appearance, that there is a meaningful sense in which appearances must always appear to 
themselves: “self-consciousness … is the only mode of consciousness which is possible for a 
consciousness of something”.55 Because its grounds is its appearing to itself, the claim is that 
consciousness only ever exists insofar as it appears; consciousness just is its appearance to itself. 
Thus the “phenomenon of being” is constituted by appearing to itself, and nothing more, although it 
has to be dependent on something outside of itself to satisfy the condition that something appears 
through an appearance; there must be a grounding condition for these appearances. This is what I 
take Sartre to mean by the “being of the phenomenon”, although before getting into more specifics 
it is necessary to look into the scope of Sartre’s project. This should go some way to showing why, 
independent of his arguments above, he has methodological concerns that militate against 
describing consciousness as some kind of machine that would be capable of incorporating properly 
mental objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 Ibid., p.10. 
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Section Four: The In-Itself and the Initial Scope of Phenomenology. 
 
 
In contemporary common discourse, what Sartre calls representationalist thinking takes the form of 
comparing consciousness and conscious subjects to computational devices, taking their cues from 
certain strands of physicalism and functionalism in philosophy of mind. We can look at the work of, 
e.g. Dennett56 in popularising this kind of idea. His work, such as his 1995 refutation of p-zombies, is 
emblematic of approaches that invite us to see consciousness as being capable of being produced by 
machines, and by extension to see a human as essentially a machine that contains and/or generates 
a consciousness.  
I take Sartre’s primary objection to this kind of story, which holds good for much more nuanced 
versions of it, to be that it starts at the wrong point, that it makes certain assumptions about how 
we are to investigate the world.57 On the one hand, it already assumes that what is needed for an 
understanding of the world is some kind of knowledge of the type we appeal to as justified true 
belief, a knowledge of what it is to be a machine, complete with a knowledge of how machines 
function and are constructed – the question is reducible to something like this: “given that the 
human is a machine, what kind of machine is it and what is the history of humanity qua machine?” 
On the other hand, it also appeals to knowledge in Sartre’s broader sense that takes in all kinds of 
judgment; it prioritises (reflective) consciousness of the form “I must catch that tram” over (pre-
reflective) “consciousness of the tram-needing-to-be-caught”.58  The latter type is our awareness of 
the world when we are absorbed in it, when we directly access the world by living through it. Insofar 
as there is always a pre-reflective backdrop to our reflective consciousness because of the very 
conditions of possibility of reflection, this lived through ‘lifeworld’ is inescapable and either entirely 
constitutes or relevantly grounds all our conscious acts. To talk about the distinctively human in 
terms of a judging consciousness always leaves something missing; this is another way of expressing 
Sartre’s opposition to the primacy of knowledge.   
 
                                                          
56  E.g., in Dennett, Dan. “The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
vol. 2, no. 4, 1995, pp. 322-326. This paper hinges on the idea that consciousness is based on the physical to 
refute the idea that a “fake” consciousness which lacks affective experience is possible. 
57 Where here the word “world” is used precritically, in the commonsense extension. 
58 TE, p.13. 
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The commitment to a ‘mechanical’ consciousness, driven by an emphasis on judgment’s usually 
privileged position, dominates our commonsense discussions about consciousness in general. Whilst 
the search for knowledge in this kind of way is very productive in explaining things such as the 
function of specific machines and natural phenomena, the accusation is that its lack of questions 
about the questions it poses is its undoing.  This kind of story dances very close to the Heideggerian 
notions of the ontological and the ontic, between the description of being and the explanation of 
beings.  Presuppositions are fine if we limit the scope of the discussion to one in which we accept 
them as useful, such as when we talk about a piece of iron appearing to be too cool to work to the 
apprentice but in reality being at the right temperature, or when we ignore facts about embodied 
cognition and treat our bodies as merely machines to be repaired in order to save a life. These kinds 
of questions ask or have behind them questions asking why a real, concrete thing is how it is – why is 
this artery filled with high pressure blood? Because of fatty deposits causing congestion. When is a 
piece of iron malleable? When it has been heated so that it is neither molten nor completely solid, to 
within X degrees of Y at standard pressures. Nonetheless, this does not tell us about what ultimately 
underpins a piece of iron or an artery, no matter how fine grained our story about the interactions of 
iron or arteries or other concrete things with the rest of the world is.  In these kinds of discussions, 
there will always be some form of question open to explanation until we hit some kind of axiom or 
presupposition. We can ask why the iron is hot and be told it is because of the forge. Why is the 
forge hot? Because of the coke burning in it. Why is the coke burning? Because of a match. Why is a 
match a good source of ignition? Because of the chemical properties of some types of phosphorous 
compound.  In effect, these questions are either moving us from one domain of questioning to 
another (e.g. the macro-level physical to the chemical), or working through one possible area of 
questioning towards us running out of questions we can ask within it. The claim is that the only 
domain where this line of questions will stop dead is the one of appearances and their appearing; 
Sartre holds that if we suppose we are asking about appearances and their appearing whilst using a 
method appropriate for some other domain, our enquiry will go on forever to no real conclusion. 
Because it has smuggled in the idea of the mind as a container from an understanding of physical 
containers and representations as objects from the idea that representations in art – statuary, 
painting, printed pages of poetry etc59 – are instantiated in physical items, Sartre is diametrically 
opposed to these ideas.  
 
This is part of why it does not matter to the account if we suggest that consciousness has some 
separate faculty that generates representations or even fully fledged objects unbeknownst to us and 
                                                          
59 Different sources for presuppositions would be equally unpalatable to Sartre’s project. 
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presents them to an awareness, because this suggestion turns on an equivocation of consciousness 
that turns the question into one that implicitly uses ‘metaphysical’ reasoning; the scope of the 
discussion is one that was identified many years before by Husserl. In LI V 1.1 Husserl identifies three 
concepts of consciousness that are relevant to phenomenological investigation: 
 
1. Consciousness as the entire, real (reelle) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the 
interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness. 
2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experiences. 
3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for ‘mental acts’ or ‘intentional experiences’, of all 
sorts.60 
(Husserl also recognises “modes of speech current in non-scientific parlance such as ‘entering 
consciousness’, ‘coming to consciousness’ … and so forth.”) 
 
Broadly speaking, the first category includes the full interconnection of both pre-reflective and 
reflective awareness in consciousness; the second takes in Sartre’s pre-reflective self-awareness; the 
third takes in reflective awareness. These three terms encompass what we are minimally given in 
our awareness of self and world, and would also take in everything relevant about our encounter 
with a world made up of entirely fabricated objects.  The structure of our encounter with a 
putatively outer object that we are suggesting is inner would not change, because with respect to 
the appearance the object would be outer – even if some further structure were generating both 
and stood in a whole-part relation to both. In principle, we would not have access to that system via 
phenomenology in any case. It is conceivable that other disciplines that have a different method 
could look into such things, although Sartre is unhelpfully unclear and poetic about this: “it is up to 
metaphysics to form the hypotheses which will allow us to conceive of this process … [w]hat will 
make their validity is only the possibility they will give us in unifying the givens of ontology.”61 What I 
take this to mean is that these metaphysical stories will explain how particular human beings and 
human beings in general came to be instances of consciousness, and how that consciousness is 
supported on the level of statements such as “ex nihlo, nihil fit”. In other words, both what we could 
                                                          
60 Husserl, E. Logical Investigations (Volume II), Translated by Findlay, J.N.; Routledge, New York: 1970. pp. 
535-6. 
61 BN, p.641. 
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call a metaphysics in the sense that Heidegger called Spinoza and Leibniz metaphysicians62 and the 
modern notion of empirical, explanatory science fall under this concept; this account puts us in 
agreement with Francis Jeanson on Sartre’s understanding of metaphysics: “[it] is continuous with 
science, it seeks to explain.”63 Explanation, in this sense, is a web of correct judgments that support 
some other correct judgments until we get back to a bedrock of some kind of axiom or 
presupposition. 
 
Instead of this kind of explanation, Sartre is involved in a project of revelation, of seeing what the 
structure is underpinning the connections between appearances, their appearing [to us, the for-
itself] and the ground of those appearances. Given that the appearances Sartre is systematising here 
are necessarily grounded, we need to clarify what sense of “grounded” is relevant here.  There are at 
least two ways we can look at grounding in this context; the first, minimal sense is that there simply 
is a principle of grounding for the appearances/phenomena of being, because the ground has to pre-
exist the appearance to act as a ground for it at all.  A second potential sense is that there is 
something like a causal-explanatory objective world underpinning the world of appearances, and 
whilst Sartre sometimes lapses into talking as though this is what he has in mind, the initial minimal 
sense is more defensible and more in keeping with his stated aims of avoiding replicating some kind 
of Kantian phenomenon/noumenon distinction. Since this grounding principle prefigures awareness 
of it, on either reading we can see that it has to be self-standing or self-supporting, and it is this 
aspect of it that causes Sartre to term it the “in-itself” – it has being automatically, it just is, its being 
is inherent to itself. As for what this actually means, we can look at Sartre’s remarks on negation for 
guidance, starting with his comparison of negation and destruction – he says that “[a] geological 
pliation, a storm do not destroy – or at least they do not destroy directly, they merely modify the 
distribution of masses of beings”.64  It is only for a[n] (aware) subject that there is destruction, he 
claims, although the mechanism about how destruction is effected comes into our discussion later. 
What is important here is that there is a relevant distinction between the distribution of masses of 
things and the world-for-consciousness, the lifeworld. This seems to strongly suggest the first 
reading of the in-itself, although there is more to the account: “[t]here is no less after the storm than 
before. There is something else. Even this expression is improper, for to posit otherness there must 
                                                          
62 E.g. in his remarks in What is Metaphysics?, a relevant section of which can be found in Kaufmann, Walter, 
Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, Plume (Penguin), London: 1975, pp. 277-9. 
63  Jeanson, Francis. Sartre and the Problem of Morality, Translated by Stone, R.V., Indiana University Press: 
Bloomington, 1980. 
64 BN, p.32. 
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be a witness [who meets certain criteria] …”.65 By this I understand that, although something 
grounding our awareness of the city or the ruin changes between us being aware of the city and the 
ruin, it is not within the scope of Sartre’s phenomenology to discuss the difference between one set 
of masses of things and another which is independent of that set of masses appearing to an 
awareness. In other words, it cannot tell us about the world as it is in itself, separately from the 
appearance of the world, although the world as it is in itself can be encountered via the world that 
we live through. The world of cities being destroyed, dogs needing to be fed, or trams needing to be 
caught comes to us first rather than the underlying ground we point at by talking about objective 
facts such as the physical durability of stone walls and the energy transferred by high winds. Insofar 
as we must always access the world through appearances, then we are not entitled to talk explicitly 
about the in-itself with the familiarity and translucency we could get if we had a pre-reflective 
awareness of being the world. If we were the world itself, it would not provide any grounds for our 
reflection and/or awareness.66  The closest we can get is to return to our first, minimal sense of the 
in-itself as a principle of grounding that is merely there to ground appearances. This characterisation 
does not yet fully capture the sense in which it is right to say that an inkwell is an inkwell in-itself 
without fear of contradiction; to get there we will need an account of negation and (human) 
freedom, which we will turn to in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 Ibid. 
66 See BN, pp. 20-21. 
 40 
 
Chapter Two – Action, Value, and 
Temporality. 
  
The previous chapter gives us an abstract conception of awareness and consciousness, but the 
picture of consciousness it leaves us with is still quite basic. In the following section, we will see how 
Sartre starts to move past an abstract description of awareness and self-awareness towards an 
ethical level (although his project was not teleological in the same way as the present reconstructive 
work is).  
 
To begin with, we will consider what makes the account abstract or about abstract things, and then 
start moving towards showing how a concrete account is possible by bringing in more key concepts 
around abstract consciousness. Broadly, the opening question is twofold: what is the relation 
between consciousness and the world, and what is the condition of possibility of that relation? This 
will lead us to the idea that consciousness constantly interrogates or “asks questions of” the world, 
the analysis of which shows that the absent is in fact always present to us, and that we put values 
into the world. This in turn leads to the famous but initially puzzling claim that ‘nothingness’ is the 
being of consciousness, and allows us to move onto the structure of action and agency - which it 
turns out is driven by lack.  
 
We will see how, for Sartre, all projects are goal-oriented insofar as they aim at a state of affairs 
which is currently lacking. The drive to preserve intuitive or commonsense ideas within the strict 
framework he has set up brings in his three components of action, the ‘motif’ or objective enabling 
circumstances, the ‘mobile’ or urge/drive/will, and the ‘fin’, the end in the objective world which is 
lacking. Next, we see that asking how we can finally justify any project of this type brings in the idea 
of the original or final project and its incoherence. The last major section addresses accusations of 
gratuity about our actions, given that we create the world as well as act within it; the answer to 
these accusations will bring in our first brush with time-consciousness.  
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Sartre imports his notion of abstraction from Laporte and Husserl when he says that “an abstraction 
is made when something not capable of existing in isolation is thought of as in an isolated state”,67 
which I read as being the separation of something from whatever grounds and conditions it. Both 
that-which-appears/the phenomenon and that-which-is-appeared-to are abstractions in this sense, 
because on the one hand something can only appear to a perceiver, and a (perceiving) 
consciousness needs an object in order to be consciousness (from the intentionality principle). 
Neither term of the pair is viable on its own, because they are mutually grounded in each other; it is 
impossible to properly analyse one independently.  Sartre goes on: “[t]he concrete can only be the 
synthetic totality of which consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only moments”. What is 
meant by a “synthetic totality” here? I take this to be a term indicating the inseparability of the 
parts/moments making up a whole. Catalano68 likens this to the relation between the clay making up 
a statue and its shape; the shape is possible because of the clay, and the clay and its (current) shape 
can be considered/discussed independently of one another, yet the shape of the clay cannot exist 
without the clay, and the clay cannot exist with no shape - “[t]he total unity is rather a gestalt, or 
whole”. His second example makes the point better, where he compares a detailed spectroscopic 
analysis of the Mona Lisa, the colours and distributions of the paint on the canvas, to the Mona Lisa 
itself; although the paint is inseparable from the painting, it is not that painting. This is a different 
type of synthetic totality to phenomenon/consciousness - the Mona Lisa and the pigments making it 
up stand in a relation of the physical and something supervening on it. We can call a synthetic 
totality a unity of parts/moments that can’t be separated out into independent, free-standing 
components, and by extension it is a relation in which the whole amounts to more than the addition 
of one part to its pre-existing partner. For Sartre, these kinds of structures are foundational to 
human reality; the earlier discussion of the reflective and pre-reflective modes of awareness cashes 
out such that our awareness of the world is formed of a synthetic totality of the pre-reflective and 
the reflective awareness of the world; the perception we have of an object depends on the 
perception of its ground, and vice versa.69 
 
As we saw in Chapter One, for Sartre the most fundamental synthetic totality related to the human 
is the phenomenon and (our) awareness of it which becomes the for-itself/in-itself totality, and is 
translated by Sartre here into the Heideggerian notion of being-in-the-world; neither the objective 
                                                          
67 BN, p.27. 
68 Catalano, Joseph. A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness'. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980., p.53. 
69 This Sartrean debt to the Gestalt psychologists is rightly emphasised by Morris in Sartre, pp. 63-4. 
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world nor consciousness is concrete in the sense discussed above. Conscious (human) reality is 
always enmeshed in the world, and at this level of abstraction Sartre, I think correctly, poses two 
fundamental questions:  
 
1) What is the relation between man and the world? 
 
2) What are the conditions of possibility for (such) a relationship between man and the world? 
 
The answer to the first question is contained within the very possibility of asking questions at all. In 
asking how man and the world are related, we are asking a question of being; human consciousness 
is interrogating the being of the world in the expectation of an answer. Questioning in this broad 
sense relates to the interrogation of the world, and is not restricted to literally asking someone (else) 
if something is the case – as Jeanson puts it, “if you interrogate a person he will first have to 
interrogate being in order to respond to you”.70 This interrogation of being is unavoidable because 
“[e]very question presupposes a being who is questioning and a being who is questioned”,71 which is 
another result of the intentionality thesis – every question, as a thought-act, has to have an object, 
which in turn must be connected to the objective world.72 The question’s object delivers an answer 
of some kind to the question it is involved in – when I ask “is it raining outside?” facts about specific 
aspects of being give me my answer – the presence of raindrops in the courtyard giving me a “yes”, 
the absence of raindrops a “no”. Questioning the world always allows the possibility of a negative 
answer; it is always possible that when I ask if there is rain outside, there will be nothing but 
sunshine. Nonetheless, there is always a being to the world; the absence of rain is the presence of 
snow, sleet, sunshine, etc. In order for there to be consciousness, there must be something which 
appears to that consciousness, and so there is always (a) being addressed by any question(ing) even 
if it furnishes us with a negative answer to our enquiries - even if it is the non-being of what we 
expected to find. The possibility of questioning the world and getting negative answers illustrates 
“[t]he permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within”73 and introduces non-being as a 
                                                          
70 Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p.119. 
71 BN, p.28. 
72 Or to questions about ontology. 
73 Ibid., p.29. 
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component of the real and lack as something that has an equal –or more important- footing with 
presence. Whilst this may still seem hopelessly abstract, we must understand the ontology to see 
how ethics can unfold, since in Sartre’s own words “ontology cannot be separated from ethics”74 
 
The relation between being and nonbeing is vital to the progression of Sartre’s argument and 
system, so we have to be clear about what this is.  Firstly, the position he absolutely wants to deny is 
that nonbeing is predicated on an act of judgment, which amounts to another denial of what in 
Chapter One we identified as the “primacy of knowledge”. This is the case in which “negation would 
be simply a quality of judgment and the expectation of the questioner would be and expectation of 
the judgment – response”.75 What I understand by this kind of account is that it proposes a faculty of 
reasoning or judgment which compares the expected to the actual, and sees negation to be a 
description of any discrepancy between them. By Sartre’s lights, on this story the negation of 200 
francs is the discovery of the (positive) being of 1300 francs when the (positive) being of 1500 francs 
was expected. Non-being would become the unifying theme of these kinds of operations, 
nothingness would be “a propositional function of the type that X is not [what was expected]”. It 
would be the common thread that runs through judging that there is 1300F not 1500F, judging that 
the breeder has malamutes not huskies, and so on. Straight away, if we accepted Sartre’s earlier 
arguments against the primacy of knowledge then we should not be surprised if they hold during the 
investigation of non-being as well as being. There is nothing on the face of it that separates the 
appearance of something positive from something negative and causes one to be free of the 
structures revealed in and through the extension of the intentionality thesis, because both are 
appearances. We all have plenty of everyday first-person experience of finding something lacking in 
the things of the world without making a (reflective) judgment, as something lived through. A 
unifying theme of these experiences is some kind of expectation we had prior to the experience of 
lack, and this is at least a kernel of truth in the judgment theory – I experience the lack of my keys 
because I expect them to be there on the hook, I feel cheated because the dealer does not have the 
goods he promised me, I experience the absence of the expected. Although Sartre simply asserts 
that “[i]t is evident that non-being always appears within the limits of a human expectation”,76 I 
think we can accept that the experience of encountering non-being is universally in the context of 
some expectation. 
                                                          
74 Personal letter from Sartre to Francis Jeanson, reprinted in Sartre and the Problem of Morality, xxxix. 
75 BN, p.30. 
76 Ibid., p.31. 
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 It is this universal experience that sets the scene for the classic example of Pierre’s absence from 
the café, which is intended to “show that non-being does not come to things by a negative 
judgment”.77 In the example, Sartre is waiting for his friend who has yet to show up at a café. Whilst 
it is tempting to look at the scene in the café as being made up only of objects that are present, 
Sartre points out that “in perception there is always the construction of a figure on a ground”,78 
which is to say that whatever is salient or important to us always must appear against the backdrop 
of the unimportant, and nothing has some kind of inherent right to be in the foreground except 
insofar as it is currently important to us. Insofar as the arrival of Pierre is what determines the 
salient, the café acts as the ground for his absence, which is very much present and real. It is present 
as the way in which similar looking people stand out from the rest of the café as not actually being 
Pierre, in the way in which pillars stand out as places where he might be hidden from sight, in the 
way that what is present steps aside to be the ground to the figure that is the absent - “Pierre absent 
haunts this café and is the condition of its self-nihilating organisation as ground”.79 The objective, in-
itself stuff of the café and the expectations Sartre has form a synthetic totality in which the absent 
can be present as being absent. Different expectations can make different aspects of the world 
salient to us, and thereby conjure up different non-beings in the world in this way – this is brought 
out when Sartre discusses the difference between the merely missing and the present-as-absent; 
any number of other people are not present at the same café, and yet because there is no 
expectation that they should be there they are not felt to be missing, they do not appear as absent 
on the ground of the café. In the case where we imagine them to be there for amusement without 
really expecting them to be present, we do not conjure them up as real absences on the ground of 
the present, and yet if I held the genuine expectation of meeting Wellington, the rest of the world 
would reorganise itself into the ground of his real absence. This interchangeability is what Sartre is 
getting at when he says that negation “can nihilate a being, cause it to arise, and then name it to be 
thrown back into non-being”.80 So, we see here that negation is produced by consciousness –and 
non-being is created- in line with some expectation, but we can still ask what grounds that power of 
negation. 
 
                                                          
77 Ibid., p.35. 
78 Ibid., p.33. 
79 Ibid., p.34. 
80 Ibid., p.35. 
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In the first place, this ground cannot be found in the category of the in-itself, which as we saw before 
is pure presence, pure being, and within which the only possible negation is of the kind “Y is not X”, 
essentially reducing negation to a faculty of judgment. When Sartre claims “it is essential [therefore] 
that the questioner have the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the causal series 
which constitutes being and which can produce only being”,81 he is reaffirming that nothingness 
cannot be within being. An act of questioning that would produce negation is impossible in a 
determined, orderly objective world, because that orderly world lacks the distance on itself required 
to interrogate it. To ask a question of something, that thing must be in question – it is unclear to me, 
shut in my office, if it is raining outside because the blinds and the volume of my music separate me 
from the courtyard and leave it unclear if there is rain or not. If I were to somehow be integrated 
with the courtyard, the clouds, and so on, my mode of being would give me immediate access to 
whether it is raining and prevent the question from being possible. Catalano’s analogy,82 whilst not 
perfect, explains this quite well: in a deterministic system such as a billiard ball on a table, being hit 
by the cue produces a completely predictable effect. This definite predictability ends the possibility 
of asking questions about the ball, because the answer to any question is always in hand at the very 
start, as a function of the forces, accelerations, masses etc that enable there to be a travelling ball to 
ask questions about in the first place. If my awareness of the table were informed by a perfect 
understanding of the relevant laws and starting conditions, no question I ask about it or 
interrogation I make of it could possibly be an attempt to gain knowledge. 
 
The ground of the power of nihilation therefore must involve a separation from the world, it must 
create a distance between the questioner and its object that creates the ambiguity needed for 
questioning to be possible. This tallies with the gap between awareness and its object that we saw 
was demanded of consciousness by the intentionality thesis. However, when we return to Sartre’s 
two guiding questions, we see that they are questions about the being of consciousness itself. Given 
the necessary distance between the questioned and the questioner, this shows us there must be a 
distance between the questioning consciousness and its being. We can thereby see that 
consciousness itself, its being, must be the ground of nihilation, it must be nothingness itself, never 
coinciding with itself to reach a solid self-identity, ultimately giving us characterisations such as “[the 
human subject] must be what it is not and not be what it is”.83  In order to pose a question of the 
                                                          
81 Ibid., p.47. 
82 Catalano, Commentary, p.66. 
83 BN, p.90. 
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world or of being, “the questioner must be able to effect in relation to the questioned a kind of 
nihilating withdrawal”,84 and as we saw before, positive being cannot by itself effect true negation, 
so the power of nihilation must always be within the being of that questioning being itself. “Man 
presents himself at least in this instance as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, 
inasmuch as he himself is affected with non-being to this end”.85  We need to emphasise here that 
nothingness is not a capacity that consciousness has over and above being, but rather is its being, 
and that this flows directly from the original logic of appearance and the appeared-to that Sartre 
posed in his introduction to Being and Nothingness.  What this in turn entails is that consciousness, 
on a weak reading that is subordinate to some independent system of metaphysics, appears to itself 
to be outside the order of the objective world, and on a strong reading, is independent of that 
objective world insofar as it negates it. This does not mean that consciousness can directly86 alter the 
state of the objective world, but rather that “’Human reality’ can only modify its relation with 
being”;87 we can change how we interrogate the world through changing what is salient to produce 
different non-beings in the world, but we cannot change positive being in this way. This feature of 
consciousness produces Sartre’s first characterisation of freedom, the ability to step outside of the 
causal order by attaining the distance from (part of) the world to determine its significance through 
interrogating it. That ‘distance’ is a disengagement that protects consciousness from being affected 
by that part of the world – “[f]or man to put a particular existent out of circuit is to put himself out 
of circuit in relation to that existent”.88  
 
From here, we can move onto Sartre’s theory of freedom and action proper, although I would like to 
offer one quick caveat here, which is to note that the theory of freedom being offered explicitly does 
not concern itself with metaphysical concerns or metaphysical freedom, and is limited to what 
happens after the isolation of the self from the order of the objective world. This is attributed to 
“Descartes following the stoics”; for context, in Epictetus’ Enchiridion the reader is advised they may 
always change their attitude towards that which they have no power to (objectively) change.89 
                                                          
84 Ibid., p.47. 
85 Ibid., pp.47-8. 
86 i.e. without acting through the body such as taking a mattock in hand to break ground (although the 
significance of the ground as “broken” is effected by a negation). 
87 Ibid., p.48. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Seddon, K., “Epictetus' Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living”, Routledge: Abingdon, 
2005.  
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Section One: Freedom and Action. 
 
This account of negation is crucial to understanding how action gets off the ground; without a 
negation that puts values into the world (‘nihilation’), it is impossible to talk about the ends or goals 
of action. Sartre describes action as having three components: the cause/motif, the motive/mobile, 
and the end/fin. He describes the commonsense idea of the mobile as a (pseudo) psychological 
reason for acting, a wish or a desire, whether it is something as slight as my idle wish for some ice 
cream or as serious as the instantaneous urge of the assassin to kill his target when he sights them. 
"The motive [mobile] … is generally considered as a subjective fact. It is the ensemble of the desires, 
emotions, and passions which urge me to accomplish a certain act. ... the explanation must them be 
sought in the psychic state – even in the "mental" state of the historical agent. It follows naturally 
that passions and other desires would have acted differently.”90 In the picture of free will that Sartre 
wishes to deny, the mobile is the largest contributor or even the only contributor to human choice, 
and it by itself enough to make subjects act differently in the same situation with the same physical 
circumstances.  
 
The motif, in commonsense usage, is a collection of physical facts that make an event happen, a set 
of “rational considerations which justify it”,91 a set of reasons which make the action make sense. 
Sartre's own example is the conversion of Clovis to the Christian faith, which was caused by the 
strength of the involved powers in Gaul at the time - “[i]f Clovis is converted to Catholicism, then 
insomuch as so many barbarian kings are Arians, it is because Clovis sees an opportunity of getting 
into the good graces of the episcopate which is all powerful in Gaul. ... One will note here that the 
cause is characterized as an objective appreciation of the situation.” This motif is only 
understandable because of the end that the agent has in mind, the goal that they are currently 
pursuing – it does not make sense to talk about action that is not directed, because that would 
amount to no more than just a random happening – something no more human or practical than a 
radioactive particle decaying or not. The simple objective fact of the power relations in Gaul at the 
time means nothing unless there is something Clovis wants to do that depends on them, in this case 
to use them to gain power and support in order to expand his kingdom. All action, on this first and 
commonsense picture Sartre gives us, depends on the agent having a goal or end, the fin. 
 
                                                          
90 BN, p.468. 
91 Ibid. 
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(With these first definitions in mind, we can dispense with translating motif and mobile; “motive” 
and “cause” are not especially helpful as translations due to the baggage they carry. A “motive” is 
more fitting for a courtroom discussion; a “cause” implies the world imposes itself on us more 
powerfully than Sartre would be comfortable with. Neither motif nor mobile, insofar as they have 
been defined and will become an ordinary part of the discussion, will be italicised from here on out. 
However, the term fin will be rendered as “end” since it is easier on the reader and does not carry 
any inappropriate nuances.) 
 
According to Sartre, the basic arguments in favour of free will and determinism presuppose that 
either the mobile or the motif is in some way sufficient for action. Determinists hold that the motif, 
the objective (usually physical) state of affairs that agent finds themselves in, is the explanatory 
factor, and the proponents of free will holding that the mobile is what is important above all. The 
first problem emerges when we try to use both a mobile and a motif to explain something, as in the 
example of joining the socialist party because of both motifs and mobiles, because of both sympathy 
towards your fellow worker and the way the party will achieve your political ends if you join it. Both 
the mobile and the motif seem to be present here, so unless we synthesise them we end up without 
any idea whether to settle on either side of the free will/determinism debate. “What can be meant 
by the statement what I have joined the Socialist party for these causes and these motives 
[mobiles]? Evidently we are dealing with two radically distinct layers of meaning. How are we to 
compare them? ... Actually under a different name it amounts to positing the existence of a conflict 
between the will and the passions.”92 Seeing either of these accounts on its own as unsatisfactory, 
Sartre suggests that all action should instead be seen to include a motif, a mobile, and an end – that 
all three must be present in intentional action for it to count as one in the first place. This, along with 
a basic commitment to excluding unintended consequences of an action as part of an intentional 
action,93 is the minimal outline of the Sartrean picture of action.  
 
Sartre takes seriously the idea the all action has an end or a goal, describing almost all actions as 
aiming to make another action possible, which will in turn make some further action possible and so 
on. For instance, when I go to make tea, I have to open the cupboard door to be able to pick up my 
mug, to be able to carry it across the room to the kettle – the actions I take lead up to other actions I 
will take. More than one project can come together in the end of a third project – I might have 
carried out another set of related actions with an end in mind, such as turning the faucet to fill the 
                                                          
92 Ibid., p.469. 
93 "We should observe first that an action is on principle intentional. The careless smoker who has through 
negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted.” – Ibid., p.455. 
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kettle in order to be able to produce boiling water, which comes together with the chain of actions 
that put a mug on the table when I add a teabag and water to the mug, which results in the success 
of my overall project to make a cup of tea. Each project's success is made up of the success of other 
projects that add together to some unified goal, and the meaning and value of the sub-projects or 
instrumental projects is entirely derivative from the larger project they work towards. It only makes 
sense that I am opening my cupboard to retrieve a mug because I am looking to make tea – each 
instrumental project is intelligible only in the light of the greater projects that are in consideration. 
Another way of looking at it is that the lesser projects create the motif for the greater projects – by 
making a change in the objective state of affairs in my kitchen, I create the physical possibility of 
making tea later on. With the exception of the original project (which we will come to later) all 
projects are parts of the project towards another end, or they are made up of smaller projects that 
open up the possibility of later projects being held and succeeding.  
 
Following on from this, projects cannot be about achieving things that are already the case.94 In an 
everyday situation, it would make no sense to talk about opening a cupboard door to get out a mug 
which I am already holding, firstly because the mug won't be in the cupboard to get out and 
secondly because having the mug in my hand with the intent to make tea is rationally justifying of 
my going to the kettle but not of my going into the cupboard. To put it another way, we can't make 
changes to the world around us if the world is already configured in the way we want it to be, 
because any changes would have to be away from what we desired in the first place. Instead, all our 
projects refer to things that are not yet in the world, to future possibilities that are possible given 
what exists in the present - “action necessarily implies as its condition the recognition of a 
"desideratum", that is, of an objective lack...”.95 The current state of affairs in the world cannot by 
itself ever supply a good reason for acting, at least in the sense of constituting a motif,96 because a 
motif is a set of objective circumstances that allow another state of affairs to be brought about by an 
action. Instead, all projects must go beyond or transcend the current state of things as they are, they 
have to be focused on a way that things could be but aren't yet.  Sartre's way of putting this is: “[n]o 
factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure of society, the psychological 
"state", etc) is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever. For an act is a projection of the 
                                                          
94 Although, as Webber picks up on in The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, (pp.48-9) there can be projects to 
maintain states of affairs. My understanding of how this notion cashes out will differ from his. 
95 BN, p. 455. 
96 Although on the account of the mobile given by Sartre's historian explaining the history of Byzantinium, the 
mobile could merely 'come from nowhere' or 'pop into my head' on top of any given state of affairs. 
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for-itself toward what it is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not.”97 In the 
example of the factory worker given inhumane levels of work for very little pay, an observer might 
think he should unionise, strike for better conditions, or outright quit to work elsewhere.  From an 
outside standpoint with access to other workers’ experiences, work safety, remuneration and so on 
this can seem obvious, but if we imagine the worker does not know what other people earn and how 
much risk they have to go through to get paid, then he has nothing to compare his earnings and the 
danger of his life to. For him, his work is just how work is, or as Sartre might put it, it's just a brute 
datum or factual state. It is only in light of discovering that other workers are paid more for less 
demanding work that he can choose to rebel against the system (or rationalise his situation, or 
decide he doesn't care, and so on) because this allows him to go beyond98 the current state of affairs 
that he experiences to another possible way things could be. No matter how objectively terrible his 
situation is, without the ability to see it as lacking something he cannot possibly act to change it. In 
the case where he has no other conception of what work is like there can be no rationally justifying 
considerations in favour of any action to improve his circumstances – it would no longer be action, 
but a random chance event that does not deserve that name, no more conscious, significant, or 
willed than a die landing on a six instead of a four. One thing worth noting here is that to transcend 
the present in the sense that the worker transcends his current situation is not determined by a 
positive psychic object either. One might object that the worker has to form a mental image of the 
possible alternative in order to come to the conclusion that his situation is intolerable, and that this 
mental image is itself something positive – in that it exists and is not a negation of the circumstances 
but a real, full being. This awareness of the situation is what, on this objection, would cause the 
worker to revolt, and thereby show that a positive circumstance has caused a change in the projects 
of the worker. This objection is not problematic for Sartre because such a mental image would be a 
fixed object, effectively an in-itself, and thereby would not be capable of being in consciousness. In 
order for the putative mental state to have some kind of positive being, it cannot be a 
(transcendent) negation of a current (objective) state of affairs, which is to say it cannot be the 
product of the action of the for-itself, because for Sartre, the for-itself is that which by its own being 
nihilates the world. This proposed mental object cannot be a for-itself because it is not capable of 
nihilating the world in its own right, and if it were it would not fit the role the objection has in mind – 
it would be more like an alter ego or voices in your head. These would be covered by the same kind 
of analysis as being told by another person (for-itself) about how things are. As such, the mental 
image proposed would have to be an in-itself, which is not eligible to affect consciousness: 
                                                          
97  Ibid., pp. 457-8. 
98 In the sense of giving the wage and risk the affective value to-be-overthrown and not in the sense of his 
being able to calculate [reflectively] that he ought to be paid more or suffer less risk of harm. 
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Indeed, it is impossible for a determined process to act on a spontaneity, exactly as it is impossible for 
objects to act upon consciousness ... [a]nd this is why the fact which strikes us first is that if the will is 
to be autonomous, then it is impossible for us to consider it as a given psychic fact, that is, as in-
itself.99 
 
What this shows us is that, as well as not being a problem for Sartre, this kind of objection misses 
the point of the analysis of consciousness as for-itself. Ends, and the projects that aim at them, must 
depend on negation. Projects that are of preservation of some state of affairs are a special case of 
this, although I do not take them to be fundamentally different to those that directly aim at a state 
of affairs that is not yet actual. Let’s look at a concrete example of the two different cases: on the 
one hand, cleaning and grooming a dog ahead of a show aims at a state of affairs that is not yet 
actual (the clean dog), whereas aiming to keep the dog clean before the judging aims at preserving 
it. Webber claims projects like the latter show us that not all projects must aim at the not yet actual, 
going so far as to say “it is mistaken to assume [Sartre] thinks of projects as necessarily related to 
things that are not yet the case”.100 However, I think we can invoke the idea of the objective world 
having an inertia to show that these are special cases of aiming at a state of affairs that is not yet 
actual. My intended parallel is with Newton’s first law describing the motion of bodies: 
 
Every object in a state of uniform motion tends to remain in that state of motion unless an external 
force is applied to it. 
 
With respect to the objective world and our actions towards it, we can say something similar: 
 
The objective world will remain heading towards a certain future unless the agent acts to cause 
something else to come to pass. 
 
If we accept this, then a project to preserve a state of affairs in the world can be about bringing 
about a definite goal that is not currently the case. Given the typical behaviour of the dog on his 
walk and the availability of mud and brackish water in the woods, the objective world tends toward 
a future in which he will become dirty; the inertia of the objective world is tending in the direction of 
                                                          
99 Ibid., p.464. 
100 Webber, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, p.49. 
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a future where the grooming is going to be undone.  The availability of places where the dog can be 
kept in comfort where dirt and mud are not around supplies a motif that supports the preservation 
of his pristine state, which combined with an end and a mobile that is the urge to keep him 
somewhere clean delivers a complete project structure aimed towards shifting the inertia of the 
objective world. The project effectively aims at shifting the likely future away from the loss of the 
desired state of the world towards the preservation of it; what is lacking is the continuation of the 
dog being clean, even though the project that forms around that lack means his potential mucky 
future never comes to pass. The possibility the dog will get dirty before the show is enough to cause 
me to act to keep him clean, and he does not have to get messy for me to orient my actions around 
his being in good condition. 
 
From these considerations, we can infer that in all action there is always an overarching goal or 
project at hand. If all action is as part of a project, and all projects are conducted as a result of there 
being something lacking in the world or about the human subject, such as the lack of an objective 
(usually, physical) state of affairs when I have a project towards building something (the plot of land 
is currently lacking a house) or the lack of a psychological state in myself, such as when I find myself 
lacking in stimulation and go to watch a film as a result, then there must be some kind of ultimate 
goal or end that these projects form a part of. It is inconsistent for every project to lead to the 
possibility and/or success of some other project, because if we accept this we enter an infinite 
regress, always looking for just one more project that will explain our actions (but which can by 
definition never come). We will always be able to ask what the project leads to, stopping us from 
properly justifying the actions taken under any project. This would be like borrowing justification for 
action from the future forever without ever gaining it. Hence there must be an intrinsic and not 
instrumental end at play at any given time, which is not different from the sum of all the other 
projects leading up to it; the meaningfulness of and justification for all of the other projects has to 
borrow from the intrinsic value or justifying power of this project, otherwise the justifications for our 
actions form one big Ponzi scheme. This means that we should not think of the value of chopping 
onions as distinct from the value of realising the ambition to be seen as a good cook and gracious 
host (for instance), because the value of this instrumental action is only really a fragment of the 
value of the overall goal and owes its intelligibility to that overall goal. It follows that this overall goal 
has to be manifested in all of our actions, even if we do not think it is (thematise it as such).  
 
The next general feature that needs to be covered here is the affective dimension of the world and 
 53 
 
how it relates to action. For Sartre, affects are not just limited to our everyday conception of them as 
releases of nervous or emotional energy like rage, joy, or fear, but instead they include our sense of 
how things are with the world at the moment – affects can be, and are often, just sitting there in the 
way we see the world, like the sense of frustration we might feel stuck in traffic on the way to an 
important engagement, or the nervous excitement felt when we are about to win a game and (we 
hope) our opponents can no longer stop us. It is not necessary for this to well up and be expressed in 
some overt act like gloating over the win or shouting with exasperation for there to be an affect in 
play; the affect just is the way the world seems to us, it is an act of perception that makes the world 
a certain way in response to certain conditions related to our projects. It is only because my project 
of being on time is under threat that I am irritated, which causes me to perceive the objects of the 
world as irritating – the simple presence of the other cars on the road is nothing more than that, 
nothing more than the presence of a few objective items in the world and cannot by itself cause us 
to act, no more than the low wages of the worker in ignorance could cause him to act. It is only 
because I have projected myself towards a possibility of my being on time for my meeting that the 
traffic can rationally justify an action, here the perceptive act of constituting the world as one filled 
with annoyances and hold-ups. In light of our projects we see the world as making demands on us, 
we feel that the shortcut past this traffic jam demands to be taken or that the phone demands to be 
used to call our clients and tell them we will be late. In response to our projects, the world lights up 
as meaningful and showing us the parts of it that are relevant to our projects as useful; our affective 
acts show us the right instrumental complexes to use to achieve our goals through making them 
appear to be valuable to us. When I am sowing seeds, for example, on an unreflective level it just 
feels right that I should dig a small hole for each one – the earth suddenly stands out from the other 
objects of the world as something that can be dug into, the seeds are there for me entirely as to-be-
covered-with-soil – the world suddenly seems to just fit together in certain ways because of the 
goals I am working towards. Ultimately, perception is active and constructs a world for us that has a 
meaning given to it by our projects – the soil is only there for me as easy to dig in because I need to 
dig to fulfil my aims, and the parts of the world that are not relevant to my current goals are there as 
peripheral, meaningless objects: “It is even possible that in the consideration of the Church [Clovis] 
can even find no cause for acting in any way at all; he will then discover nothing in relation to this 
subject; he will leave the situation of the episcopate in the state of the ‘unrevealed’, in a total 
obscurity.”101 
 
                                                          
101 BN, p. 468. 
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Section Two: Instrumentality and Our Awareness of our Projects. 
 
The above picture, while useful for showing the broad outlines of Sartre's theory, does not consider 
the relation between the motif and the mobile past the need to synthesise them together in the 
Sartrean account of action. In this section we will look at the exact relationship between the motif 
and the mobile, and the light that relationship sheds on instrumentality in Sartre's picture of action. 
 
Although we can investigate this synthesis from either side, it makes sense to begin by considering 
the motif, the objective set of circumstances (or presumed circumstances) that justify the action, 
because on the face of it that is the better candidate for explaining a non capricious, properly 
justified action – it is immune to the kinds of random changes that Sartre ascribes to Ferdinand Lot’s 
account of  the mobile, at least in the actions of Constantine. Sartre elaborates on the motif in one 
very informationally dense section which implicitly brings in everything we have gone over above: 
 
(1) the cause [motif] is objective; it is the state of contemporary things as it is revealed to a 
consciousness ... (2) Nevertheless this state of affairs can be revealed only to a for-itself since in 
general the for-itself is the being by which "there is" a world. (3) Better yet, it can be revealed only to 
a for-itself which chooses itself in this or that particular way – that is, to a for-itself which has made 
its own individuality. The for-itself must of necessity have projected itself in this or that way in order 
to discover the instrumental implications of instrumental-things.102 
 
Let’s break this down: 
 
1) The motif is objective in the sense it is not up for debate whether it is present or not in the world; 
it just is the case that there are ships in harbour or onions on the chopping board – things are this 
way, and it is up to us to reinterpret them or debate what they ask of us in their existence, but there 
is nothing we can do about their presently being where they are; the brute existents103 just are 
arranged in a particular way at the present moment. The state of affairs that we call the motif has an 
independent existence from us and is revealed to us, not generated in some kind of idealism.  
 
2) The world, and any motif manifested in it, is nonetheless dependent on a human subject because 
                                                          
102 Ibid., p. 469. 
103 Items or things considered as in-itself. 
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it must be revealed to exist, and revelation through nihilation is precisely the domain or purview of 
the for-itself. 
 
 3) To exist is literally to stand out,104 and for something to stand out as differentiated from the 
undifferentiated mass of the in-itself there must be the nihilating action of a for-itself, the 
generation of meaning via absence or lack related to our projects that we saw above. Even though 
Sartre is committed to the independence of the in-itself from consciousness or human projects, the 
world which that in-itself amounts to for us is entirely generated by and dependent on 
consciousness and conscious projects. This is a natural conclusion to draw from the earlier remarks 
Sartre makes about the nature of negation and nihilation, such as that “man is the only being by 
whom a destruction can be accomplished … [natural disasters] merely modify the masses of 
things”.105 Our world as a whole is generated in this fashion, not just what we might think as being 
the currently relevant parts of it to our projects, the specific tools that right now are useful to us in 
achieving our ends. If we are to take seriously the idea that all perception is a perceptive act, then to 
be an act it must be rationally justified in line with some project, which is to say that the entire world 
is generated in line with our projects, even if it is made to have the value of not-worth-paying-
attention-to or mere background with respect to our current project. We can see this most clearly in 
the case of “the gunner who has been assigned an objective”,106 i.e. ordered to shoot a particular 
target. Aiming at a particular spot is as much a case of not shooting at the other possible targets as 
at is a case of shooting at the designated target – in order to point out the bullseye, we have to 
exclude the outer rings, so the gunner “carefully points his gun in a certain direction excluding all 
others”. Hence even what we would want to usually refer to as inessential or peripheral parts of the 
world are enmeshed in our projects precisely as being left out of them; they are included in the 
world in order to be excluded from our projects. Instrumental complexes make no sense in the 
absence of projects, and the whole of the world is the instrumental complex at play in the for-itself's 
projects, not just the parts of the world that seem to be directly relevant. 
 
The first question that comes to mind here is how to integrate this with the notion of the 
translucency of consciousness – how are we aware of our constructing the world in this fashion, if it 
is indeed an action and a project in itself to create the world that supports our other projects? 
However, there is textual evidence that Sartre, at least, sees this characterisation to be backward 
and that in fact the mobile is our awareness of the motif. On a superficial level, if we take the 
                                                          
104 I.e. the original Latin phrase “ex sistere” which became our word “exist” literally means to stand out. 
105 Ibid., p.32 
106 Ibid., p.32 
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valuational demands made by our projects to be demands objects in the world seem to make on us 
in light of the project, it is at least plausible that the lines between this and the mobile (on our 
earlier baseline construal) would be blurred from time to time. After all, the mobile does not 
necessarily have to be thematised as a reason for acting – it can be some kind of gut feeling or 
emotional charge in the world, and we can see this quite clearly in the example of the soldier fleeing 
the battlefield under heavy enemy fire. As bullets land all around him, he is seized by a sudden terror 
and flees, never having conceptualised the need to run away as such - only subsequently being able 
to conceptualise the whole event later. It is through the emotion of terror that he apprehends the 
battlefield as dangerous because, for instance, it threatens his various projects that depend on him 
coming home from the war alive such as raising his children or pursuing some civilian career. His fear 
is almost wholly the pre-reflective apprehension of these goals that depend on his survival, which 
causes the world to manifest value properties to him, and is exactly in the same affective class of 
experience as the mobile was for Lot studying Constantinople. We might tentatively suggest that the 
mobile is nothing more than this level of apprehension of the current end the subject is working 
towards, that the affective urge to act that we formerly called the mobile is made up, at least in 
some cases, just of the value structure that is an awareness of our projects. If this is the case, then 
what we called the mobile, in the unreflective case, is just (the apprehension of) the value structure 
of the for-itself. We will return to the reflectively conscious or volitional version of the mobile later, 
the variant where I say to myself explicitly that I will perform a certain action. 
 
 Returning to the example of the soldier, the world does not disappear in the episode of wholly 
emotional engagement with the battlefield. The soldier is still situated in an objective world, parts of 
which are only a configuration of matter – the breaching explosions that are growing closer, the yells 
of the enemy in the next street, the walls that might give cover or give way at any minute to a 
hostile worming squad – and all of these are apprehended as a part of the experience. Indeed, this 
configuration of matter has to have been nihilated107 to produce the world that is so threatening; 
even if the world has melted down to just being “too much” in an episode of horrified dissociation, it 
is still there. In order to be overloaded by the experience, the world has to be present to the soldier 
as blanked-out-because-overwhelming. To this extent, the motif is always one awareness of the 
mobile, and vice versa. It is this insight that Sartre tracks in this pair of statements: 
 
It is obvious that the apprehension of the motive [mobile] refers at once to the cause [motif], its 
correlate, since the motive [mobile], even when made-past and fixed in-itself, at least maintains as 
                                                          
107 i.e. we have to have hung demands on it. 
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its meaning the fact that it has been a consciousness of a cause [motif], i.e., the discovery of an 
objective structure of the world.108 
 
[P]ositional consciousness of the cause [motif] is on principle a non-thetic consciousness of itself as a 
project toward an end. In this sense it is a motive [mobile] ... Thus cause [motif] and motive [mobile] 
are correlative, exactly as the non-thetic self-consciousness is the ontological correlate of the thetic 
consciousness of the object.109 
 
In light of this correlation, Sartre shows us that in fact the mobile and the motif are aspects of one 
and the same structure. Given that both of these components of action are in awareness of our (the 
same) ends, then the mobile, motif, and end are not really distinct. We should think of them instead 
as different parts or moments of the same thing, our current project, which we apprehend 
differently at different times and under different contexts. Our positional consciousness of a motif, 
because of Sartre's commitment to the pre-reflective cogito, must contain a non-thetic self-
awareness of itself, and this non-thetic self-awareness is manifested as what we wanted to call the 
mobilebefore, as certain feelings about the situation we find ourselves in. Hence the mobile, the 
motif, and the end all must be co-originary, and so they must all be generated at the very start of the 
project – in fact, for a project to start is exactly for the mobile, motif, and end to all come into being 
(or ‘upsurge’) at once. By extension, the entire system of instrumentality that we experience, the 
world itself, is in some relevant sense just an awareness of our projects – the choice of ourselves as 
having a given project is not at all separate from choosing the world itself. In fact, this is nothing 
more than the development of comments Sartre has made earlier in Being and Nothingness - “what I 
expect from the carburettor, what the watchmaker expects from the works of the watch … is a 
disclosure of being”110 - the whole of the instrumental complex is entirely dependent on our 
projects, the objectively present state of affairs in the world is nonetheless dependent on being 
interrogated with some aim in mind so that there can be a world in the first place. What we have to 
remember in this continuity between these early comments and the discussion of the project 
structure over five hundred pages later is that the simultaneous upsurge of our ends and the world 
was in mind from the very beginning, present right at the first discussions of negation. Sartre's 
account is holistic in the sense that the parts of the structure motif/mobile/end are interdependent 
as aspects of a synthetic totality that is action. They are not independent terms that are unified by 
being involved in action. The aspects of action they capture are also taken in by the alternative 
                                                          
108 Ibid., p.472. 
109 Ibid., p.471. 
110 Ibid., p. 31. 
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accounts Sartre considered - the motif and the mobile are all introduced as important terms for 
other writers/thinkers – the different varieties of historian, the proponents of free will or 
determinism, but never Sartre himself. The account of the unitary upsurge is already implicitly 
present in the classic example of Pierre in the café, at least implicitly – the cafe would not have risen 
up as presenting us with Pierre as an absence if meeting him there were not our operative goal and 
justifying consideration for being in the café.111 We have already seen that Sartre's overall picture is 
founded on an original project that gives meaning to a totality of meaningful projects that 
nonetheless do not make up the original project, but are rather indistinguishable from it, completely 
parasitical on it in spite of the possibility of reconstructing the original project on the basis of the sub 
projects that it produces. At the level of this original project, the project in question has to be purely 
intrinsic, in other words, the question “… but why have that project?” has to make no sense because 
our analysis is at a level beyond this kind of questioning. 
 
One clarification is still needed here as to what is meant by “intrinsic” goals, because we experience 
ourselves as doing something for its own sake very regularly. For instance, I used to enjoy having a 
cider on the way home. If someone asked me why I had chosen cider out of the whole bar, I would 
reply “because I felt like it” and really mean that; the value of having that drink seemed to come 
from itself and have nothing leading up to it or justifying it - it was experienced as being intrinsic. So, 
one objection to the above picture of intrinsic ends is that it does not do justice to these kinds of 
experiences; even if it seems to hold logically, it is breaking Sartre’s commitment to respecting the 
power and validity of first person experiences as they are lived through. Since we experience 
ourselves as having intrinsic ends that are not the original project, then there must be other intrinsic 
ends in play which in principle could serve as guaranteeing the instrumental actions leading up to 
them. This account could give us a motivational structure made up of multiple interwoven but 
nonetheless unrelated projects, some of them quite banal like walking my dog every day and having 
cider after a walk and some of them more serious like being a good citizen. One immediate problem 
with this kind of account is trying to see how the competing demands of these projects would be 
balanced if they are not related by an overarching goal. We might end up with some kind of drive 
theory by following this route, perhaps talking about a polyp-armed self as with Nietzsche in 
Daybreak 119, but Sartre rejects this kind of story: “[e]very desire if presented as an irreducible is an 
absurd contingency and involves in absurdity human reality ... I can not in fact consider this fondness 
for rowing as the fundamental project of Pierre; it contains something secondary and derived”.112 
                                                          
111  "In fact Pierre is absent from the whole café ... I myself expected to see Pierre, and my expectation has 
caused the absence of Pierre to happen as a real event concerning this café" Ibid., p.34. 
112 Ibid., pp.582/3, emphasis mine.  
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This seems to me to be a clear endorsement of the above picture, where any project or desire has to 
either feature as an instrumental component of achieving another end, or refer directly to the 
original project. All the same, given that experiences of enjoying something for its own sake are 
universal, whether that’s a cider or an apricot cocktail, we can’t throw out the idea that we 
experience projects as being intrinsic.  However, we can deny that this is the foundational form of 
the intrinsic. What I wish to draw here is a distinction between a ‘hard’ sense of the intrinsic beyond 
which we can find no support(ing project) and a ‘soft’ sense of the intrinsic which can be analysed in 
terms of some support(ing project). We can draw this idea out in terms of completeness and finality 
of the projects in question – a hard intrinsic project, once complete, would in principle admit of no 
further projects to take place which are connected to itself. A soft intrinsic project, by contrast, 
enables or at least permits other projects to take place after it has completed but does not present 
itself as such. On this system of categorisation, a hard intrinsic project is and can only be the original 
project argued for above. 
 
What could this project be? It is helpful here to recapitulate some of our earlier conclusions. Firstly, 
we should remember there is always a relevant sense in which the in-itself is the foundation of the 
for-itself, insofar as they are both parts/moments of a synthetic totality. Human reality stands in a 
similar relation to the Mona Lisa and its components in Catalano’s example, which is both the Mona 
Lisa and a collection of paint deposits on a canvas – there is no difference at all between the painting 
and the paint, nothing whatsoever separates the two, but there is nonetheless the paint and the 
painting which are different in spite of being part of an inseparable synthetic totality. Likewise, the 
for-itself just is the in-itself, and is separated by absolutely nothing from the in-itself, but the for-
itself and the in-itself are nonetheless separate. Human reality, considered abstractly as the for-
itself, is, and remains, divided from itself (as the in-itself) by absolutely nothing. Secondly, the only 
project that adequately explains human reality must be a total project, or else we are subject to an 
infinite regress, an infinite number of underlying drives that generate our drives, an infinite series of 
desires that explain our desires. This gets us nowhere. Human reality is not just characterised by the 
for-itself, because that for-itself is founded on the in-itself that is the necessary condition of its 
being. As the for-itself is coincidence with itself locked in a synthetic totality with non-coincidence 
with itself, it would fail if it made an effort to simply return to being the pure or basic in-itself that it 
is separated from by nothingness.  This means that insofar as the for-itself desires any return to the 
in-itself, “the for-itself, being the negation of the in-itself, could not desire the pure and simple 
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return to the in-itself.113” As a result it must attempt self-coincidence in a different mode, which can 
only be to self-coincide as being the for-itself, as being self-coincidence with being non-coincident. It 
is an abject paradox for non-coincidence to coincide with itself, because if it succeeds in coinciding 
with itself it is no longer non-coincidence with itself - this would be to achieve both having itself as 
its own, sole foundation whilst retaining the aspect of transcendence which characterises being non-
self founded being, “being as for-itself, a being which is what it is”.114 In more plain language, its goal 
is to be conscious of enjoying not being conscious at all, which is impossible through contradiction. It 
is this that leads to the claim that “man fundamentally is the desire to be God”,115 a completed being 
that can enjoy that completion by retaining some measure of incompleteness through His radical 
fullness, but which also causes problems because “the for-itself chooses because it is lack; freedom 
is really synonymous with lack”.116 If lack was ever eliminated from the for-itself, it would be left 
incapable of action and lose its freedom, which are two ways of saying the same thing:  “the for-
itself chooses because it is lack; freedom is really synonymous with lack”.117 The impossibility of 
realising this original project give us one approach to, or characterisation of, the state of anguish, the 
evasion of which we will see in the next chapter as our jumping-off point into the realm of the 
ethical. Nonetheless, this will have to wait – there is still the question of where specific, concrete 
projects come from and how they are determined – how does the nebulous project of self-
coincidence turn into lesser projects? This question will lead us into Sartre’s final determination of 
freedom as being radical.  
 
We might be concerned  here that Sartre's account of freedom cannot sustain an inherent tension 
between two claims, the first being that consciousness when it is free acts from entirely within itself 
(i.e. that it really does separate itself from the causal world): “[h]uman reality can not receive its 
ends, as we have seen, either from outside or from a so-called inner “nature”.118 The second is that 
the choice thus made is not gratuitous even though nothing comes in from outside to justify the free 
choice at the time of choosing – Sartre himself is aware of this and asks rhetorically, “does this mean 
that one must view freedom as a series of gratuitous jerks?”119 answering himself immediately: my 
acts are free “but this does not mean that my act can be anything whatsoever or even that it is 
                                                          
113 Ibid., p.581. 
114 Ibid., p.587. 
115 Ibid., p.587. 
116 Ibid., p.586. 
117 Ibid., p.586. 
118 Ibid., p.465. 
119 Ibid., p. 474. 
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unforeseeable”.120 The problem is reconciling these two remarks when they appear to be in direct 
conflict. There are more and less simplistic variants of this objection, and we will briefly sketch out 
an answer to a weaker variant before addressing the stronger. The weaker variant accuses Sartre’s 
account of nihilation of requiring consciousness to be completely cut off from the objective world, 
leaving it adrift and ‘unmotivated’121, making all action gratuitous or even undermining the claim of 
action to be action at all. As is often observed, the alternative is a Humean kind of happenstance.122 
 
There are two aspects to the structure of freedom that allow us to escape the weaker objection: the 
significance of value to the for-itself, and the structure of human motivation as being necessarily a 
totality. Firstly, Sartre clearly refers to value as that which properly speaking makes an in-itself state 
of affairs in the world conducive to action – “[i]t is only because I escape the in-itself by nihilating 
myself towards my possibilities that this in-itself can take on value as cause [motif] or motive 
[mobile]”.123 In other words, the very significance of some state of affairs as a mobile is only possible 
because of value, because of the following feature of value: “[v]alues in actuality are demands”,124 
they are demands that something out in the world is realised or maintained in being, and these 
demands are intelligible in a way which makes objects in the world reveal themselves in accordance 
with the values our ends place upon them – hence the mud on the dog is presented as enraging, 
because as a result of our failure to be ready for the show we are enraged.  We apprehend through 
our mobiles our current end, and make a choice on the basis of our grasp of that end. Hence we 
have the earlier example of the soldier who freely chooses to flee from battle, making a conscious 
and reasons-guided decision in pursuit of an end he has given himself – the preservation of his life. 
In the presence of heavy fire from the enemy, the fear that wells up in him reveals that fire as 
frightening because it threatens the project of survival; being in the line of fire manifests itself as 
disvaluable to him, and so he acts in accordance with a project of survival which is dependent in part 
on a motif that is constituted by the presence of the rock that can provide shelter due to its 
objective being, and the objective being of the shrapnel that makes a granite slab impassable to it. 
 
                                                          
120 Iibid., p.475 
121 “Motivated” is in scare quotes here because it refers to a wider sense of motivation or causation. 
122 Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press: Clarendon, 2007. Book 2, part 3, section 
1. 
123 BN, p.459. 
124 Ibid., p.62. 
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 Thus, one possible sense in which nothing outside consciousness can determine its choices is that 
even though an outside state of affairs is necessary for a choice to be made, it is not necessary and 
sufficient because there must also be the ‘noematic’/mental correlate of that state of affairs, the 
project, which relates back to the necessity of there being something that we are aware of as well as 
the awareness. On the other hand, the presence of value through a project is both necessary and 
sufficient to make a choice, and although it depends on an outer object, that outer object would not 
exist without there being a project and hence values held by a for-itself. It is only because we have 
projects that there is a world at all, in the sense that the world of human existence depends on 
negation and that negation is effected on the world in response to a lack apprehended through a 
project, – “what I expect from the carburettor, what the watchmaker expects from the works of the 
watch … is a disclosure of being”.125 Hence we end up back with claims like “it is man who renders 
cities destructible, precisely because he posits them as precious”126 compared with the power of 
storms, earthquakes and the like to “merely modify the distribution of masses of things”.127 
Moreover, for Sartre Spinoza's statement that all determinate things have been negated is 
“profoundly true”128 and this lets him summarise the point: “there is a factual state -satisfying or 
not- only by means of the nihilating power of the for-itself'”,129 by the ability of consciousness, 
grounded in its separation from the causal order of things, to introduce lack and nonbeing into the 
world. 
 
The more sophisticated, stronger criticism is aimed at freedom as radical freedom, which is 
concerned with the origins of motifs and mobiles. This notion of freedom is radical because of the 
connection both in English and French to the Latin “radix” (“root”); Sartre holds that freedom is, in 
its originary sense, a freedom to choose which values come into the world by choosing projects. The 
broad form of the criticism is that our choice of projects itself is problematically gratuitous, even if it 
gives us adequately reasons-justified choices on derivative levels, such as whether or not 
Constantine should found a second capital, whether that capital should be on the Sea of Marmara or 
the Adriatic coast, and so on. This is the gist of Charles Taylor’s objection: “a radical choice between 
strong evaluations is conceivable, but not a radical choice of such evaluations”.130 There are two 
                                                          
125 Ibid., p.31. 
126 Ibid., p.35. 
127 Ibid., p. 32. 
128 Ibid., p.458. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Taylor, Charles. “Responsibility for Self” in Watson, Gary. (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York, 
1982. 
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obvious and related questions we might ask here. If a genuinely held mobile131 such as wanting to be 
rid of all the problems caused by the plebs in Rome can be followed by something other than an 
effective action to solve the lack it aims at, i.e. a change in project, has Sartre proposed a model that 
captures our structures of action as being rational and dependable? Secondly, by which criteria are 
these shifts in project made? 
 
In order to start answering these questions, we will now look more closely at Sartre’s presentation 
of these ideas. Having laid out the account of the motif/mobile/end structure, Sartre is keen to 
defend his account of action and freedom on two fronts. On the one hand, he wants to be proof 
against the charge of gratuitousness, but he also wants to respect an insight found in “common 
opinion”: a choice is free “if it is such that it could have been other than what it is”132. His defence 
centres around a concrete example: we are to imagine him on a hiking trip where, after several 
hours of walking, he has just collapsed by the roadside. An argument starts - one of his companions 
accuses him of giving in too soon, amounting to the claim that he was free to have resisted his 
fatigue. On the other hand, he deflects this charge by “saying that I was too tired”.133  It would be 
easy to read this dispute around whether there is a possibility of the agent (Sartre) doing otherwise 
than he actually did, but accepting the premise that “acting otherwise” is/[was] possible for all 
action redirects the question – we are asking what makes it permanently possible to act/[have 
acted] otherwise, and by extension what the conditions (whether features of the objective world, 
logical conditions, or whatever else) are under which the agent would have acted differently.  Given 
the nested structure of projects that we saw above, this amounts to the question of how one’s 
projects can change and what the scope of this change amounts to: “could I have done otherwise 
without perceptibly modifying the organic totality of the projects which I am[?]”134 and again: “I 
could have done otherwise. Agreed. But at what price?”. 135 Here I understand the “price” to be 
either a local or a global modification of one’s project[s] – is it a question of altering instrumental 
projects/ lesser projects, or does the whole have to shift?  
 
Sartre’s answer is predictable given his commitment to our projects as being unified as a totality: the 
whole has to shift in order for our actions to differ. Although there are features of the objective 
                                                          
131 I.e. a mobile that is A) actually held as opposed to claimed such as the child who claims he wants to clean 
his room but wants to watch TV, and which B) fits into a project that truly aims at the ostensible goal rather 
than instrumentally aiming at its failure, e.g. the inferiority project described across BN pp. 494-7. 
132 Ibid., p.475. 
133 Ibid., p.476. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Ibid.  
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world that do seem to bear on the decision to give up on the hike, such as the heat, the strain put on 
the muscles, and so on, what is ultimately effective in constituting an action is the value manifested 
in (by) the world which allows the hiker’s body to “signif[y] [his] engagement with the world, in the 
form of fatigue”.136 This fatigue is only manifest because of the project137 of getting fatigued and as 
such can only be explained in terms of some project that getting fatigued enables instrumentally, or 
as holding the status of a hard/complete intrinsic end. With respect to the objective/in-itself 
preconditions of, for instance, fatigue, what the project amounts to is the generation of fatiguing 
pathways, sun, and lack of water out of the mere objective being of paths, sun, and dried river beds 
which are missing water as a simple not as opposed to via nothingness. What this in turn cashes out 
into is the project of creating a world in the first place; in order to reach my ultimate end through 
being fatigued, I have to first produce a world that is fatiguing, and one viable route to generating a 
fatiguing world is through the nihilation of the “objective correlate”138 of a country road in the 
summer. Hence, talking about one of his companions who can endure similar journeys, Sartre says:  
 
[H]e is going on this expedition because the mountain which he is going to climb and the forests 
which he is going to cross exist; his mission is to be the one by whom their meaning will be made 
manifest. Therefore he attempts to be the one who founds them in their very being.139 
 
In other words, the brute existence of the mountain and the forests enables the adventurer to 
negate them and give them a meaning (make them manifest values) and so projects entail the 
creation of parts of a/the world. However, if we recall Sartre’s acceptance of Gestalt principles, 
these parts cannot be created on their own – if they are to be figures, there must be a ground for 
them to rise from. Hence we must create an entire world all at once through our projects, even if 
some or most of it has to be backdrop which is currently only included as the excluded.140 This isn’t a 
reflective choice like an artist choosing to work on canvas rather than a wall or the floor; it’s a 
precondition of there being a world, and by extension a precondition of action. In fact, this entails 
that any choice at all is also a choice of oneself as (a) being within a/the world, and we can see this 
                                                          
136 Ibid.  
137 An instrumental part of some other major project, e.g., to be seen as inferior or weak. 
138 This term is here to avoid confusion between the “country road” in-itself and a country road which is 
differentiated and imbued with value; strictly speaking the in-itself is undifferentiated and hence it is 
misleading to call a region of that in-itself a country road at all. 
139 Ibid., pp.478-9. 
140 This is the same conclusion we reached earlier through the co-originarity of motif, mobile, and end.  
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by summarising this result with some principles we saw earlier. To conjure a nonbeing in the world 
such as Pierre in the café, we must also conjure a being that it stands out against,141 and as such we 
must constitute a world all in one piece. This world must, too, be generated as one that I am 
inescapably engaged with because it is generated through my relation to it, through an act of 
perception which places nonbeing (and hence value)142 in it as real constituents of that world.  This 
can be seen in the following comments about the original project143 and relation to the world: “[t]his 
original relation is nothing other than the for-itself’s being-in-the-world insamuch as this being-in-
the-world is a choice”144 and again: “[w]e choose the world not in its contexture as in-itself but in its 
meaning, by choosing ourselves”.145 However, the possibility of shifting our global project makes it 
possible to “apprehend our choice as not deriving from any prior reality but rather as being about to 
serve as foundation for the ensemble of significations which constitute reality”,146 which amounts to 
the apprehension of gratuitousness that sparked the objections in the first place. 
 
With this account in mind, we can turn back to our two questions: 
 
A) Has Sartre proposed a model that captures our structures of action as being rational and 
dependable? 
B) Secondly, by which criteria are shifts in (original) project made? 
 
As far as A) goes, we are really asking what distinguishes when a shift in overall project occurs from 
when a given mobile leads to the result it aims at through an action. Webber supplies a helpful 
literature synopsis here; he captures the problems this can pose well, having set up the initial 
schema of project change as follows: “[m]otives [mobiles] can fail to result in the relevant actions, 
not by being followed by an entirely unmotivated action, but by being replaced with new motives 
                                                          
141 Once again it is worth noting that “existence” derives from the Latin “ex sistere”, standing out from. 
142 The nonbeing “added” to the world is a lack or something missing, such as a condition I want to be in but 
am not; the value in the world is manifested through the apprehension of conditions of possibility of meeting 
this goal, such as the desirability of catching a bus to attend a job interview in order to be employed. 
143 I.e., the search after the hard/complete intrinsic end. 
144 Ibid., p.479. 
145 Ibid., p.485. 
146 Ibid., p.486. 
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[mobiles] that issue in another action”.147 Webber goes on to list three (effectively two) arguments 
against a freedom that involves such a conversion of the entire world at once,148 which I will address 
with broad strokes individually and then more precisely after resolving them into essentially the 
same problem: 
 
1) “[T]he sustained pursuit of a project is incompatible with this element of chance in the 
constitution of motives [mobiles]” (attributed to Peter McInerney).149 
 
2) “[W]ere he right to say the adoption of projects is entirely unmotivated it would be wrong to call 
it a choice” (attributed to Dagfinn Føllesdal150 and in modified form to Gregory McCulloch).151 
 
As a result of these objections (among others), Webber rejects the indeterminism entailed by the 
Sartrean picture of action; I wish to show that these problems are not problematic enough to cause 
us to throw out the concept of radical freedom. With regard to the first objection, I do not think that 
Sartre saw radical freedom as causing problematically random or even frequent shifts in project. The 
biggest problem with reconciling our everyday experiences with the account is that we see ourselves 
and others as being reasonably consistent in our actions, at least stable enough that the idea of a 
personality or character determining our actions is both common and seen as basically reasonable or 
rational worldwide. In principle, Sartre held that a process of psychoanalysis was possible which 
could discern the fundamental choice made by the analysand, devoting an entire subsection on BN 
pp. 578-96 to the prospect,152 as well as other mentions which are notable in connection to it on pp. 
479-82.  This kind of undertaking would be basically pointless if one’s original choice of the world 
could be completely reversed at any time without warning; the fundamental choice of the analysand 
could change between or even during sessions of the attempted analysis if it were completely 
without stability and/or some kind of inertia. Nor do we see the characters in his novels or plays 
constantly stricken by complete, inexplicable reversals of project, even if they might reflectively 
                                                          
147 Webber, The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, p.62. 
148Ibid., p.66. 
149 McInerney, Peter K., “Self-Determination and the Project” in The Journal of Philosophy vol. 76 no.11 (1979), 
pp.663-677. pp. 675-6. 
150Føllesdal, Dagfinn. “Sartre on Freedom” in Schlipp, Paul Arthur (ed.): The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Open Court: La Salle, Illinois, 1981. pp.392-408. 
151McCulloch, Gregory. Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes. Routledge: London, 
1994. pp. 62-4. 
152 For a book-length account of this possibility, see Stern, Alfred, Sartre: His Philosophy and Existential 
Psychoanalysis. Vision Press: London, 1967. 
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attempt to effect these reversals (e.g. Mathieu adopting the mantle of the warrior-hero in the 
church belltower153, Daniel’s attempt to drown his cats).154 For this reason, even if we grant that 
radical conversions are events of mere chance,155 I do not think that Sartre would hold, or ever held, 
that a radical conversion which effects a shift towards an unrecognisable new persona was likely. 
The sense that comes out of the pain that, e.g., Roquentin felt is more that the experienced 
possibility of such a conversion hangs over the human subject like the Sword of Damocles,156 which 
after all only falls once, and does not need to fall at all to horrify the victim. Nonetheless I have to 
concede that he does refer to the “frequent upsurge of conversions which cause me to 
metamorphose my original project”,157 but the rest of this discussion will minimise that as a 
problem. 
 
With respect to the second question, I do not think Sartre sees the lack of motivation for a change in 
project to be a problem, at least within the confines of a limited scope of “motivation”. It is true that 
there might not be motifs or mobiles leading up to a change in overall project, but this is not 
problematic because the project is manifest in terms of motifs and mobiles. If there were motifs and 
mobiles and a fin leading towards the change of the ultimate project, then we would be back with 
the problem that the original project is not intrinsic in the hard/complete sense required to give 
meaning to our actions. As we have seen in the previous sections, a key part of Sartre’s story is that 
the original project generates all motifs, mobiles, and ends, and as such further motifs, mobiles, and 
ends beyond those the original project supplies are a contradiction. In other words, if a putative 
fundamental project were shown to be influenced by a further set of motifs, mobiles, and ends, this 
would be good grounds to show we had misidentified a project as being fundamental rather than a 
normal process of its operation. This type of reading is why Catalano in his Commentary does not 
address the lack of motivation of the original choice as problem, passing over it by saying: “[s]ince 
this fundamental freedom is the origin of all secondary motives [mobiles] and reasons,158 it is 
unmotivated but not capricious. It is the very being of the for-itself as it makes a world-to-be-there 
and reveals the in-itself as reasons for action”.159 I hold the claim here to be that radical freedom 
                                                          
153 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Iron in the Soul. Translated by Gerard Hopkins. Penguin: London, 1974. pp. 222-5. 
154 Even in these examples, there is still interpretative room to say that their reflective attempts to change the 
world qua the values they put in the objective world are basically a self-deceptive sham. 
155 Which is a position I do not want to naively endorse. 
156  More on this next chapter in the discussion of Sartre’s concept of “anguish”. 
157 BN, p.497, emphasis mine. 
158 i.e., mobiles and motifs. 
159 Catalano, Commentary, p.199. 
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precedes all160 motifs and mobiles, so it cannot be held to account on that level of motivation. This 
view can be read into Phyllis Morris’ when she says “Sartre’s point is not that reasons are generally 
irrelevant to decision making, or that reason should be rejected in favour of, say, impulse, but rather 
that what counts as a reason must be decided upon before one can begin the process of decision 
making on the level of particular acts”. 161 Immediately we might want to demand that the choice is 
still rational in some wider sense, that there is some kind of reason to which the original choice is 
responsive.  
 
With regard to what guides the creation of new reasons, the Sartrean reply seems to be that we 
cannot answer the question of what ‘meta-reasons’ there might be behind the production of 
reasons.162 Whilst this claim means that we will always apprehend the process of project 
change/conversion as gratuitous, it also entails nothing either way about whether they are in 
themselves gratuitous in the sense of random or chance-driven, just that the way is barred to 
investigation.  Sartre says: “no interpretation of [the original project] can be attempted, for it would 
implicitly suppose the being-in-the-world of the for-itself just as all the demonstrations attempted 
by Elucid’s Postulate implicitly suppose the adoption of this postulate”.163 What I take this to mean is 
that we cannot engage with whatever lies beyond motifs and mobiles because we are permanently 
locked into using a structure of motifs and mobiles to investigate them. Or to put it another way, 
what we are just is the engagement with the world through a structure of value, through motifs and 
mobiles, and so we cannot opt out of asking after motifs and mobiles. Our basic structures of 
investigating the world are locked into using motifs and mobiles, and all the while it seems that our 
efforts to reason about rationality are blocked if we work within the motif/mobile structure.164 
Alternatively, we can frame the problem as being an infinite regress in our requests for rational 
explanation: we are asking for a rationality that underlies rationality. Even if we get an answer, some 
set of principles that rationally describes the choice of the rational, we can still ask what rational 
principles describe those, and so on into a very vicious regress. What this means for the timing or 
conditions for an abrupt change in project is that these will be basically mysterious, hence there will 
be chance and caprice in the selection of fundamental projects or rules for generation (if there are 
                                                          
160 In the sense that it has power over what counts as a motif or mobile in such a way that it cannot be swayed 
by motifs and mobiles alone; more on what alone means here shortly. 
161 Morris, Phyllis, Sartre’s Concept of a Person. University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 1976. p.108. 
162 At least with respect to answering these questions. 
163 BN, p.479. 
164 i.e., a rationality based on motifs, mobiles, and ends leads us and cannot but lead us to impossibilities and 
contradictions which we cannot reject, such as the effort to achieve the status of God. 
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such rules at all) of motifs and mobiles: “[t]he absolute change which threatens us from our birth 
until our death remains perpetually unpredictable and incomprehensible”.165 We will now consider 
two alternatives to what this might mean, in which either we hold onto an inaccessible (realm) of 
meta-reason or we reject it entirely. 
 
Beginning with the idea that we can preserve meta-reasons for conversion, the first objection 
identified by Webber seems to go against conversion being gratuitous: we do experience ourselves 
as holding projects reasonably consistently and predictably, and yet we ought to see disruptions in 
our own projects and personalities if this permanent risk of change were present. Firstly, the fact 
such change is possible says nothing about its frequency; levelling this objection presupposes an 
awareness, or even knowledge, about the way in which these conversions occur – it posits that these 
conversions occur frequently in order to make their apparent rarity evidence against them. 
Secondly, it is possible that such conversions occur without being (reflectively) conceptualised – the 
new motifs and mobiles will manifest as different saliences to the world, but if these result in 
superficially the same action these will be easy to (reflectively) miss or ignore. If I go from exercising 
to stay healthy for purely selfish goals to staying fit to be able to play with my children, there might 
well be a very similar kind of pull exerted by the grass as “to-be-run-on” as there was before. This 
shift could plausibly be so subtle that it would take a degree of analysis to reflectively apprehend 
which I might never carry out or have carried out on me. Hence many conversions might go 
unnoticed. Thirdly, the drift in actions and observed personality in ourselves and others can be small 
because of the way in which we are connected to the past – recall that, in making a choice, we 
change our relation to the objective world but not the objective world itself. Sartre affirms many 
times that “essence is what has been”,166 which means that the past is objective in the sense that it 
is fixed –  everything from who I first fell in love with to what I had for lunch today is now 
unalterable. Nonetheless we can change our relation to this objective past and build upon it – “the 
fundamental project which I am decides absolutely the meaning which the past I have to be can 
have”167 and indeed as a part of the objective world, the past is something that must be engaged 
with as a part of action. What this leads to is a kind of anchoring of our current projects in past 
history – “a converted atheist is not simply a believer; he is a believer who has for himself rejected 
atheism, who has made past within him the project of being an atheist”,168 which will always keep us 
related to the old (and familiar) even if that relation is outright rejection or scorn. Moreover, any 
                                                          
165 BN, p.487. 
166 Ibid., p.59, pp. 460-4 and p.518. 
167 Ibid., p.519. 
168 Ibid., p.488. 
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shift in overall project can leave minor projects more or less intact, for example something that 
substantively addresses the rationality of eating meat does not need to hold sway over my 
subprojects to do with car maintenance, allowing personally distinctive patterns of action to hold 
after conversion. Lastly, we can miss changes in project by looking at the wrong thing – I might be 
reflectively comparing just a local project over time or a fairly large project, not seeing that my 
projects are appreciably shifting at a different scale. I could be on guard against turning Atheist from 
Unitarian, but inattentive towards my growing cynicism about life as a whole. Therefore, qua the 
change in personality or character the objection aims at, frequent changes and conversion are not 
necessarily likely but can be accounted for even if they are. 
 
All the same, we can still point at the intelligibility of fundamental projects to identify some kind of 
rationality to them, their development, and how they change. The possibility of an existential 
psychoanalysis depends on there being a coherence to these fundamental projects and some kind of 
broader rationality underlying them; Sartre clearly holds that such an analysis is possible and later 
even wrote two extremely lengthy psychoanalyses169. As I noted above, I do not wish to hold that 
fundamental projects are actually down to random chance – there is certainly something lending 
them this intelligibility, but all the same there is a subtlety that Sartre is attempting to draw between 
an unjustifiable choice of fundamental project and an unintelligible choice of this kind. I think the key 
clue here is that the intelligibility of these fundamental projects is retrospective – Sartre can 
diagnose Flaubert’s project because Flaubert has already lived through the events that make the 
diagnosis possible. As such, this analysis ascribes an essence – recall that “essence is what has been” 
and is distinct from the lived through experience of consciousness in live progress. We can see this 
distinction by looking again at the regress of reason or rationality we saw above: 
 
 Freedom makes itself an act, and we ordinarily attain it across the act which it organizes with the 
causes [motifs], motives [mobiles], and ends which the act implies. But precisely because this act has 
an essence, it appears to us as constituted; if we wish to reach the constitutive power, we must 
abandon any hope of finding it an essence. That would in fact demand a new constitutive power and 
so on to infinity.170 
                                                          
169 E.g., Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr, translated by Bernard Frechtman. University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis, 2012. 
170 BN, p.460. 
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If we identify the general, lived-through structure that constitutes the motifs and mobiles171 with 
further motifs and mobiles then we are looking for a fixed, determined essence, yet as far as living 
through my freedom is concerned “I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the 
motifs and mobiles of my act”.172 What is our experience of living through having this freedom? It is 
having a set of motifs and mobiles and a world which they illuminate, but it is only by objectifying 
them and thus cutting them off from life that we can render them intelligible in the sense of 
knowable. If our fundamental aims change then we are aware of this through the new way the world 
lights up with value before any reflective awareness of those aims or how and why the change 
happened, but a reflective analysis is needed to supply a why. For instance, a reformed thief could 
live through a world where unguarded valuables no longer appear as to-be-stolen without 
reflectively considering how a recently adopted project to be a good father effects that change. 
Undergoing an existential analysis might give him an understanding of his objectified freedom, but 
the relevant change in his world and his measurable behaviour as seen by others has already taken 
hold. Skipping ahead slightly, we can also live through an awareness of another person’s freedom 
and act in accordance or attunement with it – I can exercise empathy without attempting to 
reflectively grasp their fundamental project. Thus there are two senses of intelligibility of freedom 
here, and the conceptualised, fixed knowledge or understanding is grounded on the lived through 
experience of having a particular, concrete freedom revealed by the motifs and mobiles it produces. 
 
All the same, we are left without access to the ground of the rationality of project changes – prima 
facie we must take it on faith that there is a rationality there. As we saw above, a major strand of 
argument against the theory depends on the apparent rationality of human consciousness, but this 
argument can equally be flipped on its head – since we have access to a general structure of 
freedom as it is lived through, and we observe the rationality of the actions exercised through that 
freedom, a certain rationality must be constituted in and through that freedom – even if it is only 
accessible qua rationality when that freedom is objectified. This is the kind of reading supplied by 
Gardner when he says that “[u]ltimately, Sartre gives no independent account of rationality as a 
distinct capacity because he regards it as emerging necessarily with freedom; freedom is 
undetermined responsibility for determination, and as such constitutes the space of reasons”.173 
                                                          
171 i.e., determines what a motif and a mobile can be. 
172 Ibid., pp. 461- 2. 
173 Gardner, Sebastian. Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Continuum: London, 2009. p. 172.  
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Here I would like to (re)address two obvious objections: firstly, why ought we give Sartre the charity 
of assuming rationality must be present in radical freedom, rather than dismissing his account 
because rationality is not given to us as a constitutive part of freedom? Secondly, what form could 
this automatic presence of rationality possibly take?  In the first instance, asking in terms of a 
dependency of consciousness on structures of knowledge about this sheer givenness of rationality 
amounts to provoking the vicious regress we saw earlier, and questions about the lived experience 
of this rationality can be answered with respect to the motifs and mobiles. With respect to the other 
question, nothingness and freedom are tightly linked to each other and to more Sartrean concepts 
such as his picture of temporalisation in what Gardner calls “horizontal” relations174 such that the 
coherence of one is a guarantee of the coherence of the other(s). This is extremely useful provided 
that these concepts genuinely do translate forwards and backwards – which, going by how Sartre 
can unfurl the account of percipi and percipiens into the accounts of nothingness and freedom, 
seems to be the case.   
 
Nonetheless, I do not think this second answer is entirely how Sartre would want to respond to the 
problem – even though it does address the issue at hand using his concepts and methodology. 
Rather, he would probably deny that the question is correctly posed for the same type of reasons he 
denied that we should ask how we know that we know we are conscious. We saw above the two 
senses of intelligibility, intelligibility as something we currently live through and are aware of in 
terms of the pure demands of the world (i.e., the exercise of freedom itself being an awareness of 
freedom) and intelligibility in terms of the possibility of being able to posit a fixed essence to 
freedom. This maps on to the difference between awareness and knowledge/judgment in given by 
the introduction.175 When Sartre makes claims like “existence precedes and conditions essence”176 in 
this context he is reaffirming that the latter kind of (judgment based) understanding of freedom is 
dependent on a primary awareness of it. We do not need to be able to judge that we are rational in 
order to exercise rationality, because if this were true we would have to ask how that very judgment 
was made rationally. If we demand, implicitly or explicitly, that all choice is rational, then in our own 
accounts Sartre holds we must either invoke an infinite series of rational decisions or we end up 
accepting an extra-rational term, which is exactly what Sartre is being accused of. Hence there must 
be a basic, immediate rationality that emerges simultaneously with freedom, and this immediacy 
                                                          
174 Ibid., p. 169. 
175 This also maps onto the distinction between different varieties of reflection; we will come to the 
significance of “pure” and “impure” reflection later. 
176 BN, p.461. 
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must not be problematic. 
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Section Three: Action, The Present, and Changing Projects. 
 
All of this can be restated as a commonsense point: doing is separate from knowing or theory is 
separate from practice.  Whatever my theoretical commitments and knowledge about a subject, 
there is something fundamentally different about doing something and idly talking or (reflectively) 
thinking about it, and this gap can’t be bridged except during the process of acting. The idea that we 
cannot access the present except as it is lived through, as it turns out, is explicitly there in in 
prototype form in the War Diaries, in comments like “what is termed the present … never has any 
substantiality; it is on the point of vanishing, is being coincides with its evanescence”.177 Moreover, 
this nebulous, infinitesimal present depends on the past as (it is) a development of or out of that 
past: “every present defines itself as separated by nothing from a has been – the ‘has been’ being as 
close to the present as you like”.178  As I act, there is just the doing, the new unfolding of the world in 
front of me, and in spite of any number of reflective attempts to control my action (imagine the 
soldier telling himself not to panic just before losing his nerve) the possibility is always open that I 
will act otherwise than I originally planned, that a different set of motifs will light up as relevant as I 
act. This doesn’t have to necessarily lead to bad consequences – it would equally be a conversion if a 
different soldier in the unit, panic stricken during insertion, suddenly took initiative and led his 
fellows to victory.  
 
In light of this reading, we can look back at one of the earlier citations and see a new meaning to it:   
 
The absolute change which threatens us from our birth until our death remains perpetually 
unpredictable and incomprehensible179 
 
Change in our projects does not always and forever escape our appreciation: it can be understood 
after the fact in terms like “Clovis decided to conquer Gaul because he developed a thirst for 
power”, however whether change will happen right now is always up in the air. As the saying almost 
                                                          
177 Sartre, Jean-Paul, War Diaries: Notebooks From a Phoney War. Translated by Q. Hoare. Verso: London, 
1999. pp.212-3. 
178 Ibid. pp.213. 
179 BN, p.487. 
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goes, the proof of the pudding is and will always be in the eating. We might be able to make better 
or worse predictions about future action and the mutation of the fundamental project, but there will 
never be a certainty to them – and talk of chance or certainty is right because we are making these 
predictions from an external standpoint, even about ourselves, because of the distance from (one’s) 
consciousness which is needed for self-questioning. It might well be the case that we can make 
better or worse predictions based on evidence about how and when projects have changed for 
others and ourselves in the past, but that moment of going through the looking-glass is still 
unavoidable; the exact meta-reasons for changing what we grasp as reasons can never be grasped 
exactly as they are. 
 
For these reasons, I think that we can uphold the notion of radical freedom through the objections 
given above. Moreover, in order to consider ourselves fully engaged with Sartre’s ethical project, we 
will soon see the need to uphold it in order to have access to the vital notion of anguish, in which 
“we do not simply apprehend the fact that the possibles which we project are perpetually eaten 
away by our freedom-to-come; in addition we apprehend our choice –i.e., ourselves- as 
unjustifiable”.180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
180 Ibid., p.486. 
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Chapter Three – The Self, Knowledge, 
and Self-Knowledge. 
 
The discussion so far leads us to see that we have a basic responsibility for the world insofar as we 
make it exist; the world we are faced with is made by our projects, by our ends that create a world in 
line with their conditions of completion and satisfaction.  The inherent lack in human reality means 
that “[m]y ultimate and initial project … is, as we shall see, always the outline of a solution to the 
problem of being. But this solution is not first conceived and realised; we are this solution.”181 Any 
given concrete approach to the problem of lack demands a world in which to enact it, and so we are 
responsible for the world that we live through.  The awareness of this responsibility, anguish, is 
apparently extremely painful to the point where we can find ourselves entirely devoted to avoiding 
it.182 We are told that “anguish is reflective apprehension of the self”;183 insofar as the self is an 
ultimately impossible project, anguish is the collision of our reflective awareness of ourselves as 
having achievable, well-formed goals with the awareness that they ultimately point towards 
something impossible. It is a special kind of horror at the way that our actions are all dependent on 
the impossible, on an original choice that sits outside of the space of reasons yet is still definitively 
ours. Moreover, the flexibility inherent in our choice of the world poses a double-edged threat to 
our goals as we usually see them; either that our most cherished and meaning-giving values might 
collapse and see us becoming what we most hate, or that a change we see as positive and constantly 
strive for might remain eternally thwarted by processes for which we are responsible. I might remain 
locked into smoking despite despising it and myself for carrying on, for instance.  We will see that a 
reconciliation with our freedom is the foundation of ethics for the early Sartre; the unethical begins 
with the set of responsibility dodging tactics he puts under the umbrella of “bad faith”. 
 
To fully describe the structure of this self-deception, we need to have the answer to three sub-
questions about self-awareness qua awareness of the Ego or I: 
 
A) What is the nature of the self? 
                                                          
181 BN, p.485. 
182 More on this later, in the chapter on “bad faith”. 
183 Ibid., p.45. 
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B) What is it for us to be aware of or know something as being true? 
and 
C) Are there any special considerations relating to our awareness and/or knowledge of truths about 
ourselves? 
 
Hopefully this is uncontroversial; if the overall question is one about self-knowledge and self-
deception, then we need to know what the self is and how we come to have knowledge (about it). 
This chapter will look at the picture of the Ego and character coming out of Transcendence of the 
Ego, asking if our character can casually determine our action(s) or not and if our consciousness is 
coextensive with our character.184 
 
In the less conventional second half, the chapter looks at what knowledge is in Truth and Existence, 
setting out his unusual picture of knowledge as a kind of intuition or ‘direct seeing’. After addressing 
some apparent flaws to do with subjectivism, we will see that the nature of error in this account is 
directly applicable to and pre-empts the account of self-deception in Being and Nothingness. Along 
the way, it will note the interesting connection between the intuition/presence based account of 
truth and knowledge and his account of the present, given in the chapter above.  
 
Although Being and Nothingness contains material on knowledge (some of which will be drawn on), 
Truth and Existence will be the main focus of this account. This is because, in Being and Nothingness, 
knowledge is covered as a facet of presence and temporality, as a stepping stone to later points in 
the text and its overall arc. Moreover, in Being and Nothingness, no completed ethical position is 
present and the goal of the text is not to elucidate an ethics – not even as a stated secondary goal. In 
Truth and Existence, by contrast, we have a complete text devoted to knowledge and truth which 
also explores its ethical dimension. Although it was never published in Sartre’s lifetime, the text is 
complete and compatible with the ontology of Being and Nothingness. The opening pages of Truth 
and Existence read almost as a summary of that prior text, with little or no drift in the broad strokes 
of Sartre’s position. I hope that the reader can, by readily reconciling the ideas from Truth and 
Existence with those that came before, see that this is the case and accept that text as a 
                                                          
184For an alternative account of the arguments in Transcendence of the Ego, one that focuses far more on the 
divergence from Husserl it represents, see Priest, Stephen. The Subject in Question: Sartre's Critique of Husserl 
in The Transcendence of the Ego. Routledge: London, 2000.  
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continuation and expansion on Sartre’s earlier ideas on the project, presence, and knowledge. 
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Section One: The Nature of the Self in Early Sartre. 
 
The question “what is the self?” can itself be broken down into at least three sub-questions and/or 
senses in which the question can be asked: 
 
A) What is it for there to be (for me to have?) a unified stream of consciousness and/or conscious 
experiences? (e.g., the questions we saw Sartre to be asking in his initial accounts of awareness and 
the pre-reflective cogito). 
 
B) What is it for that self to have a personal identity, in the sense of identification of the self across 
different places and at different times? (e.g., the kinds of post-Lockean identity debates in which 
Derek Parfit made his name, and which Phyllis Morris engaged with in the Sartrean context.) 
 
C) What allows us to be able to identify ourselves with identities such as being a tailor, a soldier, or a 
spy, or to evaluate ourselves or others as having distinct characters, personalities, and/or roles in a 
group or society?  
 
For the purposes of looking at self-deception I will be focusing here on A) and C), primarily on 
personal identity in the second sense – about how one is identified or self-identified as 
(instantiating) a certain type of person.  
 
In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre is concerned with how consciousness is unified – how all the 
experiences that I identify as mine are bound together – the main question being whether there is 
some real entity (that we could call the Ego) that binds together our experiences into one consistent 
series or stream.  Husserl’s arguments in his Ideas II185 in favour of such an ego are Sartre’s main 
target. Sartre deploys a well-known trio of arguments against this conception of the Ego: that it is 
not needed, that the self can go missing, and that the (really existing) Ego is impossible anyway.  
Since we have already covered arguments in Being and Nothingness that by themselves lead to the 
latter two conclusions, we will look at them first. 
 
The argument against the possibility of the Ego being in consciousness is effectively interchangeable 
                                                          
185 Husserl, E. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy (Second Book), 
trans. Rojcewicz, R. and Schuwer, A. Kulwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 2002. 
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with the arguments against representationalism we saw in the first chapter. If the self or Ego is a real 
object that is contained within consciousness, then there is the question of what it means for that 
object to be located in consciousness. A self that is present as a mental object could not be given to 
us all at once because of the infinite number of aspects or abschattungen that make it up, which 
would demand an infinite object (the Ego qua mental object) to be located in a finite space or 
container (our stream of experiences). Since there will always be hidden aspects to the self as a real 
mental object, it will be a “centre of opacity”186 that would break the Sartrean thesis of the 
translucency of consciousness, and as such it cannot be a mental object found within consciousness 
itself. Presenting the argument this way misses out a vital premise, that the Ego is the kind of object 
that appears through profiles/abschattungen. This premise can be supplied by observation187 of the 
states of our selves – a self taken up with hatred, for instance, is given through instants and never in 
its entirety. “[A]n instantaneous consciousness of revulsion cannot be my hatred”188 because the 
hatred persists through different contexts and times, it might be a unifying theme for multiple 
instances of revulsion, schadenfreude, envy, and so on which individually are not and cannot be my 
hatred – “is this experience of revulsion hatred? Obviously not. It is in any case not given as such.”189 
Since the Ego/self is given through profiles, then it must have a type of being that is not the self-
translucent being of consciousness, and so could only be an object for consciousness since it sits 
outside of it.  
 
Secondly, it is possible to have an experience that does not relate to a self or Ego at all – it is possible 
to have an awareness of the world that is entirely pre-reflective, such as the example of having only 
“consciousness of the tram-needing-to-be-caught”190 and as such, there can be cases of a fully 
unified stream of consciousness in which the Ego does not appear. If the Ego does not appear at all 
times, then we at least have good reason to doubt whether it is necessary for the unification of the 
stream. The argument of TE pre-empts the conception of freedom in BN here: [in the example where 
the Ego is missing] “I am then plunged into the world of objects, it is they which constitute the unity 
of my consciousnesses, which present themselves with values, attractive and repulsive values”.191 
Sartre is describing a world that we are engaging with purely on the level of motifs and mobiles 
apprehended through values in the world; the world is unified in and through a project which 
                                                          
186 TE, p.8. 
187 (i.e. via reflection). 
188 Ibid., p.22. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid., p.13. 
191 Ibid. 
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generates those values. Since consciousness must make the in-itself exist to fulfil its projects, and it 
must produce a whole world at once for the valuable to stand out against. Nonetheless the 
continued presence of the stream of consciousness implies that there is always subjectivity, i.e., the 
presence of a consciousness that is pre-reflectively aware of itself, even when the I goes missing. 
 
The main argument he makes is the most relevant to our selves qua our self-identification, which is 
that the real Ego is unnecessary for unifying the stream of consciousness because the stream comes 
as already unified. The claim is that time comes to us as a flow rather than a set of moments – I am 
immediately aware, to use the Husserlian example, of a melody as a whole extended temporal 
event, not as a series of notes or instants that I unify later. In the Phenomenology of Inner Time-
Consciousness192, Husserl attempts to explain this flow by effectively extending the basic unit of time 
consciousness from the present back into the past and forward into the future; the quantum unit of 
our awareness of a temporal world sustains the past in ‘retention’ and projects toward the future in 
‘protention’. In simpler terms, the basic unit of time is not an isolated present, but also takes in the 
past and the future. As (our consciousness of) time advances, the future intended in protention 
enters the ‘now-phase’ which maps on to the present, and the present passes into retention, so at 
any given point in the flow two dimensions of the current phase map onto the previous one 
(protention and now-phase always become now-phase and retention, respectively).  The link 
between the different units is thus established and sustained by what Sartre misnames the 
“’transversal’ consciousnesses that are real, concrete retentions of past consciousnesses”.193 These 
connections never create a link between isolated presents – it is not a case of connecting the 
present at t1 with the present at t2 and the present of t3.  If time (or at least the consciousness of 
time) were given as a series of disconnected moments or instants, then the argument runs that it 
would not be experienced as a flow but as a series of disconnected moments that would have to be 
unified later, as some kind of slideshow to which more work would have to be applied to produce 
the world as we experience it. Instead, the perception of time is done through blocks that already 
refer to the dimensions or ‘extases’ of time that correlate with the past and future as well as the 
present. Any experience we have that has a duration is to be explained by means of this multiple 
structure of time-consciousness. 
 
                                                          
192 Husserl, Edmund. Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness. Translated by John Barnett Brough. 
Dordrecht: Kulwer Academic Publishers, 1980. The following account mainly draws on pp.153-58. 
193 TE, p.7. 
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As an example of how this looks, consider the classical Husserlian example of a melody: if I am to 
recognise a phrase of a song as that song, i.e. as an extended sequence that is made up of varying 
notes that occur through time and which are unified into a whole, I cannot just be aware of a note in 
the present.  I have to be aware that this C is connected to the B that came before it, and to 
anticipate (protend) the next C that follows in order to hear the phrase C – B – C whilst only ever 
being able to hear one of the notes at once. In our actual experiences this is supported both by the 
tendency of musical notes to linger with us as the music goes on, as well as the confusion or 
annoyance we can feel if the tune stops abruptly or is played incorrectly.  Zahavi194 makes a similar 
point about how we hear and understand spoken sentences, which we can expand on: in order to 
hear sentences as sentences, they have to obey certain regularities of grammar and meaning that 
can only ever be given by the structure of a sentence of a whole. If I were to say to you at dinner, 
“pass me the…” you would only be able to make sense of “pass” in light of the recipient “me”, and 
can only connect “me” to the “pass” by retaining the instruction while you hear the intended 
recipient. Moreover the structure “pass me the ___” is only properly intelligible if it has an object, 
i.e. if a noun is coming afterwards, and hence you must anticipate/protend an object is coming such 
as “the vinegar” so that “pass me the ___” doesn’tt sound like gibberish. Without the first words 
being retained and the last words being anticipated, the word “me” doesn’t relate to the vinegar or 
either of the other words at all. If I say “pass me the” at the table, the most likely result is that 
someone asks for clarification; their anticipations have become empty intentions. For now all that 
matters is that the stream of consciousness has to come pre-unified, that as Gurwitsch once put it 
we should see “time as the source of all egological genesis”195. 
 
Given Sartre’s denial of a transcendental Ego, he is left with the question of what we are talking 
about when we describe an I or Ego or self; since we talk about these things on a regular basis (e.g., 
“I am tired”, “I went fishing”, etc) this expression must be tracking something rather than nothing. 
His first attempted definition of the Ego is “the unity of states and actions”,196 which is to say states 
like anger and our actions forming a descriptive or explanatory whole – if I say I am angry and I hit 
my desk, these two factors tally and combine into what I am, what my I or Ego is. As (Phyllis) 
Morris197 points out, there are already ambiguities about how we ought to read this very minimal 
claim, giving us at least two possible readings. Reading that the Ego is a unity of states and actions 
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already invites us to see it as being synonymous with what we would call “character”, and indeed 
she claims that “Sartre does not make a further distinction between character and, say, personality; 
he uses the terms ‘psyche,’ ‘ego,’, ‘self,’ as well as the term ‘character,’ to refer to the system of 
conscious relations”.198 However, this very temptation comes from the way that character seems to 
describe something genuinely predictive of our future actions – the idea behind this intuition is that 
states we are in cause and then subsequently explain our actions. It would not be unusual to say 
things like “I’m angry right now, I shouldn’t talk to the customers” because being angry might make 
us give bad customer service. This is the view that “character stands in some sort of semi-causal 
relation to actions”,199 which Morris ultimately argues is not Sartre’s. There is also the alternative 
that the Ego or character is descriptive, a kind of narrative construction out of our past actions which 
can be used to make more or less effective predictions about our future behaviour yet which does 
not exert causal influence over our acts. Morris’ thesis is one of the earliest thorough statements of 
the second view, and in what follows I will take her to exemplify this line200 of thought. In recent 
years Webber201 has made a significant effort to realign the semi-causal relation line with Sartre’s 
position, more or less explicitly in opposition to Morris.  To summarise: either the Ego/character is 
either retrospective, narratively/poetically created and inefficacious in guiding action, or that it plays 
a part but, in line with the thesis of radical freedom, does not entirely determine future action. 
 
Resolving this issue hinges on what exactly a state is – Sartre claims that they are real, given 
concretely to reflection – I can grasp, e.g., my hatred as a real thing, I can talk about it or introspect 
about it and it has more reality than some kind of theoretical or purely imaginary object.202 
However, the way in which we can grasp these states shows that they are not in consciousness – 
they are grasped as having duration in time rather than being instantaneous. We grasp hatred, for 
instance, as being there both in disappointment that someone is at the same café us as in the 
morning and in a revulsion at their actions in the afternoon; through different separate instances of 
disgust or unease or disappointment we apprehend the overall whole of our hatred. Thus, “my 
hatred appears to me at the same time as my experience of revulsion. But it appears through this 
experience”203 and this set of appearances is really a series of profiles through which hatred is 
grasped as a transcendent object. Rather poetically, Sartre says that “[h]atred is a letter of credit for 
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an infinity of angry or revulsed consciousnesses”,204 which is to say that a state suggests its own 
permanence and immutability – even if it is given in annoyance at one point and disgust at another, 
it endures through these appearances and will do so forever. In this sense the Ego we normally talk 
about does present itself as causally determining – since we hold hatred in our hearts, we will feel 
annoyed if we have to work with our enemies, nauseated by their successes,205 and so on. 
Nonetheless this infinite extension of a hatred shows that there can never be certainty about a state, 
since we would have to grasp all the abschattungen or profiles of it at once; as we have already 
seen, this is impossible for a finite consciousness. So the state, even if we are or were accurate in 
thinking it determines our future actions, could never completely determine them – states are never 
permanent and certain, even if they present themselves as such. 
 
This leaves us with the possibility of error about states in much the same way as we can have 
perceptual error, despite the accuracy of the individual moments of revulsion, disgust etc that make 
up the hatred – the indubitable lived experience or erleibnis. For example, we might conceptualise 
repeatedly being uneasy around someone as a dislike of them, and later realise we were actively 
trying to suppress a powerful attraction. Although the indubitable consciousnesses did not change, 
some kind of reorganisation and reconceptualization of our experiences is always in principle 
possible.206 The continued survival of the state has to hinge on further instances of the [type of] 
consciousness that make it up – a hatred that does not produce more instances of revulsion is like a 
bounced cheque which we can safely rip up. If we are presented with enough contradictory 
consciousnesses, it seems to be both irrational and against near-universal experience to say the 
state we are in does not change – it makes no sense to say that I feel only happiness around 
someone yet hate them, for instance. This is a key common-sense observation supporting the 
Morris-style view, which strongly counts in favour of character as (a conceptualisation of) a series of 
past actions as matching a certain description. If we read Sartre’s description of qualities as being 
second-order states, this conception of character seems definitive. In TE, Sartre claims that “[t]his 
psychical disposition (I am full of rancour, I am capable of violent hatred, I am inclined to anger) is 
naturally something more than and different from a simple average. It represents the substratum of 
states just as states represent the substratum of the Erlebnisse.”207  In other words, in the same way 
that a state like anger seems to cause the individual consciousnesses of hate, revulsion etc., the 
                                                          
204 Ibid., p.23. 
205 Sartre’s example of hatred here seems to be about a rather petty person. 
206 Confusion over this relationship leads to a pair of “tempting error[s]”; firstly, doubting the indubitability of 
the lived consciousness because we can be wrong about states, and secondly positing the indubitability of 
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207 TE, p.27. 
 85 
 
quality of being an angry individual seems to cause the states of anger we enter. In reality, moments 
of lived experience are unified into the states and states are unified into qualities. These qualities 
sometimes play an important role in sustaining an ego or character – if a state like hatred really does 
project itself to infinity but we find ourselves forgiving others, changing our opinions of them, or just 
going a long time without seeing anything that would be enraging, something needs to sustain that 
state in being. If someone is characterised by giving out heavy-handed punishments but all their 
(current) underlings are above reproach, we might still want to call them a harsh taskmaster in spite 
of not having punished anyone lately. This is why qualities are “a potentiality, a virtuality which, 
under the influence of various factors, may pass over into actuality. Its actuality is precisely the state 
(or the action)”.208  A quality is a state that might be expressed in the right circumstances, it is a 
promise of future action if those circumstances are right. The quality of being a harsh taskmaster is 
the promise of more punishments and the state of rancour if the employees’ work quality slips. 
Qualities are not necessarily contained in the Ego in the same way that states and actions are, 
however: “they are never indispensable, since states and actions can find directly in the Ego the 
unity which they require”.209 I take this to mean it is entirely possible to constitute an Ego entirely on 
the basis of recent evidence, without retaining states which have lapsed. Whilst this means that 
qualities are not a structural part of the flow of consciousness and can be missing from the Ego, it 
does not mean that they lack reality. They are, after all, valid intentional objects for us; we talk 
about them all the time. 
 
This account of the Ego as states, actions, and qualities matches up well with Morris’ general 
formula for character ascription:210 
 
A) Actions have been performed matching the character trait/description, e.g. fleeing a battlefield 
for cowardice. 
 
B) There are a sufficient number of actions of this type to rule out unusual or uncharacteristic 
behaviour. 
 
C) There is an absence of contradictory action in the time span under consideration, e.g. thievery 
alongside charity. 
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Whilst conflating the literary and philosophical works should be done with care, Sartre explicitly 
supports this view in No Exit when Inez says: “it’s what one does, and nothing else, that shows the 
stuff one’s made of”.211 She says this to directly contradict Garcin, who claims heroism or at least a 
lack of cowardice, despite an actual track record of flight from battle. It is not insignificant that this is 
a case of somebody judging another’s character – on the face of it, there is something different 
about us knowing ourselves and other knowing us, and this counts double in light of Sartre’s thesis 
of the translucency of consciousness. Yet if we have already accepted that we can be in error about 
our states and that states are not in consciousness, then there is nothing fundamentally different 
about one’s own access to these states and others’, since they are relevantly external and public. We 
might have access to more evidence about those states because we are always there at the events 
that make them up, but the whole is equally accessible and real to others – “My I, indeed, is no more 
certain for consciousness than the I of other men”.212 If we frame the discussion in terms of how we 
can discern character in others, then a deceptively simple argument Morris makes takes on great 
force: how can we have character information in the absence of actual, concrete actions? Without 
access to some kind of mental criterion we are left with the question of what character can be – if all 
we have access to is the actions of others (and ourselves) to (re)construct our characters, what is left 
over and above those actions which can take on the description “character”?213 It seems that the 
sum total of available character evidence is a set of past actions and states, which claim is all-but 
explicit later in TE: “[t]he Ego is nothing other than the concrete totality of the states and actions 
which it supports”.214 
 
The obvious rejoinder, which I am hesitant to link to Webber’s position but which could be the basis 
of its own semi-causal view, is that future actions do constitute evidence for our characters. Because 
I will donate to charity, it is true that I am benevolent, for instance.  To be slightly unfair, this sounds 
like something a liar might claim rather than a substansive position – “I’m reliable, don’t worry, I’ll 
pay the bill tomorrow”. More to the point, the possibility that I will do otherwise takes away from 
the usefulness of it as character evidence – we would usually look at past performance to decide 
whether we believe the statement itself. A successful business manager, with a long train of prompt 
payments behind him, would be far more likely to be believed than a serial defaulter.  We might look 
back when a chancer has paid up and see that he was actually reliable, confirming our prediction and 
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through it confirming our outline of character ascription. Yet if we do this, we seem to be merging or 
unifying a set of past actions/states into a character in order to prove that character is not a 
unification of past actions/states. To replace the idea that we can predict actions in this way, Morris 
suggests we see actions as in or out of character215 – actions can conform or not to the characters 
ascribed to us and this allows us to use character as if it were a predictive or casually effective force, 
even though it is not. This makes it possible to use predictive language as a part of our discourse of 
character ascription, even though it tracks something other than we usually take it to. Since we 
usually experience our Ego/character to be something stable and coherent, i.e. we experience the 
majority of actions we or others carry out as being in character, we might ask why this is, and the 
answer will have a lot to do with the structure of action and of projects. To see how this is not a case 
of smuggling back in a semi-causal view, it is time to look at another picture, namely, Webber’s. 
 
Webber’s position is explicitly intended to be a semi-casual view; having defined216 a character trait 
as a “relatively stable” disposition to act a certain way given a certain situation, he states that “[the] 
idea that character traits explain our behaviour but are nonetheless parts of ourselves that we can 
change is central to Sartre’s philosophy”.217 He makes a further specification that some traits might 
be generic but others might be useful identifying tools (especially when they are part of a set of 
traits). A love of Ottorino Respighi’s music might be a much better tool for identifying or marking out 
a particular character than an aversion to fire, for instance.218  Webber gives two possible options for 
cashing out this notion of a character trait: either a sum of actual action in line with Morris’ view, or 
“purely in terms of mental events”, which would make character identical to something within the 
flow of consciousness.  He ends up rejecting the Morris-style view on the basis that it provides us 
with confused grounds for ascribing character, given that our future predictions about someone’s 
action require a huge amount of very subtle information taken in concert.  An attempt to talk about 
someone’s vicious character in response to an action, such as reaching the deadly voltage point in 
the Milgram Experiment, might end up being rejected if they did not do the same without authority 
compelling them to cruelty. Instead, argues Webber, we would end up favouring more fine grained 
descriptions like cruelty-under-authority and benevolence-when-alone. If all of our decisions made 
in character lead to trait and state descriptions of this fine grained kind, soon we are left dizzy and 
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lost by the difficulty of unifying them into an overall character: 
 
[we] would have to think of ourselves as having displayed a wide variety of traits on a wide variety of 
highly specified occasions and would be unable to prescribe any remedy for the future. The moral 
purposes of thinking in terms of character would therefore be hamstrung.219 
 
We can make two early observations here: it does not seem to follow that an account of character 
must be wrong because our constitution of a given Ego/character is prone to error, as we seem to 
make mistakes about our own Ego and those of others all the time. Indeed, we seem to make very 
serious mistakes of this kind. In fact, I would go so far as to say the error would be to claim we have 
mostly accurate ideas about others, given the rate at which we are simply wrong about how people 
will act or think in a given circumstance, even people we know well. There is also an issue here about 
the difference between reflective consideration and reasoning about Egos and the original 
appearance of a reflectively considered Ego to us – it might well be very difficult to reflectively 
reason about Egos without error, but if the Ego is an(other) object in the world it will be necessarily, 
i.e., spontaneously, unified when consciousness creates that world. If we take this seriously, the 
question is about the difficulty of reasoning about Egos/characters, not about the difficulty of 
constituting them to begin with. Moreover, it is not clear that character or Egos are the site of 
ethical involvement at this level of removal from ethical reasoning, and so neither is appealing to the 
ethical applications of the theories a convincing argument away from the Morris-style view. If we 
already had in place a conception of ethics which did require certainty about Egos and which we had 
good reason to take as a dependable fixed premise in Sartre’s system, the argument would be 
persuasive. As it stands, this is a prima facie objection that hinges on unsupported intuitions, which 
highlights that Webber already has an implicit stake in what character turns out to be – a particular 
structure that fits into a later conclusion at worst and which merely reflects an intuition at best. 
Before getting deeper into his account, this point needs clarifying.  
 
When it comes to the extension of “character”, there is something different and instructive going on 
between Morris’ Sartre and Webber’s. When Morris talks about character and/or the Ego, she is 
attempting to track, based on the Sartre of TE, what we are actually addressing when we use these 
words.  She is asking what the referent of “character” actually is, in spite of what we take it to be – 
trying to identify a real structure underpinning our use of the term. If we observe that we have 
access to something we call an Ego which is or contains within it a character, then it is natural to ask 
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what that is. Subsequently learning that the Ego is purely retrospective does not remove our ability 
to talk about it and make predictions on its basis; all of us have experienced the unreliablility of 
inductive arguments at one point or another, yet we can continue to use them. The fact that we can 
use them to make predictions does not change if they are a retrospective unity instead of a semi-
causal force, any more than learning that ladybug larvae are not their own species of insect stops 
them protecting my garden from aphids. Given that we know it to be an object from its givenness via 
profiles, and we know that objects cannot compel consciousness, then we must see the Ego and the 
character-giving states within it as something purely retrospective.  Webber’s move seems to be to 
ask what actually grounds the regularity and predictability of action and to call that character, which 
is subtly different. In effect, instead of asking what our use of these character terms tracks, he is 
asking what they should track and redefining them to fit. His account ultimately terminates in the 
idea that our character is made up of our projects: 
 
Sartre understands behaviour to manifest qualities, or character traits … [t]hese qualities consist in 
the overall set of projects that each person freely chooses to pursue and has the power to change.220 
 
This makes a lot of sense in terms of explaining certain regularities in conduct and behaviour; our 
actions will be consistent as long as they are unified within a certain set of projects and hence fit 
within a consistent space of reasons. It also satisfies the lack of total determination of the future 
because of the possibility of radical conversions and because of local indifference.221 It also preserves 
the idea that consciousness is purely internally motivated. However, insofar as Sartre explicitly 
subsumes qualities, states, and actions under the Ego,222 and our usual way of talking about 
character indeed involves states and qualities such as being in anger or being an angry type, this is 
not what Sartre has in mind with respect to Egos and character. The term character as Webber uses 
it is referring to a different concept altogether, to (the consistency of) the original project. This 
discussion started with mention of an overlap between him and Morris, and that overlap is with the 
importance of projects to determining our future actions. Insofar as our projects have not 
undergone radical conversion, the acts they constitute will be located within (motivated by) the 
same space of reasons as the ones coming before, allowing us to unify223 them into a consistent 
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whole, i.e. to incorporate them into the Ego or character we are ascribing to ourselves or others. 
This is why, where Webber sees character, Morris sees the characteristic.224 It is hence somewhat 
unfair for Webber to claim that character, as “the projects the individual has chosen to pursue and 
could choose not to pursue … [which] warrant the ascription of character traits”,225 has been ignored 
by Morris and others, who deny the reality of character, when they have differing understandings of 
how to proceed and use the word character. If we look for Webber’s intended extension of the term 
“character” in earlier commentaries, we can find engagements with it via the project structure and 
original project. For instance, when Webber claims that Gregory McCulloch excludes character from 
his understanding of facticity and transcendence, he quotes the following part of McCulloch’s 
description: “our past decisions and choices that have brought us to where we are now”.226 Under 
the Morris-style reading, these decisions and choices spell out into the states etc that make up 
character, and so McCulloch neither downplays nor ignores the original project as being abstractable 
into other projects.  
 
Prediction227 of our actions based on character is, for Sartre, itself an action since it has an 
intentional object – the future state of being that will be realised and we are aiming to correctly 
anticipate. In order to make a reasonably definite prediction about action, there must be motifs 
making it possible, i.e. objective circumstances which enable it – and these can only be located in the 
past. In fact, even if we are making a reflective probabilistic prediction (“there are better than even 
odds he will be bored at the theatre”), this is on the basis of a series of reflective predictions that 
themselves depend on the assumption of fixed motifs.228  The temporal flow of consciousness means 
that any candidate semi-causal character traits (Webber sense) could never be located in the 
present, in short because “the present is … nothing more than being, it is a slipping-past alongside 
being, pure nothingness”.229 If we attempted to keep them present to us forever, this would be 
impossible because that act of grasping and determination is also an act of negation which makes 
them fixed and past. The trait that we attempted to grasp would be constantly rushed downstream 
in the flow, so to speak, and will always appear in the past having necessarily slipped through our 
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fingers in the present.230 The trait will always be a past aspect of the flow and indeed of the Ego, 
resolving the position back into a Morris-style view. 
 
Where seeing projects as the site of “character” is profoundly right is in what is tracked by states, 
qualities, etc. Sartre claims that states and qualities are “inert”231 and posits something like 
occasionalism about the effectiveness of the Ego: although the Ego has no determining influence, it 
seems to because the flow of consciousness magically projects that power onto it at the same time 
as it determines action. Our direct awareness of the actual determinants of action - the motifs, 
mobiles, and end[s] – is entirely contained in the values that manifest as appearing in the world. 
Those values are what genuinely precipitate the actions which are later unified into a reflectively 
grasped Ego, yet we approach the world through “magical objects which retain, as it were, a 
memory of the spontaneity of consciousness, while still being objects of the world”.232 The Ego is a 
construct which does not reflect the actual action of consciousness and which is nonetheless our 
only reflective access to consciousness, which seems to contain qualities and states which produce 
consciousnesses: “[c]onsciousnesses are given as emanating from states, and states233 as produced 
by the Ego”.234 It is right to say we reflectively apprehend our projects through the Ego, but this does 
not mean our talk about Egos and characters is actually about projects – it is still about Ego or 
character, which nonetheless turns out to be derivative from projects. Our character might well 
suggest we have certain projects or inhabit a certain space of reason, but is never coextensive with 
those projects or that space of reason. 
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Section Two: The Ego, Knowledge, and Truth. 
 
 
With this picture of the Ego in mind, the next question is: how are we to account for the inaccuracy 
or accuracy of our self-knowledge?235 Self-knowledge in the sense of knowledge of character is 
knowledge of an object, because the Ego of states, qualities, actions etc is a transcendent object.  
This means it is safe to begin by assuming that there are no special considerations about knowledge 
of the Ego, and instead look at knowledge more generally. 
 
 Sartre has an unusual account of knowledge which he describes as follows: 
 
There is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and discursive argument, incorrectly called examples of 
knowing, are only instruments which lead to intuition. When intuition is reached, methods used to 
attain it are effaced before it; in cases where it is not attained, reason and argument remain as 
indicating signs which point to an intuition beyond reach.236 
 
As Detmer puts it, it seems that “intuition” means “the direct apprehension, or if you prefer, the 
immediate seeing or grasping of some point or principle.”237 238 Given our everyday conceptions 
about knowledge, the idea of a knowledge solely based on intuition might seem unlikely or even 
fantastical, but a good reason to allow this importance to intuitive knowledge comes to us through 
Lewis Carroll. In order to prove an argument through deductive logic, he claims, we must accept the 
truth of a certain set of premises and propositions that show they lead to a conclusion. If knowledge 
is something gained by this sort of reasoning, it flows from a series of propositions that necessarily 
entail a conclusion.  In Carroll’s original paper, “What the Tortoise said to Achilles”,239 we have 
Achilles advancing the following argument (overleaf): 
 
 
                                                          
235 i.e., the (reflective) judgments we make about ourselves. 
236 BN, p.195. 
237 Detmer, Freedom as a Value, p.187. 
238 In order for this to meet our ordinary expectations about knowledge, there has to be come kind of 
immediate givenness to the ‘accuracy’ of knowledge that would lead to these disputes being potentially 
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239Carroll, Lewis, “What the Tortoise said to Achilles”, in Mind, vol. 2 no.14, 1895, pp.278-80. 
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A 
B 
Therefore, Z. 
 
The tortoise, not believing Achilles, is prepared to grant A and B, but not to accept that they entail Z. 
Achilles asks that the tortoise grants a further premise, C: “if A and B are true, Z follows”.  Yet the 
tortoise can refuse Z even on the basis of A, B, and C, because he can demand a further premise, D, 
which says that A, B, C is a good argument for Z. This can go on forever: if we posit A, B, C, D the 
tortoise can make trouble by demanding a premise E, that “A, B, C, D proves Z “is a valid argument. If 
“A, B, therefore Z” is sound and valid but not convincing, no amount of extra premises will be 
sufficient, or necessary and sufficient, to make it persuasive. The conclusion we are meant to draw 
from this is that “deductive logic without intuition proves nothing. Logic is of no use if it does not 
help me to see that something is so”.240 This seems to give us reason to accept that intuition is 
necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. Sartre radicalises this: intuition is sufficient, not merely 
necessary, for the acquisition of knowledge: “[t]here is only intuitive knowledge”.241  If all knowledge 
is ultimately grounded on some kind of immediate seeing, then there is no place at the site of 
knowledge gain for a deductive argument. Logical reasoning can allow us to see something, to have 
an insight, but it is not sufficient for knowledge. Later on, in Truth and Existence, Sartre explicitly 
rejects the idea that logical discourse creates knowledge; the “contemplative” outlook that insists 
that it does is “a kind of thought making truth the product of reasoning and of discourse that refuse 
[sic] intuition’s fundamental revealing value”.242 We can still need a specific procedure to get to 
knowledge, such as deductive reasoning, but the way this gives us knowledge lies in intuition, not 
some special non-intuitive feature of the argument itself.243 
 
Before getting into more detail about this “seeing”, there is one objection it is useful to get out of 
the way. We might want to suggest that two people could “see” the same thing and fail to get the 
same knowledge. If all knowledge is a matter of seeing but what you learn is un(der)determined by 
what you see, then we don’t have a good explanation of how a particular contact with the world 
                                                          
240 Detmer, Freedom as a Value, p. 189. 
241 BN, p.195. 
242 Sartre, J-P., Truth and Existence. Translated by Adrian van den Hoven. Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992. p.58. Hereafter referenced as T&E. 
243 If the reader still sees the idea of intuitive knowledge as strange, it might be helpful to see how Husserl 
proposed something similar in Cartesian Meditation III. See Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to 
Phenomenology. Translated by Cairns, D., Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1960. 
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gives you knowledge. Imagine you are playing poker with two other people, Alice and Bob. Alice has 
just placed a very large bet, and your response could turn the whole game. You and Bob have the 
same, unobstructed view of her playing with her watch; Bob is aware, but you are not, that she plays 
with her watch when she lies. On one reading of the situation, you both see exactly the same thing, 
therefore if knowledge is a matter of seeing you should have the same knowledge. If we know 
everything we see, and Bob knows Alice is bluffing, you should too.  
 
This objection falls down because of the passive model of perception it presupposes – by Sartre’s 
lights, perception is active. This passivity is what suggests the claim that you and Bob are both 
“seeing the same thing”, since it suggests that in “seeing”, something independent of you filters in, 
unmodified, via the senses. The active sense of “seeing the same thing” here is something like 
experiencing the same sensations, which is quite different from sharing an active perception of the 
world. We say we are “seeing the same thing” because there is, give or take a few degrees of visual 
angle, the same pattern of light reaching us, and hence the same image created on our retinas, 
transmitted to the sight centres of the brain, etc. Sartre explicitly rejects the notion of sensations 
this hangs on, saying “it is pure fiction”.244 When we equate sensation with perception and describe 
it as some kind of sense-data based on light wavelengths travelling into the eye, we leave out both 
the immediate givenness of the world and the affective dimension of perception. The world 
manifests values to us as well as a brute picture or image, and so whilst the players may all see the 
same visual picture (in terms of primary and secondary qualities), only Bob experiences the world as 
demanding that he bets. When we look at a full account of what is actively perceived, we are not 
perceiving the same thing as Bob because we are not directly perceiving that Alice is lying. By taking 
in the affective dimension of perception, we can see that the players were not “seeing” the same 
thing at all, so the objection does not hold. 
 
So far we have a starting point: knowledge is a matter of contact with the world through perception. 
Knowledge either is or is intimately related to the presence of the world to us – there is something 
about seeing that specific tree writhe in the Mediterranean heat that gives us knowledge. In light of 
the world being created or illuminated by consciousness, this contact or presence must be part of a 
project – the project of making a world that can meet our desires out of the in-itself. If knowledge is 
only present during direct contact with the world, then there is a tension here with our necessary 
separation from the objects of our perception. This can both be seen and accounted for in the 
following statements: 
                                                          
244 BN, p.338. 
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The for-itself is outside itself in the in-itself since it causes itself to be defined by what it is not; the 
first bond between the in-itself and the for-itself is therefore a bond of being.  
 
Consciousness, having projects that depend on making a world to enact them (like the hiker making 
a steep, harsh mountainous path in order to be fatigued), is defined by those projects that relate to 
a missing end such as a fatigue the hiker does not have. The world is generated as one that presents 
values in line with those ends; the in-itself and consciousness are linked by their needing each other 
to exist.245 
 
But this bond is neither a lack or absence … [t]he knower is not; he is not apprehensible. He is nothing 
other than that which brings it about that there is a being-there on the part of the known, a presence 
– for by itself the known is neither present nor absent, it simply is. 
 
Here is the problem: how can we fit in the characterisation of projects as oriented at lack with the 
claim that lack and absence do not characterise the bond between the object and consciousness? 
One way to solve it is to suggest that at the point of access to the object, it is neither given as in the 
present, nor in the future or past. It could be given as being a pure movement through the temporal 
extases of past and future, a contact that involves the past, present, and future all at once and is not 
located or stuck in one of those moments. Sartre gives a statement supporting this: “But this 
presence of the known is presence to nothing, since the knower is the pure reflection of a non-
being246”, i.e. since the knowing consciousness is oriented towards the non-being of the future, it is 
“not” in the sense of not yet, it borrows its being from the future. This is supported by a later 
remark: “if we can not posit any intermediary,247 we must at the same time reject both continuity 
and discontinuity as a type of presence of the knower to the known”.248 This matches up to our 
picture of temporality because the past is definitely continuous with consciousness and the future is 
always potentially discontinuous with consciousness, yet both extases cannot be removed from the 
overall flow. Sartre’s conclusion later in the same paragraph is more definitive on this point: “[t]he 
presence of the for-itself to the in-itself can be expressed neither in terms of continuity nor in terms 
of discontinuity: it is pure denied identity”. I take “pure denied identity” here to mean the primary 
                                                          
245 Of course, there is the in-itself regardless of consciousness, but it does not have the meaningful status of 
the world, it cannot stand out in the sense of ex sistere on its own. 
246 Ibid., p.200. 
247 Between the knowing consciousness and its object. 
248 Ibid., p.201. 
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instance of non-identity between consciousness and its object. This non-identity helps make sense of 
the idea that the present is mysterious or vanishing; presence, the time where an object is present 
to us, is bizarre. Knowledge is (closely related to) the constitution of the world in the present 
moment, it is the site of the creation of what there (now) is in order for projects to engage. Our 
knowledge of the world is an immediate insight into the world given to us in and through our 
creating that world. 
 
This opens up another problem: since we ordinarily talk about knowledge as being something we get 
to keep, talking about instantaneous contact with the world doesn’t seem to capture it. Rather than 
being (semi) permanent, knowledge is challenged constantly because consciousness is always 
temporalizing – time is always flowing, and the contact with the object we have in knowledge is 
always slipping away from us: “I can grasp what is present to me only by temporalizing myself in 
behaviours that aim at the future”249 250 which makes us “a being which is not yet what it is”.251 
Because of this, the project of verification or checking of knowledge and truth is perpetual; this lines 
up with earlier remarks in BN about the constant need for renewal of projects, like the early example 
of the gambler’s constantly (un)renewed project to give up gambling.252 Moreover, each object as it 
is present to us suggests a([n] element of the) future, such as the cup of hot tea which suggests both 
that it will be warm in a few seconds but cold in a few minutes. “[Being] depends, in its manifest 
being, on a verification which is to come and that is considered as having occurred or, rather, there 
is a whole important dimension of its present being which is not given in intuition and yet which is 
present in its very character as absence”.253  Objects in the present refer forwards into the future 
because they manifest a lack of some future state of affairs, like the mushrooms that demand to be 
kept in the pan because they aren’t cooked. These claims exerted on the future can serve as 
motivation for a future project: the mushrooms might also contextually demand that salt and 
pepper are added when they have been fried.  As I engage with the world, I constantly test my 
anticipations and establish new ones, so all free projects will lead to the creation of (new) 
knowledge. In turn, all knowledge involves the process of objectifying the world by the negation and 
nihilation involved in the passage of time,254 it is constantly being made determinate. The passage of 
knowledge into the past turns it from a live, actual contact with the world into a fixed, determinate 
                                                          
249 This bears striking parallels with Hegel’s arguments about Sense-Certainty and the “now”: Hegel, G.W.F., 
The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford University Press: New York, 1977. pp.63-5. 
250 T&E, p.19. 
251 Ibid., p.18. 
252 BN, p.56-7. 
253 T&E, p.24. 
254 i.e., the flow of the future and present into the past makes them negated, objectified, definite. 
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object that is part of my past – the specific contact I had with the world is now a part of my history. 
Since our knowledge is perpetually becoming fixed, it changes from an irreducible part of our own 
conscious flow to a publicly available object. Instead of being a set of demands that are sustained by 
their flow into other projects, the knowledge (and through it, its object) has become fixed and an in-
itself. In fact, this process is another way of looking at the flow of the present into the past. Sartre’s 
belief that “essence is what has been” is crucial to explaining this – the past is, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, determinate, negated, and fixed. So what does this constant negation actually do 
to knowledge? 
 
Since this negated knowledge is fixed and determinate, it will be communicable in a way my 
immediate lived experiences are not. I have revealed the world to myself through and to knowledge 
when I have the initial knowledge-constituting insight; the process of temporalisation, of creating a 
unity of consciousness across time, ensures that our knowledge immediately passes over into a 
negated, intersubjectively available form. This form is what Sartre calls truth: “truth cannot be for 
just a single absolute-subject. If I communicate a revealed manifestation, I communicate it with my 
revealing behaviour, with the outline and selection that I performed on it, with contours”.255  A 
truth’s “contours” are the selections of project and/or attitude that led up to it being made, which 
make it a revelation of a concrete, specific world. When that truth is shared, “the in-itself appears to 
the newcomer as for-itself”, i.e. the world appears as something coming to me through the 
intermediary of another consciousness. “[A]t the same time the for-itself becomes in-itself” in the 
sense that my subjective revelation of the world takes on the form of an object seeking to compel 
the other to see the world in a certain way, which appears as ownerless and objective.256 Thanks to 
temporalisation, at any point where we grasp knowledge apart from the initial moment of insight, it 
will therefore be through a truth – the same fixed, determinate, or propositional object that we 
communicate to others. When I try to (re)capture my previous insight into the way the world is, it 
comes from the in-itself, the factical, rather than being lived through as a present and ongoing 
revelation. Knowledge as it is presented in BN is never truly present to us but has always already 
                                                          
255 T&E, pp.5-6. 
256 These remarks borrow a lot of their force from the BN chapter on intersubjectivity which has not been 
addressed yet, but the description should seem reasonable. If a friend tells me a certain part of town is 
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certain direction seemingly to contradict Sartre’s account of freedom, but the influence of other 
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slipped into the past,257 so in Sartre’s specialised terminology what we call knowledge is really truth 
apart from when it is lived through. Since truth is a ready-formed and ready shaped vision of the 
world, it can trigger in us a new or renewed appreciation of the knowledge we previously had – it 
can cause us to see the world in the same way we did previously. It suggests to us certain 
anticipations about the way the world is, like that our salt cellar is filled with salt, and can be tested 
by having those anticipations tested. As long as the anticipations are fulfilled, we regain the 
knowledge we had, and the truth remains stable and unchallenged. This is only a sketch, and we will 
return shortly to a fuller account of how Sartre sees error and how it relates to truth. 
 
We might worry that this leaves us with a story about knowledge and truth which doesn’t leave 
room for accuracy or inaccuracy. We could be suggesting a total subjectivism where there are no 
wrong or right answers, just potential spaces of reason that might or might not be inhabited, 
different ways of seeing the world we might or might not think of as appropriate.  The argument 
runs something like this: if I have free rein in setting my goals, I have free rein in the anticipations 
that they give me, so I have almost limitless freedom with regard to what is true for me. In short, it 
says we are at risk of losing everything we normally want to capture when we talk about truth and 
knowledge. Detmer summarises this danger well: “You have your claim, based upon your intuition, 
and I have my counter claim, based upon my quite different intuition. All we can do, so the objection 
runs, is to ask each other to look again, and, should we each persist in our original claims, to call 
each other "blind"”.258 There is a naïve way of reading this where we have lost our power to identify 
correct knowledge/truth by denying the power of instruments like empirical study to help us. I think 
Detmer is absolutely correct to say that this is misguided because “[i]ntuition is not being proposed 
as a replacement for these instruments. Rather, it is merely that a new understanding of the relation 
between these instruments is being proposed”.259 Instead of insisting on a different set of methods 
and procedures for acquiring knowledge (and through it, truth), Sartre’s account suggests that the 
methods we normally think of as giving us knowledge work because of the intuitions they give us 
access to.  
 
A stronger version of the objection might say that even if we grant that (e.g.,) empirical study does 
not ultimately ground knowledge claims, neither can intuition; something else entirely could yet be 
                                                          
257 Having something as live knowledge for an extended period of time is a case of having the same object 
slipping through our fingers repeatedly. By analogy, even if we can’t grasp a single drop, we can have water 
running through our hands. 
258 Detmer, Freedom as a Value, p.194. 
259 Ibid. 
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shown to underpin and/or regulate knowledge. We have good reason, the objection runs, to look for 
this X-factor because of the arbitrariness allowed to knowledge by the intuitive model. We are 
effectively back with the earlier argument that we might see the same thing and get 
different/underdetermined knowledge out of it. So, let’s turn to a second, more precise answer to 
the problem. Remember that the world in-itself is not negotiable – it always presents us with the 
coefficient of adversity discussed here in Chapter Two. Even though I can change my attitude to the 
factical/objective world, I cannot alter it by an act of will alone, so the mountain which can be a call 
to adventure, a place of natural beauty, or a pain to bypass cannot be genuinely made into a place to 
find gold if there is none there. Any specific project will reveal the in-itself in specific ways that are 
unique to that exact project or constellation of projects. When we have an argument about the 
world, we are really arguing about the precise way we should engage with the in-itself given to us, 
not what there is in-itself. We are, strictly speaking, arguing about the questions we ask the world, 
not about which answers that come back, because these answers are given to us in the immediate 
translucency of pre-reflective consciousness as soon as the question is asked. As such, they are open 
to us, and any identical interrogation of the world will yield the same result.  We are not looking at 
the world and arguing over if both of us are getting the same knowledge from seeing the same thing; 
we are asking if we are both looking in the same place.  
 
All the same, we might want to object that there are cases of perceptual error that make this overall 
account false or trivial. Imagine we are looking into a shop window; I see a store clerk cleaning the 
windows but you see a mannequin with your worse eyesight. When we argue over whether there is 
a mannequin or employee in the window, the objection runs this is because of our different faculties 
of vision, not different questions we are asking the world. We are both looking to see what is in the 
shop window (asking the world what is there in the same way), and yet the world is returning 
different answers to us. On a hardline anti-metaphysical reading of Sartre (such as Jeanson’s260), 
visual error and its consequences/effects are within the remit of metaphysics and the sciences 
grounded on it – specifically, medicine or ophthalmology, where the eyes can be legitimately seen as 
a mechanical part of a mechanical system. As such, any differences in our detection of primary and 
secondary properties are prior to and outside of phenomenology’s scope, and can be safely ignored. 
This is probably going to be unsatisfactory to anyone seriously making an error-based objection. 
More sympathetically, we might respond that there are certain questions we can only ask if we have 
the right tools in hand –  e.g., we can only get meaningful answers about the alcohol content of a 
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liquid by using something like a hydrometer or refractometer. Whilst I can ask aloud how strong a 
brew is empty handed, I can only interrogate the world with access to the right tools261 – I can only 
get the world to open up conclusive answers when I am properly equipped. In the man/mannequin 
case, we might not be able to ask the world the right questions because our eyes, seen as a piece of 
equipment, are the wrong tools for that job. The body seen in this sense is an in-itself, and presents 
a fixed starting point for our projects; in order to share motifs two people would have to have 
(within a certain tolerance either way) the same basic bodily capacities. As a fully grown adult, I can’t 
share a child’s project of squeezing through playground railings, but I can share going through a 
normal doorway with someone 5 cm broader across the shoulders. Since we always have a facticity 
to deal with, there will always be certain questions we cannot ask. What the argument about the 
man/mannequin boils down to is whether we are asking the same questions, after all. Overall, what 
this highlights is the potentially misleading equivocation between “sight” as a mechanical-optical 
process and “sight” meaning the presence of objects to us.  
 
With this interlude out of the way, we can get back to our original question in earnest. When our 
knowledge does change in response to good reasons, what is happening? We can get an answer 
when we consider that the fundamental logic or rationality of our projects translates into a 
fundamental logic and rationality to the knowledge we can hold.  Knowledge is challenged when our 
anticipations are made and tested; Sartre describes the failure of an anticipation as follows: “it 
annihilates itself if it does not allow a correct construction”.262 What does this “annihilation” really 
mean? When we usually talk about ourselves as irrational, we are talking about our stated goals not 
matching up to our actual motivational structures and actions. If I claim I want to be a good parent 
but all of my motivational structure is geared toward alcoholism, I act irrationally263. This irrationality 
comes down to the mismatch between the motif of the whisky in my desk drawer, the mobile of my 
feeling like a drink, and my stated end of being a good parent – because my actual end, the end 
locked into my motivational structure, has everything to do with alcoholism. It really comes down to 
a properly structured actual project of alcoholism clashing with a claimed/false project of good 
parenthood. At the pre-reflective level, the end of good parenthood doesn’t connect to decisive264 
                                                          
261 See also Notebooks, p. 313: “[t]he instrument is not just a tool, it is a way of seeing.” 
262 T&E, p.23. 
263 This is the sense of irrationality Moran uses in an analytic context: “if the persistence of the attitude is 
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must instead be seen as a kind of fixation.” Moran, Richard, Authority and Estrangement. Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, New Jersey, and Oxford, 2001. p.108.   
264 Even in a genuine project of good parenthood, the whisky might still appear as weakly motivating, and we 
might still be tempted to drink; there isn’t an overwhelming motivation or temptation. Strictly speaking, there 
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motifs and mobiles about whisky so a proper motif/mobile/end structure can’t be made. In the 
absence of any self-deceptive protection of the project, there is no way to fit a paralytic, drunken 
stupor into looking after a child properly, so the two can never share in a proper motivational 
structure. Since drinking can never refer to a future where I have been a good parent, 
“autodestruction” or “self-destruction” is strictly speaking the wrong term, since the incoherent 
project can never be created in the first place.  
 
This gives us a preliminary answer about how (self) knowledge is generated: our projects lead to 
anticipations that are tested by the world. When an anticipation fails, the projects which depend on 
it aren’t renewed,265 causing a different project to take their place. This means we end up with a 
different contact with the world. For instance, I might look forward to seeing the neighbour’s cat in 
the garden when I drink my morning coffee. If she doesn’t arrive, the anticipations to do with her are 
made empty, so all the projects I have to do with her, like giving her scraps of bacon from breakfast, 
are cancelled. Rather than dealing with my normal routine, enjoying the company, worrying about 
how much my landlord hates cats, etc, a completely different set of contacts with the world takes 
hold.266 I can equally fail to have a certain anticipation without finding my intentions empty in the 
meantime: I might be preoccupied and have a project entirely to do with getting somewhere quickly, 
in which case I do not verify the world in the same way (thematise the cat’s absence as anything 
significant). All the same, I do generate positive knowledge about the world, but train times and 
likely traffic are present to me rather than the (objective) elements of my normal routine. 
 
These arguments also lead to an answer about how (self) knowledge can be inaccurate. On the one 
hand, our knowledge might not have been tested yet, and so it can persist even though when it is 
challenged it will turn out to be wrong. This, as Sartre readily acknowledges,267 is largely the impact 
of chance: I can incorrectly know there are eggs in the cupboard even though it is empty, because I 
haven’t checked since someone took them. This would be the kind of inaccuracy when someone 
asks me “did the cat visit?” as I was halfway down the road when it should have come to the door. 
Alternatively, I might not contingently have read or heard that the world can be unified in a certain 
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way; I might just not know that taking the largest slice of the pie is greedy here if it was a cook’s 
privilege back home. Both of these can be the case even if I am properly critical about the world, for 
no other reason than that I can’t spend my entire life staring at the kitchen cabinet or double 
checking local customs and how my actions will develop my character.268 On the other hand, we can 
also explain error via self- deception: since all revelation of the world is motivated and chosen, it 
should be possible to choose not to reveal (part of) the world: “since the truth is an illumination 
through an act and the act is choice, I must decide the truth and want it; therefore I am able to not 
want it.”269 I can, for instance, deliberately avoid checking my bank balance so I never learn how 
badly I am budgeting. We can be much subtler about the ways we ignore the world, such as being 
aware of a threat but downplaying it in order to not properly recognise it as a conclusively 
motivating and problematic thing – and this will become very important in the next section. If this 
seems trivial as a reason for error, it’s meant to be – if our picture didn’t return back to something 
relateable then it would not do a good job of capturing our lived experiences.  
 
Still, there’s one last thing missing: what exactly is error about the self or consciousness? As we saw 
above, on the pre-reflective level there isn’t really such thing as error, since a project that doesn’t 
reflect reality is always immediately destroyed in the face of evidence against it:270 “there is no error; 
anticipation is a non-being which gets its being from the anticipated in-itself”.271  Mistakes must be 
at the reflective level if they aren’t pre-reflective. Even though we can show that we chose the 
situation at the level of radical freedom, error and complicity or innocence only come in at the 
reflective level. This bears out the much earlier claim that consciousness is ‘translucent’; pre-
reflective consciousness is available to itself and incapable of hiding any ulterior motives from itself.  
A mistake, as the product of reflection, mirrors one of the ideas about negation we earlier saw 
rejected272 – it is a kind of comparison between a desired set of ends and what actually happened. A 
mistake is something like when we find 1300 francs in our pockets not 1500, or the cafe is closed not 
open. When we track the innocence of mistakes, we are tracking rationality in Moran’s sense, we are 
tracking how our reflectively held/avowed goals match up to our prereflectively held projects. In the 
case of an innocent mistake, error happens despite our avowed goals matching our pre-reflectively 
held projects. An example would be hanging laundry outside to dry having read a weather report 
saying it will be sunny; if it then rains and the clothes stay wet, we can say it was due to chance and 
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270 In the absence of any self-deceptive project protecting it. 
271 Ibid, p. 23. 
272 I.e. on BN pp.30-1. 
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not self-sabotage. If I were both aware that it might actually rain and prereflectively aiming to fail 
(such as in order to avoid having to go out by having no suitable dry clothes), then I would have 
made a deliberate error when it ultimately rained.  
 
This sketch of innocence and complicity in error still leaves lots to be answered – if the reflective self 
depends on the pre-reflective self, then there are plenty of holes in the argument. We will see that 
the problems that ought to arise due to the translucency of consciousness can be addressed by the 
impact of ‘unknown unknowns’ on truth and knowledge. Donald Rumsfeld famously invoked these 
to escape American responsibility for the War on Terror: “There are things we know that we know. 
There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But 
there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know”.273 Despite 
being mocked at the time (and deep into bad faith himself), we will see that he was being 
surprisingly insightful into the fundamental means we use to escape responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
273 Donald Rumsfeld speech to NATO on 6 June 2002, archived at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm accessed 08/12/2015. 
 104 
 
Chapter Four – Knowledge, Temporal 
Ambiguity, and Self-Deception. 
 
 
With the point in mind that error is only possible at the reflective level, we can move onto the 
mechanics of self-deception or ‘bad faith’. Although Sartre devotes considerable time to 
distinguishing his picture from Freud’s, I will skip over the issue of the unconscious because it is a 
negative, not a positive, consideration. Instead, I will start with additional background on the 
motivation for bad faith, the anguish caused by the strangeness of the present, the permanent 
possibility of conversion, and by the incoherence of our ultimate ends. Examining the classic 
examples of bad faith, I will show how it is basically dependent on an appeal to either the past or 
future and that the crises which should engulf it can be a normal part of its operation. That is to say, 
the pre-reflective self-awareness that we are deceiving ourselves can be, and is even often, a tool in 
sustaining bad faith.  Moreover, bad faith’s appeals to an eternal essence coming out of the past or 
going on forever are driven by poor standards of character evidence which are made reasonable by 
the ambiguity of the future. The immediate givenness of this ambiguity, we will see, also means 
these poor standards of evidence can apply without introducing an epistemological level into the 
pre-reflective.  
 
This chapter will then go on to consider whether self-deception is purely intrasubjective, considering 
whether the character of the individual is possible without the intercession of the other to begin 
with. Given that our characters seem to be often -or always- constructed by and for the benefit of 
others, we have to ask whether our self-deception depends on them. In this connection, we will see 
that the intuition/idea that the other can define our characters socially has to be challenged: we 
have to defend it against the idea that only consciousness can determine consciousness.  
 
 
 
 
 105 
 
Section One: Intrasubjective Self-Deception.  
 
Bad faith is explicitly named as the flight from anguish: “in bad faith, we are anguish-in-order-to-flee-
anguish”.274 To recap, anguish is an awareness of our freedom as inherently threatening to our 
projects. This can be the awareness that our future projects might change from within, causing us to 
act differently to how we would (now) want to: “[t]he artillery preparation which precedes the 
attack can provoke fear in the soldier who undergoes the bombardment, but anguish is born in him 
when he tries to foresee the conduct with which [he will face it]”.275 As far as our freedom goes, the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating, yet we abhor uncertainty in our current projects and/or the 
instability of our characters. The anguishing thing about a potential artillery strike is that I might 
become a coward when it hits, despite depending heavily on my heroism for my self-image.276 The 
real horror here is that the objective world does not compel me either to bravery or cowardice; 
whatever I do, I do for purely internal reasons. Since those reasons are subject to spontaneous 
change in the present, the future can be an almost unbearable threat to us: “the decisive conduct 
will emanate from a self which I am not yet”.277 Conversely, in cases like the famous gambler 
example, the past can be the focus of anguish – a past resolution or project might be something I 
can abandon and have to take responsibility for abandoning, regardless of how strongly I felt 
motivated at the time – “what [the gambler] apprehends then in anguish is precisely the total 
inefficacy of the past resolution”.278 In either case, anguish is the awareness that freedom can lead 
to us holding completely different values over time, which runs counter to the world of solid plans 
and self-consistency of our reflectively held hopes and dreams. Anguish might also take hold when 
we realise some aspects of ourselves are made up of a collection of events that we can’t live in or 
through – we will never get to really be the individual our avowed goals aim to create. Hatzymosis279 
has a reading of Nausea280 where Roquentin is anguished by the impossibility of adventure or the 
adventurous life; although he can look back at his adventures in Indochina or his romance with 
Anny, he never lived through them as adventures. This can apply to any adventure: getting out of a 
country without a ticket, for instance, might really be a stressful episode of realising you’ve run out 
of money, hours of despair in a hotel room, the frustrating sacrifice of giving up your luggage, and 
then a dull hitchhike broken up only by the stress of passing through official checkpoints. None of 
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277 Ibid., p.56. 
278 Ibid., p.57. 
279 Hatzymosis, Anthony, The Philosophy of Sartre. Accumen: Durham. pp. 6-8. 
280 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Nausea. Translated by Robert Baldick. Penguin: Harmondsworth, 2000. 
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these things are inherently an adventure, and they’re all quite unpleasant, but collectively we might 
look back on them fondly or tell people at parties about them for years to come. Even adventures 
mostly or completely made up of enjoyable moments (a fairytale romance) can only be enjoyed as 
single episodes at a time. You might be able to have an enchanted evening with your lover, but you 
could never enjoy the whole romance at once. This kind of anguish is realising that we might have a 
certain character or Ego whilst never getting to experience being that Ego. Although this is an 
extrapolation which is not explicit in the substantive philosophical work of Sartre, it gives us the 
notion of anguish before the present. 
 
As commentators like Webber281 have recognised, full-blown anguish is always reflective; Sartre 
explicitly states that “anguish is reflective apprehension of the self”.282  We can also see the claim 
that it is a special, reflective form of emotion in the work of Joseph Fell.283 This should flow from our 
previous discussion of error and mistakes: if anguish is an apprehension of a (potentially) mistaken 
belief about oneself and one’s projects, then it is essentially based on judgment. To make a mistake 
is to (reflectively) compare the expected or desired result (I get to be brave forever) with the reality 
of what our freedom produces (our projects change).  Anguish is the reflective awareness that, 
whatever work we do on/in the world, (more) work will always be needed to sustain the results.   
Sartre’s later comments (In Truth and Existence) on (deliberate) ignorance as a way of fleeing from 
being speak to this: “the world first appears to [us] as that in which nothing is given to man, within 
which man has no place unless he carves it out for himself”.284  The same text describes a love-hate 
relationship with freedom and the objective world that underpins it: “an ambivalent mixture of 
attraction and repulsion vis-à-vis the revealing for-itself”. We are, through the fundamental project 
to become God, attracted to an in-itself which offers the means to complete our existence, but also 
repulsed by its refusal to let us actually get there. Our freedom, through the impossibility of pure, 
eternal presence to the objects we intend, faces us with the impossibility of self-recovery whenever 
we reflect on it. Since all projects aim towards a final, closed end that is impossible, we are faced 
with a horrifying contingency to our actions: we are in an absurd, unjustifiable situation that we 
have to take responsibility for all the same.  The impossibility of finally grounding our projects is the 
greatest possible disvalue we can encounter. It is the detachment of all our rationally held goals 
from any grounding rational order, which our motivational structures nonetheless survive. We 
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remain capable of acting despite the basic irrationality and contingency of the structure as a whole, 
yet a reflective and full apprehension of this would provoke an unbearable crisis.285 The question, 
which returns us to the sphere of reflective and prereflective error, is how this is possible. 
 
As noted above, we can dispense with Sartre’s dismissal of Freud to skip to the real meat of things. 
Sartre opens his discussion proper by outlining three classic conducts of bad faith: the “flirt”, the 
waiter, and the homosexual with the “champion of sincerity”.286 A common tactic when approaching 
the literature is to look at the latter two as being more important, and the flirt as some kind of 
outlier case or exception.287 By contrast, I maintain that the flirt is the most important example he 
gives, far more so than either the waiter or the homosexual. As an opening thesis, we can say that 
bad faith is a way of suppressing the reflective awareness of anguish, which makes use of 
“psychological determinism”,288 an attitude which in general attempts to deny our freedom. The 
picture it paints is “deterministic” because it suggests our choices are made for us in 
advance/causally determined in order to avoid encountering the basic contingency of human 
existence. In turn, this attitude is enabled by manipulating the difference between facticity and 
transcendence – “it must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being 
facticity”.289 Exactly what this means is controversial, especially if the meanings of “transcendence” 
and “facticity” are still up for grabs. So before getting into the concrete cases of bad faith, I want to 
give a working definition of facticity and transcendence. For these purposes, facticity includes 
everything that could be a motif/mobile, including our past, our body, and the objective 
circumstances we find ourselves in.290  It is everything which is fixed and which we have to take 
responsibility for. Transcendence and the transcendent, by contrast, is everything that could be an 
end, they are our possibilities which are rushing towards us, they are what we will or could be. 
Transcendence is not coextensive with freedom, but it is a necessary part of freedom. However, so is 
facticity. On the picture I have been drawing across the previous chapters, we can identify facticity 
                                                          
285 However, a reflective apprehension of our freedom’s full effects is not alone sufficient for full-strength 
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with the past and present elements of consciousness, and transcendence with the future.  A 
temporalizing freedom is that which converts transcendence into facticity and/or shows that a given 
transcendent anticipation was empty.  I submit that, as well as being consonant with the system as 
set out above, this reading is partially proven by the power it has in making sense of bad faith. 
 
How does this play out in Sartre’s concrete examples of bad faith? Consider the case of the “flirt” on 
her date. She is out to dinner with a man who wants to sleep with her, and “knows very well the 
intentions which the man who is speaking to her cherishes”.291 Whatever she enjoys about the 
game, either leaving with him or turning him down will ruin it. Nonetheless, there are “possibilities 
of temporal development”, which is a ten-dollar way of saying the present in the restaurant implies 
a future, although not a specific one where they are together or not.  As he carries on obviously 
trying to seduce her, things ought to come to a simple decision: have sex with him, or don’t. Once he 
says to her, “I find you so attractive!”, things are make-or-break. Instead of choosing to see the 
urgency in the situation and the need for a decision, Sartre claims she chooses to make him a thing. 
What does this mean? It is “the projection of the strict present of the qualities into the temporal 
flux”, which is to say the denial of transcendence. It is the denial that there is anything to the 
situation apart from facticity, apart from the past or the present, the denial that there will ever be a 
future. Magically, she changes the world so it only contains abstract “objective qualities” or possible 
motifs, which makes him “sincere and respectful as the table is round or square”, whilst disavowing 
that those motifs require (and so suggest) an end.  She lets his comment wash over her while 
disarming the future it points to, and practically speaking this allows the evening to keep on going.  
 
Where this gets more complicated is Sartre’s claim that she hedges her bets between wanting to live 
in the factical or objective world (enjoying a feeling which “address[es] itself to her body as object”) 
and wanting to live in a world where she does have transcendence, where she gets “a recognition of 
her freedom”.  She “does not quite know what she wants”, which isn’t a simple case of indecision or 
a reflective analysis of the information she has to choose on, it’s a deliberate way of avoiding 
responsibility by choosing to not choose either way. While she is safe within the factical from the 
transcendent, it is still possible for factical things to threaten her project. Her defence, which is 
magical and does not actually change objective reality, cannot stop her date from taking her hand. 
Her body, part of the facticity that she tried to escape into, now suggests the decision she wanted to 
escape. Anything done to alter facticity (which in the specific case relevantly means moving her hand 
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or not) will imply a decision or demand one: “[t]o leave the hand there is to consent in herself to flirt 
… [to] withdraw it is to break the troubled and unstable harmony which gives the hour its charm”.292 
The answer is to dive headfirst into transcendence, to become “all intellect”. Potentially misleading 
Cartesian implications aside, she is identifying with an abstract transcendence293 which is a pure 
freedom, a pure consciousness with nothing to do with the body-as-object.  In temporal terms, she is 
projecting a future where she has been divorced from her hand (in the sense that where her hand 
was didn’t matter) and imposing that imagined possible future onto her facticity.  Although we will 
come back to this in the concrete case of the waiter, she is denying that she has a body, or past, by 
making her past and body pure reminders that she is only the future she is projecting. 
 
The overall point is that she uses both the association of facticity with transcendence and the 
association of transcendence with facticity in response to different existential threats. In the one 
case she denies the future by expanding the past/present into eternity, and in the other she denies 
the past/present by expanding the future back over the past/present.  Yet, if something should 
break us out of the one strategy, bad faith seems to be able to adapt and switch to the other, and 
this is what is captured here: “[bad faith] must affirm facticity as being transcendence and 
transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instance when a person apprehends the 
one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other”. In this process, we are always positing a 
fixed nature to ourselves, which is the whole point of the exercise. Whether we deny transcendence 
or facticity (more precisely, whichever side we give the status of the other) makes no difference to 
the end result: the denial of freedom. This is how Sartre can find bad faith in “Love is Much More 
than Love”, where “unity is established between present love in its facticity … and love as 
transcendence” to leave us “beyond the present and factual condition of man” as well as in “I am 
too Great for Myself” which “throws us first into full transcendence in order to suddenly imprison us 
within the limits of our factual existence”.294  As we will see later, this equivalence of the two 
conducts gives the overall structure a great deal of stability: as we see in the case of the flirt, we can 
always switch to the other type of bad faith if the one we are using falls apart.  
 
So in order to produce bad faith, we see Sartre appeal to a denial of transcendence or facticity or 
both. However, it is prima facie unclear what this “denial” entails, and this ambiguity plays out in the 
                                                          
292 Ibid., p.79. 
293 Which is magical because an actually existing abstract transcendence is impossible. 
294 Ibid., pp.79/80. 
 
 110 
 
historical debate between Stevenson, Gordon, and Hymers on bad faith.  At a gloss, Stevenson295 
gave the first Anglophone reading of bad faith as the reflective denial of that which we are 
prereflectively aware of, starting a debate about how this denial is possible if consciousness is 
translucent. The initial challenge to this model came from Gordon, who pointed out that denying 
something we are aware of should make us fully aware of whatever we are denying. His argument is 
almost naïve but devastating:  directly affirming that I am not counting cigarettes when I actually am 
is impossible.296 If I reflect on my prereflective activities, the translucency of consciousness entails I 
am also aware of any contradiction between what I affirm across the two levels of consciousness. In 
turn, Hymers suggested that bad faith avoids this problem by dealing in half-truths and half-lies. 
When we might get in trouble, he notes, we can use ambiguous statements to avoid confrontation 
or admitting guilt.  “No, I haven’t done the reading” becomes “I haven’t finished the reading yet”, 
which is strictly true because not even starting isn’t finishing, but in another sense a blatant lie 
because it implies some progress. The half-lie works because of an “underlying ambiguity between 
their public and private significances”,297 because of a difference between what I am saying and 
what is understood by the listener.  In a parallel way, the ambiguity of the conducts of bad faith 
allow us to deny the situations we are in without forcing us to avow directly contradictory claims 
about ourselves. However, it is not clear that the parallel works, since we can’t fall back on the 
public/private distinction to create an intrasubjective ambiguity. Nonetheless, I think we can make 
changes that let this kind of denial go through. 
 
Firstly, we should note that Hymers’ account is really addressed at transcendence, or the future. 
When it comes to past actions or character proper, self-deception doesn’t face the same problems 
because of the ambiguity of assembling evidence.  An individual’s past, even the past of someone 
who has done relatively little, is so full of events that there could be any number of ways to 
assemble them into a whole. Unless the picture of ourselves we paint is completely extreme, there 
will always be some kind of evidence for it – however tenuous. If I want to say I am basically bad 
because I once stole money as a child, seeing my whole law-abiding adult life as the close-call result 
of heroic self-denial, I can. By contrast, when someone asks “have you done the reading?” and we 
half-lie “I haven’t finished yet” it is not an appeal to, or reinterpretation of, facticity. There is nothing 
in the past to base the (implied) claim I have started the reading on whatsoever. When we look at 
our own self-image, the same thing holds. If I avow to myself I am studious and have not failed in my 
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studiousness by not reading, this might be supported by no factical evidence either. If we can’t 
appeal to public/private or implicit/explicit meanings for ambiguity, where can we look? The answer 
is, to the future. Since the future is always in question, we can appeal to a future where we will have 
done the reading in spite of our current projects being incompatible with studying. When we reflect 
on it, this kind of anticipation is of the form “my actions will form part of the evidence for my desired 
character” or “my action will be irrelevant to judgment of my character”. Imagine someone 
challenges my eating habits when I am eating chocolate cake, but I don’t want to give up the belief I 
am on a diet. By anticipating a future of lots of exercise or a number of healthy meals that outweighs 
it, I can appeal to that possible future and avow “I’m on a cheat day”. The notion of “cheat days” 
depends on a sustained period of dieting before and after, and since nothing can yet prove with 
certainty that I will fail, I can appeal to a future of good behaviour without contradiction. This kind of 
appeal to the future is a half-truth insofar as it acknowledges objective facts about the present yet 
surrounds them with virtual future events to disarm them of anything troubling. 
 
The next two examples of bad faith, the waiter and the homosexual, are important because they 
spell out the poles of bad faith in more detail and give us a better purchase on bad faith on the level 
of character, Ego, and identity. Nonetheless, they do not show us anything structural that is not 
there in the example of the flirt and the remarks around it.  When we look at the behaviour of the 
waiter, we see that he is play-acting on some level since his movements are exaggerated, too 
stereotypical: “all his behaviour seems to be a game”.298 Although he can never become a waiter 
permanently because his projects are always subject to change, he nonetheless attempts to 
symbolically or magically affirm that he is completely and entirely a waiter by adopting the role as 
fully as he possibly can.  As Catalano has pointed out, possibly later influencing McCulloch’s focus on 
the discussion of logical and real possibilities,299 there are limits to what we can transcend ourselves 
towards: “’transcendencies’ does not mean remote or farfetched ways of acting, but believable ways 
of behaviour”.300 The logical or abstract possibility of taking on the permanent essence of waiterhood 
is played out in his actions, it’s a possible future that he makes equivalent to his facticity by shaping 
his actual facticity around it, trying to glue down his actions (and presumably his past) into the 
unquestionable actions of a waiter. Of course, it is impossible that he achieves this permanent 
essence: “the original structure of ‘not being what one is’ renders impossible in advance all 
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movement toward being it itself or ‘being what one is”301 This is, in principle, no different than the 
flirt trying to shape her factical situation into one that does not spoil her evening,302 yet we will soon 
see the significance of the example as being bound up with an identity. 
 
The second single-pole example Sartre gives us is the “unhappy homosexual” who is, insofar as we 
can have impermanent identities, definitely gay; reading his past actions through a Morris-inspired 
picture of character makes him unequivocally homosexual.303 He ought to agree that “[t]o the extent 
that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of [homosexuality] and to the extent that I have 
adopted this conduct, I am [homosexual]”.304 His colleague, who pushes him to confess his 
homosexuality, wants him simply to admit what he is, rather than trying to spin facts about his life as 
out of character, the result of chance, and so on.305  So to begin with, he is in the same situation as 
the waiter: he plays with a possible way of transcending his past actions and attempts to disarm his 
present and past by making it continuous with a desired character or description.  His past actions 
become a phase of experimentation: “the results of a restless search, rather than the manifestations 
of a deeply rooted tendency”.  He overcomes the facts about his situation by using his freedom: he 
sees the acts that make up his homosexuality as “a destiny”, as equivalent to influences beyond his 
control. What happens if he “admits” his nature and is sincere? As far as the evasion of freedom 
goes, not much. Giving in to the demand, at least the demand put on the homosexual, is “to confess 
what I am in order that I might finally coincide with my being”,306 it is becoming all facticity. Once he 
identifies with his character, he affirms that it is essence and not merely the unity of his past actions. 
Or at least, this is the “ideal” of sincerity, the condition that the person aiming to be sincere is trying 
to reach – even though it is impossible, as impossible as the waiter being a waiter or the flirt’s date 
lasting forever. However, the case is not this clean-cut: we need to make a distinction between living 
the life of someone attempting sincerity, and this ideal or end game of sincerity to see what is going 
on more broadly. Considering the wider life of someone attempting sincerity, we have already seen 
how the homosexual originally favoured transcendence over facticity. Once this failed (the failure 
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triggered by his colleague’s demands), then he switched to the ideal of sincerity, the favouring of 
facticity over transcendence. Yet since we do not really have fixed essences, this has to fail too, 
eventually leading him back to some equivalent of the first position (which doesn’t have to be a 
denial of homosexuality, but can be any conduct that denies one’s facticity). This creates “a 
continual game of mirror and reflection, a perpetual passage from the being which is what it is, to 
the being which it is not what it is and inversely from the being which is not what it is to the being 
which is what it is”.  
 
Strictly speaking, the lifestyle or broader conduct of someone aiming at sincerity does not produce a 
different result from the broader lifestyle of someone in the waiter’s position. Taxonomically it can 
be useful to talk about the difference between the ideals that organise their lives lived in bad faith – 
usually Bad Faith307 for trying to privilege transcendence and sincerity for trying to privilege facticity, 
along with the umbrella term “bad faith” for all conduct denying freedom. The flirt is a case that 
takes in both indifferently, a very local case happening over an evening or even a few minutes. Yet 
even when we look at each individual pole, it is clear that “the goal of sincerity and the goal of Bad 
Faith are not so different”.308 While we can abstract from concrete examples of bad faith to the 
abstract structures of Bad Faith and sincerity, all actual instances of bad faith must be concrete. They 
must be the bad cook persuading himself his food is delicious, the homeowner putting off paying 
their bills, the child who says he “is just bad” at mathematics.  Whilst bad faith is abstractly the game 
of playing with facticity and transcendence, like anything else consciousness does it must be a 
project. Since our projects lead to actions, and our actions form a vital part of our history, bad faith 
will always interact with character and identity.  Bad faith will shape the new elements of our 
character being laid down, and it has to reckon with our character insofar as our past acts are motifs 
for future ones.  Thus, the ontological game always leads us into who we are, our ethos, and from 
there into the realm of the ethical. Therefore, although the structure of bad faith says nothing by 
itself about character, every actual instance of bad faith will take the form of games about identity 
which make use of character. 
 
This fact is what allows us to describe bad faith on a psychoanalytic level: the preoccupation with 
identity can give us the obsessions of a person with a character, over and above the stream of 
consciousness’s need for unity which can be basically any theme whatsoever. A bad faith which is 
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concerned with identity and stability of the self is on the level of Laing’s “ontological security”.309  
The ontologically secure person “will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, 
biological, from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity”,310 in other 
words, they will not experience freedom as anguishing.311 An “ontologically insecure” individual will 
be keenly aware of anguish and driven in their everyday actions by avoiding it. The conducts of 
ontological insecurity Laing covers in The Divided Self contain striking parallels to Sartre’s conducts 
of bad faith. Under the threat of “implosion”, there is the “experience of the world as liable at any 
moment to crash in and obliterate all identity as gas will rush in and obliterate a vacuum”.312 This is 
almost as clear a statement of the threat anguish poses as there could be.  He goes on: “[R]eality, as 
experienced from this position, is necessarily implosive … and in itself a threat to what identity the 
individual is able to suppose himself to have.”313 In the more precise Sartrean terms, this is the 
threat posed by the in-itself to our projects, the hate in the love-hate relationship with being Sartre 
describes in Truth and Existence. To repeat, even though attaining an identity is not the goal of bad 
faith, the stability that is its goal can only be accessed through a security of identity, through 
ontological security. Although Laing is not concerned with the ontological level, the parallels 
between his descriptions of psychological defences and Sartre’s of bad faith underscore how tightly 
connected the two are: “[b]eing like everyone else, being someone other than oneself, playing a 
part, being incognito, being anonymous, being nobody (psychotically, pretending to have no body) 
are defences that are carried through with great thoroughness in certain schizoid and schizophrenic 
conditions”.314 
 
For all of this, we have yet to see how this ties into our picture of error and the (willed) failure to 
reveal (parts of) the world. These conducts, while they show how bad faith connects to the life of 
the psyche and show locally how bad faith is possible, don’t fill in the blanks between the basic 
structure of Sartrean knowledge and these conducts of bad faith.  The key lies in the section called 
“the faith of bad faith” which connects the denial of facticity or transcendence to the structures of 
knowledge covered in the previous section. The key part of Sartre’s setup is this:  
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The true problem of bad faith stems evidently from the fact that bad faith is faith. It can not either be 
a cynical lie or certainty – if certainty is the intuitive possession of the object. But if we take belief as 
meaning the adherence of being to its object when the object is not given or is given indistinctly is 
belief; and the essential problem of bad faith is a problem of belief. 315 
 
Going by the picture of knowledge in the previous section, there is no such thing as the intuitive 
possession of the object. We are always necessarily separated from our objects by nothingness, by 
the temporalisation inherent to the structure of consciousness. In this sense, no object is given 
distinctly at all, since the project of grasping it always makes them slip away from us. Apart from the 
fleeting moment of presence of the object, we can also apprehend the world through truth, but 
truths in the sense given above are provisional, every time they are used is a time that they are 
checked or verified. As a result, the sense in which knowledge is belief is incredibly wide, covering 
(almost) everything we would normally think of as being knowledge.316 Rather than being in a 
separate realm to knowledge,317 on this reading belief is not sharply divided from it. This is what is 
exploited by bad faith; since all knowledge is akin to belief, it is possible to collapse the distinction 
and thereby lower our standards of evidence until it is possible to see as true all kinds of things that 
wouldn’t stand up to real scrutiny. This is why we are told that “I have not persuaded myself [of a 
given self-deceptive avowal]; to the extent that I could be so persuaded, I have always been so”318 
since the normal standards of what persuades have been suspended, and that same extent of 
evidence is now sufficient – the goalposts move, not the state of the objective world. All of this is 
summarised in the claim that bad faith works because it “does not hold the norms and criteria of 
truth as they are held by the critical thought of good faith”,319 which I will follow Catalano as taking 
to a be a properly critical set of standards of evidence. 
 
If bad faith is a case of manipulating evidence and exploiting the nature of belief, we must be very 
careful. If we sneak in (or Sartre sneaks in) a cognitive, judging element to the way pre-reflective 
consciousness constructs its projects/approaches evidence, then we will have broken the very first 
                                                          
315 BN, p.91. 
316 With the exception of apodictically certain truths, which are mostly mathematical or logical, or facts about 
our experiences as we experience them.  
317 A reading which appears in the work of, e.g., Cox: see Cox, Gary. Sartre and Fiction. Continuum: London, 
2009. p. 128. 
318 BN, p.91. 
319 Ibid. 
 
 116 
 
tenet of Sartre’s system, that pre-reflective consciousness is not based on judgment.320 This is why 
he is at pains to confirm that “there is no question of a reflective, voluntary decision, but of a 
spontaneous determination of our being”.  Whether or not this is true remains to be seen.  Belief, in 
the picture of Being and Nothingness, is uniquely self-destructive.  Sartre, with a perhaps 
unnecessary appeal to Hegel, describes how immediate belief (“I decide to believe in it, and to 
maintain myself in this decision; I conduct myself, finally, as if I were certain of it”)321 has to give way 
to non-belief, since being aware of a unified set of things in the world (like his friend’s actions) also 
entails awareness that I am effecting that unification (through the translucency of consciousness). At 
the same time as I am certain of my belief, it “appears to me as a pure subjective determination 
without external correlative”, i.e. as something I am making that is not exclusively grounded in 
objective reality. So whilst I have certainty in a belief (Pierre is my friend) as an immediately given 
part of the world, that very immediate certainty about the world has to come with the awareness 
my own consciousness generates the world that belief is about.  In summary, (all) belief is inherently 
contradictory because it is grounded in something is that simultaneously out there, completely 
independent of me, and something wholly dependent on me for its being. This tension is another 
manifestation of the impossibility of simply grasping one’s object that is there right from the 
beginning, from the separation of consciousness from the tree “out there” in the Mediterranean.  
While the impossibility of ever grasping the object perfectly as if it were purely an in-itself prevents 
belief and knowledge from being permanent, there are different ways that this can factor into how 
we try to grasp the world. If we choose good faith, we are trying to grasp our objects in spite of this 
problem:  “the ideal of good faith (to believe what one believes) is, like that of sincerity (to be what 
one is), an ideal of being-in-itself”.322 323  Bad faith is, at heart, an attitude that uses this fact to 
accept low standards of evidence, by divorcing itself from evidence one way or the other: “If every 
belief in good faith is an impossible belief, then there is a place for every impossible belief”.324 The 
equivalent reflective choice would be to accept any old evidence for a position, since perfect 
evidence is not available, and when we put it this way the fallacy should be obvious. As Catalano 
puts it: “the uncritical evidence of bad faith is thus seen by the person in bad faith to be as good as 
                                                          
320 This is, in effect, what Wider accuses Sartre of doing in her The Bodily Nature of Consciousness. We will see 
this in more detail soon. (Wider, Kathleen: The Bodily Nature of Consciousness. Cornell University Press: 
London, 1997). 
321 BN, p. 92. 
322 Ibid., p.93. 
323 This comparison to sincerity might cause us to see good faith as a subspecies of bad faith, however the very 
effort to apprehend the world is different from a reflective attempt to apprehend the world as certain. 
324 Ibid. 
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the critical evidence of good faith”.325 
 
So far, this could very well be introducing judgment into the pre-reflective level: an attitude of bad 
faith seems to judge that all evidence is as good as any other, or that belief is not to believe. Wider 
notes that “In explicating what this duality [that belief is not to believe] amounts to, Sartre 
reintroduces epistemological considerations”.326  She illustrates the point with this quote: “To 
believe is to know that one believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe”.327 If bad 
faith turns on introducing judgment into the pre-reflective, then pre-reflective consciousness can no 
longer ground reflection, destroying Sartre’s entire system.  However, we can substitute in a non-
problematic awareness that “to believe is not to believe” if we consider the Sartrean schema of truth 
and belief with respect to his picture of temporality and presence.  Earlier, we saw that the wider 
sense of “belief” needed to drive bad faith in fact includes almost all knowledge and truth in their 
technical Sartrean senses, because there can never be the final, definitive presence of the objective 
world to consciousness.  Every attempt to grasp an object is a kind of reaching into the future, an 
anticipation, and yet our anticipations can fail. If our anticipations automatically carry with them an 
awareness of their uncertainty, then we can be aware that belief is “not to believe” without 
problematically making prereflective judgments. I want to suggest that the awareness of our failure 
to grasp our objects is not something that we judge or reason towards; it is coextensive with the 
awareness that time has a flow. This spares Sartre from Wider’s criticism, insofar as the normal 
operation of consciousness could imbue us with an awareness of its structure instead of 
prereflective consciousness passing judgment on itself in bad faith. As far as the fallibility of belief 
goes, there is a world of difference between being aware that there is a future which is a priori 
subject to change and judging that a given, specific vision of the future is liable not to happen. 
Williford captures this point well when he says that “[t]he anticipation of a specific future, that may 
or may not unfold in the way expected, is already a level or layer above the flow, although it 
presupposes the flow”.328  There is, he points out, a certain sense in which the future is infallible: our 
projects involve an anticipated or protended future which they refer to and cannot exist separately 
from. As far as there being a future goes, “protention is infallible just because it is an internal 
relation consciousness bears to itself as already reaching into its future”.329 Nonetheless any 
                                                          
325 Catalano, Joseph, Good Faith and Other Essays. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: London, 1996. p.138. 
326 Wider, The Bodily Nature of Consciousness, p. 88. 
327 BN, p.92, emphasis Wider’s. 
328 Williford, Kenneth, “Degrees of Self-Presence” in Miguens, Sofia, Preyer, Gerhard, and Bravo Morando, 
Clara (eds.) Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge: Abingdon, 
2016. p.73. 
329 Ibid. 
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anticipation of an actual future can be inaccurate; an anticipation is by its nature not certain (see the 
description of presence in Section Two, above). We can straightforwardly be aware of a given 
anticipated future as relying on the temporal flow of consciousness without judging that it is so, and 
that awareness of temporality brings along with it an awareness of the future’s uncertainty. Let’s be 
precise about this: the awareness of uncertainty that is immediately given is purely logical and 
related to my own freedom. It has nothing to do with the objective circumstances surrounding the 
anticipation, nor is it an awareness of destiny (the impact of chance). It is the (direct) apprehension 
of the uncertainty the present introduces, of the impact of our ambiguous separation from our 
intentional objects. Wider’s claim was that belief has to know itself as belief to generate the 
ambiguity that drives bad faith, but if all knowledge is immediately given as uncertain, the troubling 
cognitive element drops out.   
 
This attitude of “uncritical evidence” plays out as we make the kinds of claims that only we seem 
convinced by; Catalano gives an excellent example of the bad rower who sees all he signs he is 
unathletic as normal parts of athleticism. Athletes sweat, of course, so the way he sweats as he 
flounders is normal, and proves that he is an athlete. Since rowing is strenuous and rowers get sore 
muscles, the resistance he feels is again normal and a sign that he really is a rower like the rest of 
them. A normal, critical standard of evidence about athletic ability says that someone whose 
muscles ache in the first five minutes is at best very rusty, yet what should be evidence against 
calling him an athlete is used to let him avow he is doing well. There is a problem for this kind of self-
deception: since consciousness is translucent, he should be prereflectively aware that he is not 
actually a good athlete.330 Yet, as Calatano points out,331 the awareness we have of our failure can be 
reconceptualised. A muted or dim awareness of ourselves as self-deceptive might be a background 
feeling of uneasiness or dread, which we can avow is related to something else. The rower might say 
that he is tired, or that the uneasiness is about the tax return he hasn’t filed, explaining away the 
lingering, abstract disvalue he is aware of. Guilt about an unfiled tax return might be unpleasant, but 
it isn’t an existential threat unless being prompt and efficient is a critical part of the identity we are 
trying to latch on to. In fact, the discomfort that should challenge our deceptive practices might be 
used to reinforce our (current) identity. What should, on the face of it, destroy our bad faith can 
reinforce it. 
 
                                                          
330 I.e. that he lacks the character evidence for being one. 
331 Catalano, Joseph, “Successfully Lying to Oneself: A Sartrean Perspective.” in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research vol.50, no. 4 (June 1990): pp. 673-693.  
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Consider how our identities can turn on disliking or liking certain things: someone eco-conscious 
might get angry at the government’s management of high ground in England and how it leads to 
flooding. Their anger should flow from the huge disvalue to them of arbitrarily grazing land that 
should be covered in shrub, and it would be surprising if they did not feel that way.  It might even be 
good evidence they don’t care about the environment if these cases didn’t provoke a response in 
them. This kind of account flows naturally from a Sartrean picture where emotions, which are 
actively generated, can reflect our projects332 and the progress of those projects. By conflating our 
sense of unease that we aren’t really, e.g., eco-conscious with despair or anger about the state of 
the environment, we can reinforce that identity, using our discomfort as evidence for our avowed 
projects.333 The anger, the unease, is beyond the possibility of doubt, but we can still hide the target 
of that anger from ourselves. This leads to one way that bad faith can remain stable and enduring: 
the mechanisms that ought to tear it apart can be hijacked by the effort to keep it together.  
 
Despite accepting all of this, we might object that we ought to be aware of this second-order self-
deception, the self-deception about our self-deception.  If it fails, our basic self-deception should be 
vulnerable and ultimately fail, causing bad faith to inevitably degrade and fall apart. However, 
talking about second and first-order projects in this way presupposes the deceptions are layers of 
physical protection, like a moat and then a wall. If we were trying to get past a series of physical 
obstacles like a castle, clearing the moat would be enough to never be faced with it again. In the 
case of self-deceptive projects, both the deceptive project and second-order protections can be so 
diffuse that physical break-in analogies fail completely. A whole series of self-deceptions, both 
sincerity and Bad Faith, can be leveraged to support the master project, and replaced or re-used at 
any time. In fact, the objection presupposes that a failed self-deceptive project has to be replaced 
with a project in good faith, which as we saw with the flirt isn’t the case; the failure of concrete 
projects is an integral part of a life lived in bad faith. Having described the collapse of bad faith under 
the translucency of consciousness, Sartre notes that “these phenomena [i.e., collapses of bad faith] 
are frequent and we shall see that there is an “evanescence” of bad faith which, it is evident, 
vacillates frequently between good faith and cynicism”,334 i.e., he is willing to grant that conducts or 
second-order projects of bad faith collapse very often.  If we read this into the case of the flirt, the 
attraction of good faith would be the awareness that she has to make a decision, an assessment of 
                                                          
332 See Chapter Two. 
333 This possibility was highlighted by Bob Solomon in his “Sartre on Emotions” in Schlipp, Paul Arthur (ed.): The 
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Open Court: La Salle, Illinois, 1981. pp. 211-229. The closing pages of Solomon’s 
article are most relevant here. 
334 BN p.73. 
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the situation based on a certain realistic and appropriate standard of knowledge. Yet, since a 
different conduct of bad faith is available to her (whether that’s the dodge into all-facticity or all-
transcendence is irrelevant) it is possible to re-enter the “cynicism” of bad faith, the poor standards 
of evidence and avoidance of one’s freedom. He goes on: “[e]ven though the existence of bad faith 
is precarious, and although it belongs to the kind of psychic structures which we might call 
‘metastable’, it presents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form”. What I take this to mean is, 
even though Bad Faith and sincerity are vulnerable and collapse often, we can still remain slaved to 
their overall goal of bad faith.  
 
This structure allows us to avow addressing our bad faith without really challenging it at all. If, in bad 
faith, I try to investigate why I feel uneasy or out of place, destroying one of the poles allows me to 
end my self-examination. It lets the investigation be finished without ever addressing the real 
problem, without addressing the avoidance of freedom. Although individual conducts are constantly 
exposed and outed, bad faith can take the form of “a constant and particular style of life”. It is easy 
to imagine what this would look like: a life filled with uneasiness, constant self-examination, and 
desire for improvement but which nonetheless remains stagnant. An individual living like this will 
constantly have revelations about themselves and be acutely self-aware about what their projects 
have aimed at, revelations like: “I became a waiter because I was scared to go to law school” or “I 
was weird with him on the date because I am afraid of commitment”. There is nothing about bad 
faith that makes these things false, and in a certain way they are massively insightful. These types of 
observations might be extremely good at assessing character, but they say nothing directly about 
our projects.335 This insightfulness is part of their danger: since they are accurate at the local level, 
they are enough to stop our self-examination or railroad it somewhere else. This is where the 
“unknown unknowns” of the previous section come in:  an accurate reflective assessment of our 
character is impossible if we don’t even set the right parameters for investigation. Our master 
project of bad faith, such as an inferiority project, is in principle always perceptible in our character 
and analysable. Yet if we are constantly looking at concrete reasons why we have failed in our 
endeavours, the transcendent unity of the project can remain hidden – even if we are reflectively 
aware of everything that should show it to us under some description. In bad faith, there can be 
things that we are ignoring by making ourselves not even look for them: ask why we failed the exam, 
when we should wonder why we decided to fail it. In this way, the “evanescent” switching between 
different forms of bad faith can stop the master project from ever being unveiled, which leaves the 
                                                          
335 See the following remark: “’to know oneself well’ is inevitably to look at oneself from the point of view of 
someone else, in other words from a point of view that is necessarily false” (TE, p.38). 
 
 121 
 
prereflective motivations for our actions hidden to reflection. They appear to us as unknown factors 
that we didn’t even know to look for, as “destiny”336 in the lexicon of Truth and Existence. Once we 
have accepted destiny, we are in the realms of chance events determining us. While we pursue 
projects hidden to reflection, we can end up in a world of causal determinism that just happens to 
always be stacked against us, again and again.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
336 See T&E p.39: “if I run toward the ditch hidden by branches to avoid the beater who is running after me … it 
does not exist for me and my projects do not take it into account … since each step brings me closer to it and 
for-me these steps can neither bring me closer nor move me away from it … it awaits me, comes nearer and 
manoeuvres my legs. This relationship of interiority in exteriority without reciprocity … is called Destiny”. 
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Section Two: The Social Nature of Self-Deception. 
 
The above account misses out something that should be obvious: in practice, self-deception often 
plays out for an audience. Our acts of self-deception are more likely to play off the reactions of 
others than not. It is almost a cliché to point out that the flirt, the waiter, and the unhappy 
homosexual are all embedded in social contexts, and those contexts are necessary to getting all of 
those examples off the ground.337 In particular, there seems to be something special about the 
character(s) we aim toward and their social origins – all kinds of archetypes we might be trying to 
embody only exist in a social context. Being a priest, for example, is only intelligible in the context of 
an organised religion created and sustained by a community. One key question is how these 
characters can be substantial enough to offer an escape from the problems of incompleteness and 
desire that we, as conscious entities, necessarily face. The obvious path here is to examine the 
famous “look” which Sartre claims is capable of gluing us down and fixing us; in the look, the other 
can make us into a voyeur, a gardener, a waiter, etc. We might ask two further questions: in what 
sense are we forced into a certain character by others, and does the seeming need to embody a 
(social) character in bad faith mean that all bad faith is necessarily social? 
 
So what is the look and how does it serve a role in fixing us, in whatever sense, into having a 
particular character/ego? In the standard example, Sartre imagines himself motivated by jealousy to 
spy on someone else (a couple) through a keyhole, “alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-
consciousness”.338 While he is alone and unnoticed, he is purely living his actions, not thematising 
them or their consequences and significance. His consciousness is, as he puts it, “a pure mode of 
losing myself in the world”, at that moment all that he is is exhausted by the act of spying.  More 
simply, he is focused on what he is doing and is not reflecting on its impact on his character or what 
it will add to the narrative of his history; he is there, purely caught up in the moment. His response 
to his jealous ends and all the motifs and mobiles present is to spy, to put his ear up to the door, but 
there is no Ego or self that is spying. This is what is meant by the claim, “[t]here is nothing there but 
a pure nothingness encircling a certain objective ensemble and throwing it into relief outlined upon 
the world”.339 So what comes next? At the sound of footsteps down the hall the other is made 
                                                          
337 Not to mention the example of the grocer which society “demands he limit himself to his function as a 
grocer” (BN p.82). 
338 Ibid., p.283. 
339 Ibid., p.284. 
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present to him, and he is made present to himself: “I now exist as myself for my unreflective 
consciousness”.340 Suddenly, he is aware of what he is doing, of the consequences, of who his 
actions make him – he is, to himself, a pervert, a failure, etc. This awareness is immediate, powerful, 
and all-consuming; something in the outside world seems to compel him to adopt it. To say that the 
other has forced him to adopt an identity seems to be a perfectly accurate assessment of the 
situation. Whether it is shame, pride, embarrassment, or whatever else, the takeaway message is 
that there are cases of emotion and/or self-awareness that seem to be imposed from outside.341 If 
we want to accept that analysis of the situation, then we have to cash out the description and deal 
with some apparent contradictions with the system as it has been presented so far. 
 
Since all awareness of the Ego/character so far has been reflective, falling under knowledge and 
judgment, if we are given pre-reflective knowledge of a socially mediated character through the 
look, the pre-reflective cogito has been violated. If that’s right, we either have to throw out the 
analysis or break the system as a whole.  So how can we be aware purely prereflectively of a 
character or Ego being imposed on us? One answer is that the intersubjective Ego or character is 
traced out in a kind of negative space, a process which can functionally introduce an Ego into my 
pre-reflective consciousness even though there is, strictly speaking, no such object there. When we 
use negative space in art, we exploit the way that if I draw everything around a figure like a chair, 
then there will be a perfectly chair-shaped gap in the scene I have drawn. It is possible, and in many 
cases easier, to draw the ground rather than the figure – and at no point would an artist using 
negative space focus on or attempt to reproduce the chair itself. Instead, they would look at the 
edge of the dog sitting by it, the boundary of the table in front of it, etc. This idea helps us make 
sense of the claim that the Ego “comes to haunt the prereflective consciousness”342 through the 
action of the look, rather than being present as an object within consciousness. What I take this to 
mean is that (since) the other can directly alter the values present in my world, and make my world 
into the world of a pervert (hero, coward, etc), he can make my world into one that traces out a 
character for me because of the gaps and blanks it is shaped around.  Under the look, Sartre claims 
that “I am in a world which the Other has made alien to me, for the Other’s look embraces my being 
and correlatively the walls, the door, the keyhole. All these instrumental-things in the midst of which 
                                                          
340 Ibid. 
341 This gives us a naïve objection-and-reply. Someone might object that they don’t experience emotions in this 
way, stopping the account dead; the only reply would be that the experience is universal and to claim 
otherwise is simply mistaken. 
342 Ibid. 
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I am, now turn toward the Other a face which on principle escapes me.”343 Although I remain free to 
respond to this imposition, I am faced with a world which is no longer (uniquely) mine, with a set of 
limitations on my freedom.  
 
How are we to make sense of the other modifying our values, and through them our world? One 
option is to say it is just given in or discovered through the experience of the look. On this reading, 
something about the experience of intrasubjective emotions both reveals the other to us and shows 
that they are capable of an action-at-a-distance to affect our world.344 Since the description of the 
look is given as a fiat, then more needs to be said for us to run with the account. Recall345 how, For 
Sartre, the world can be described as a kind of web or map of significance – as marking out 
‘hodological’ space. In line with our projects, some parts of it appear in the foreground, others in the 
background, some demanding to be realised, others demanding to be stopped. All of it appears at 
once, its parts intimately interconnected with each other in figure-ground relations and depending 
on our nihilating, value-granting being to exist. We can meaningfully talk about this hodological 
space, taking some Merleau-Ponty inspired terminology, as a field of value. Just like an 
electromagnetic field repels or attracts certain objects, the hodological value field attracts or repels 
certain possible futures or ways for the world or the subject to be. When a project clicks into place 
and I act on it, we can talk about my value field having successfully attracted its end. As metaphors 
go, this might seem fairly strange, but its strength is how easily it can be extended to cover how the 
Other might directly give me values or modify my value structure.  
 
Imagine for a moment how two electromagnetic fields interact. To begin with, out of range of one 
another, they are completely distinct, with independent charge and strength across the whole field. 
As they come closer, some of the field lines will be strengthened by constructive interference, and 
others weakened by destructive interference. If the two are pushed together such that they merge 
completely, the gross charges in the original patterns will be replaced by the net charges of the new, 
single field. No object, in the sense of a physical, tangible thing is modified, yet the potential 
behaviour of objects in the field changes. In the case of two individuals either looking, being looked 
at, or mutually looking at one another, no object is created by means of the encounter, but a 
                                                          
343 Ibid., p. 285. 
344 I say here intrasubjective emotions because the case of the look falls under the second account of emotion 
in the Sketch and the compatibility of the first and second accounts can be contested, e.g. by Richmond in her 
“Magic in Sartre’s Early Philosophy”, in in Webber, Jonathan (ed.) Reading Sartre Routledge: Abingdon, 2011, 
pp. 145-161. pp.154-5. 
345 See also Chapter Two, above. 
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modification of the value structure of the world is effected, a modification which depends on my 
existing projects and the values I already project into the world. It is not a creation from nothing of a 
new world, but the net product of the action of the other’s field/hodological space on mine.  Why 
should this description be any more persuasive? The answer is at least threefold: first, it allows us to 
take an unusual stance on the refutation of solipsism that reinforces Sartre’s point in that section. 
Second, it makes sense of Sartre’s description of the self as a limit to the power of the other to 
dominate our world or assimilate it entirely into our own.346 Lastly, this picture allows interesting 
comparisons with the ‘second account’ of the emotions in the Sketch, especially if we read the 
references to magic there as still being operative in BN. 
 
The analogy comes into its own when Sartre claims that “consciousness can be limited only by 
consciousness”.347 Whenever we look at fields interacting, the condition of possibility of that 
interaction is that they are bound by the same laws, and of the same kind. Just as we can see the 
presence of a new electromagnetic field in telltale distortions of a pre-existing one, the idea is that 
living through a distortion in our own field of value proves to us, immediately, the presence of 
another consciousness. This is suggested when Sartre talks about the look as being “my 
transcendence transcended”.348 When Sartre says that “I perceive that these possibilities which I am 
and which are the condition of my transcendence are given to another, given as about to be 
transcended in turn by his own possibilities”, we can easily read this as an awareness of the 
modification of projects (via the modification of “possibilities”, i.e. the goals those projects depend 
on) by the presence of the other. Yet, if the other can transcend my own possibilities, then how is it 
that they do not completely overwrite or overstamp the whole? One answer lies in the following 
claim: “[the self is] the limit between two consciousnesses as it is produced by the limiting 
consciousness and assumed by the limited consciousness”.349  Effectively, the objection is backwards 
since the self-for others is what limits our absorption into the consciousness of the other. The other 
does not fail to absorb us for want of trying; the self-for-others arises as the barrier or limit to the 
total integration of the two consciousnesses. Or, to put it another way, the self-for-others turns out 
to be the manifestation of the resistance each field of value offers to the other, giving way in places, 
resisting in others, with a possibility of mutual strengthening in still others.  
This picture is not localised to BN. The direct modification of the other’s field of values is also a 
                                                          
346 BN p.312: “[the] Self-as-object (is) the limit between two consciousnesses” 
347 Ibid., p. 310. 
348 Ibid., p.287. 
349 Ibid., p.10. 
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theme in the Sketch, although in that context it is presented as one aspect of “magic”, insofar as 
“man is always a sorcerer for man”.350 In the main body of that text, emotions fill a similar role for 
Sartre as dreams do for Freud:351 they act as a symbolic or magical fulfilment of the individual’s 
wishes, a compensation for thwarted desires. These emotions’ direction of fit is mind-to world; 
consciousness begets a reality where our problems have been transcended.  In the second picture, 
the direction of fit is reversed, and “the world reveals itself as unrealisable and reveals itself as a 
magical environment”,352 chiefly in the encounter with the other.  What is it for something to be 
magical? “[T]he magical … is an inert activity, a consciousness rendered passive”353 where to become 
passive is to be “altered, degraded”, which tallies with the above account of the other making an 
alteration or modification of consciousness. That degredation comes through an other, e.g., through 
a face at the window. Immediately, terror takes hold, an “act of consciousness which destroys all the 
structures of the world that might dispel the magic … the window as ‘object that must first be 
broken’ and the ten yards as ‘distance that must first be covered’ should be annihilated”.354 The 
ordinary requirements of (objective/physical) threat are swept away, and we are no longer in a 
logical world. If we were dealing with the situation as a mundane one, it would hold far less threat. 
The room functions as an instrumental complex that makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for the 
potential threat to reach us, because of the way any attacker’s body is held in check by the door, the 
bolt, bars at the window, etc. Yet in the magical experience of terror, the instrumental complex does 
not feature because we are “in a world which is such that all the things existing in it are magical in 
nature, and the only defences against them are magical”.355 Now, although he is talking about 
consciousness as it manifests through (embodied) behaviour, Sartre also asserts that in the same 
circumstance “[t]he behaviour which gives its meaning to the emotion is no longer our behaviour; it 
is the expression of the face and the movements of the body of the other being, which make up a 
synthetic whole together with the upheaval in our own organism”.356 357 The two descriptions are 
                                                          
350 Sartre, Jean- Paul. Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Translated by Philip Mairet. Routledge: London and 
New York, 2002. p.56. Hereafter referenced as the Sketch. 
351 See Freud, Sigmund. The Interpretation of Dreams. Trans. Brill, A.A., Ware: Wordsworth: London, 1997. Esp. 
ch.1 &2. 
352 Sketch, p.57. 
353 Ibid., p. 56. 
354 Ibid., p. 59. 
355 “Magic” here is doubly relevant since an Other in this sense is like a spirit which is from, and operates on 
different rules to, the mundane world. For an excellent account of how spiritual worlds differ from and interact 
with ours, see Carmen Blacker’s account of Shinto Kami worship: Blacker, Carmen, The Catalpa Bow. 
Routledge: London, 1999.                                                     
356 Although this is a claim about behaviour, that behaviour derives directly from consciousness insofar 
consciousness “drags the body with it in as much as the body is belief and the consciousness believes in it”. 
(Sketch, pp. 57-8). 
357 Ibid., p.58 
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interdependent. The only defence is magical because it would have to be a direct counter-
modification of the other, rather than a manipulation of the objective world, the world of tools and 
objects. I am not vulnerable because of a projected chain of events like the door getting kicked down 
and an attacker bullrushing me. I am vulnerable because I am infected with a project of making-
myself-vulnerable, and the only way to stop that vulnerability is to parry-riposte this projection by 
directly making the other nonthreatening.  The possibility, even necessity, of this kind of 
counterstrike makes a circular game of bad faith possible, the (in)famous “circle of desire” in sadism 
and masochism, although to prove minimally that the ethical can be intersubjective we do not need 
to spell out how that specific conduct plays out.358  
 
For all of this, there is still the issue of how deeply identity and character depends on the other. 
Simply put, does identity qua character depend on the self-for-others? The strong claim that all 
identity depends on others is instinctually appealing because of, as Laing put it, the 
“complementarity” of identities: “[a] man needs a wife for him to be a husband. A lover without a 
beloved is only a would-be lover… All ‘identities’ require an other: some other in and through a 
relationship with whom self-identity is actualized … By complementarity I denote that function of 
personal relations whereby the other fulfils or completes self”.359 Of course, a picture like this 
extends to unwanted or undesirable identities too – a thief or a conman depend on having victims. If 
we find this kind of idea appealing, and we grant that bad faith depends on a social identity and 
character, then we end up at a position like Eshleman’s: “[b]ad faith always involves engagement in 
a social world, where social forces pressure one into assuming a social identity”.360 Eshleman argues 
that Sartre’s conception of character and identity shifts irreversibly after Being and Nothingness 
introduces the Other; beforehand, “Sartre lacks the technical resources necessary to explain the 
ascription or denial of determinate characters to one’s self”.361 In our actual, concrete world the 
notion of complementarity seems to support the idea that all identity is relevantly social, which 
would make the claim go through. It is extremely difficult to think of an identity that is not 
dependent on others in this way – even a wandering ascetic or a doomsday-prepped survivalist 
stands in relation to society as something they reject. 
                                                          
358 Of course, this example is still hugely significant to the reception of Sartre on intersubjectivity; an early and 
excellent account of the “circle of desire” is found in Butler, Judith, Subjects of Desire. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999. Especially relevant is pp.138-56. 
359 Laing, Ronald D., Self and Others. Pelican: London, 1971. p.82. 
360 Eshleman, Matt. “The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith” in Sartre Studies International, Vol 14. No. 2 (2008), 
pp. 1-22. p.2. 
361 Ibid. 
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 When it comes to specifics, the argument gets more sophisticated but also less clear-cut, because of 
contradiction between apparently ontological claims about the other and the self and the 
ontological necessity of the other given the self. When Eshleman cites passages of BN such as “the 
presence of the for-itself as for-others is the necessary condition for the constitution of the for-itself 
as such”,362 the claim seems to be that consciousness ontologically implies the existence of the 
other.  This is compounded by the further argument that, since the look shows us the “irruption of a 
self … at the level of preflective consciousness”, then “consciousness can be understood as non-
egological363 only when considered solus ipse, that is, in abstraction”.364 Given the context, this 
appears to contradict the foundational work on character and identity laid down in Transcendence of 
the Ego, and the implication is made that a genuine shift has occurred. However, if we take the 
negative space argument from earlier seriously, we can describe the intersubjective, prereflective 
ego as nothing especially new. If the self-for-others is given to us unproblematically (i.e., without 
reintroducing reflection to the prereflective) then its discovery only asks us to unpack Sartre’s 
foundational claims, not revoke them. Eshleman’s key contextualising remark is, “Sartre admits that 
during Parts I and II he was not talking about flesh and blood humans, because intersubjectivity is a 
necessary condition for being a man”.365 If we are talking about the way that concrete, actually 
existing humans act and relate to one another, we are well past discussing the basic makeup of 
consciousness. 
 
This recontextualisation allows us to avoid arguing over whether bad faith is necessarily social or not 
– because we have to ask which bad faith we are haggling over, the most basic and abstract form or 
bad faith as we actually encounter it in our daily, flesh-and-blood lives? When Santoni, in “Is Bad 
Faith Necessarily Social?”,366 argues against the other as ontologically implied and required by bad 
faith, he is somewhat arguing past the point. He is completely correct that the self does not 
ontologically imply the Other, and when he quotes Sartre that “the existence of Others is not a 
consequence which can derive from the ontological structure of the for-itself”367 Eshleman is not 
                                                          
362 Ibid, p.10, citation given by Eshleman as BN p.95, emphasis Eshleman’s. 
363 i.e. in the sense of not containing an Ego or character, as opposed to the other senses that Zahavi has so 
eloquently pointed out (see Chapter Two, above). 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Santoni, Ronald E., “Is Bad Faith Necessarily Social?” in Sartre Studies International, Vol. 14 No. 2 (2008), pp. 
23-9. 
367 BN, p.297, quoted in “Is Bad Faith Necessarily Social?” p.26. 
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contradicting the social identity and complementarity based account of bad faith.  He is completely 
correct to say that “an understanding of the original phenomenon of bad faith requires an 
acknowledgement of its ontological beginnings, as well as the ontology of human reality’s “coming 
into the world”368 and bad faith is ultimately grounded on the lack at the heart of consciousness. 
However, if we separate the ontological and properly ethical domains,369 we only need to show that 
an intersubjective ethical domain can be founded in and analysed through Sartre’s ontology, and 
that we really are in contact with others. While the ethical will have to wait, the possibility of an 
intersubjective bad faith shows that there is space to talk about intersubjective ethics in general. 
Any experience of the same type as shame or pride is by its very nature intersubjective – we are not 
ashamed of ourselves, but of ourselves as the other has constituted us – of what Sartre calls out 
being-for-others.  I appear as an object in the experience of shame, and this appearance demands 
that there is an Other – as Zahavi summarises it, “foreign subjectivity is revealed to me through my 
awareness of myself in the capacity of being-an-object for an other”.370 These experiences are still 
contingent. Because it happens that we, as members of our concrete civilisation, universally 
experience them, then it is implied that for us the Other is both certain and our characters draw 
something from the Other. All actual instances of human bad faith are social, mediated by the ability 
of others to alter our worlds or transcend our transcendences. Although there might be other, non-
human consciousnesses in bad faith, in order to do a concrete ethics of human life there is no 
pressing need to examine them; since we find ourselves in a human, social world then to discuss 
how an ethics can rule over us we need only describe how ethics play out in that world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
368 Santoni, “Is Bad Faith Necessarily Social?”, p.29. 
369 See the previous section and Catalano’s remarks on bad faith and inauthenticity being distinct. 
370 Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, p.171. 
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Chapter Five – Authenticity as an 
Undertaking. 
 
With an account of Sartre’s basic system in place, and an account of the how and why of self-
deception, we are now in a place to consider the alternative: “authenticity”, a way of acknowledging 
our responsibility for our actions and our characters. This chapter will explain how authenticity 
works by defending a naïve statement about what it is or should be. By turns it will look at how 
taking responsibility plays out given the nature of our situation, given what value is in Sartre’s 
system, given our relation to others, and given the link between practical freedom and freedom to 
choose projects.  
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Section One: Responsibility and the Subjectivism Charge. 
 
One of the most, if not the most common historical criticism(s) of Sartre and Sartrean ethics is the 
charge of vicious subjectivism. Broadly, the charge is that it allows the agent him/herself to define 
what is ethical arbitrarily, robbing Sartrean ethics of any normative power and rendering it useless. 
We find an early version of this charge in Plantiga;371 Detmer372 makes it; and it is the substance of 
MacIntyre’s infamously cavalier dismissal of the early Sartre.373 Anderson, in Sartre’s Two Ethics, 
found subjectivism in ASJ but not in the Notebooks,374 and the problem is clearly not going away. 
Since the criticism is so long-lived, and answering it draws in so many aspects of Sartre’s picture, it 
will be our inroad to exploring what authenticity is and is not. 
 
A major source of the criticism is the following, one of the most explicit and often quoted 
statements Sartre made about the nature of authenticity:  
 
Authenticity, it is almost needless to say, consists in having a true and lucid consciousness of the 
situation, in assuming the responsibilities and risks that it involves, in accepting it in pride or 
humiliation, sometimes in horror and hate.375  
 
A common interpretation of this passage leads to what Detmer calls the “Authentic Torturer 
Problem”.376 If, in the above, we read “situation” to mean simply what is currently going on, we can 
carry out any action and be authentic if we recognise and avow our responsibility for it. The problem 
seems to be that a torturer, currently inflicting unimaginable pain on someone else for no apparent 
reason, is acting authentically so long as they recognise and acknowledge they are doing it: “Sartre 
must be read as saying that as long as we confront our choices honestly and acknowledge our 
responsibility for what we choose, and for the consequences of our action, without resorting to 
                                                          
371Plantiga, Alvin, “An Existentialist’s ethics” in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 12 no. 2 (1958) pp.235-56. See 
p.250 for the criticism itself, which is outdated but illustrates the aggressiveness with which this attack was 
first made in the Anglophone world. 
372 Detmer, Freedom as a Value, Chapters Two and Three, esp. pp. 163-7. 
373 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. Duckworth: London, 2007, pp.5-6. 
374 See Anderson, Sartre’s Two Ethics, pp.54 -5. 
375 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Anti-Semite and Jew. Translated by George J. Becker. Shocken: New York, 1974. pp.64-5. 
Hereafter referenced as ASJ. 
376 Detmer, Freedom as a Value, p.165. 
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deterministic excuses, we are entirely above any possible reproach on the ethical plane”.377 If we 
accept as a premise that there are certain actions, like torture, that we directly know to be immoral, 
then there is a major problem here. This picture of authenticity has it, at best, allowing unethical 
actions to go on without passing judgment, and at worst, actively condones them in some 
circumstances.  Nonetheless, similar objections, which turn on a principle like “[a]ny acceptable 
ethical idea must accommodate the fact that other people deserve a minimum of consideration, 
toleration, respect or recognition”,378 amount to an invalid external critique unless they are 
grounded in the system in question. Even though they might be intuitively desirable and/or later 
turn out to be valid, we end up begging the question if we say an ethical system has failed because it 
fails to produce anything that would commonly be called the ethical. With this in mind, the way this 
picture allows authentic torturers is not by itself a fatal flaw. 
 
The deeper subjectivism problem comes in when we ask what makes authenticity a coherent ethical 
model – if there were an internally coherent argument supporting it based on sound premises, we 
would have to accept the system, permission of torture included. Yet if choosing a “lucid 
consciousness” of the situation is just another choice, then a truly vicious subjectivism charge 
becomes possible:  
 
if it is truly Sartre's view that values are created by the free choices and free actions of individual 
human beings, and have no status apart from their being so created, then whatever is freely chosen 
or brought into being by a free action is valuable, and there are no possible grounds for determining 
what individuals should choose in any given situation. But this entails the absurd conclusion that 
there is no reason why anyone should not choose hate over love, war over peace379 
 
If this particular awareness of a situation is chosen like any other project, then having a lucid 
awareness of the situation is only as valuable as any other freely chosen project. If the authentic 
attitude cannot confer objective value on the projects undertaken in it, then it cannot be the basis of 
any ethical system whatsoever. Hence, any Sartrean ethics of authenticity will fail. 
                                                          
377 Ibid. 
378 Heter, T. Storm, “Authenticity and Others: Sartre’s Ethics of Recognition” in Sartre Studies International, vol. 
12 no. 2 (2006), pp. 17- 43. p. 19. 
379 Detmer, Freedom as a Value, p.167. 
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Whilst historically common, these criticisms rely problematically on at least three things:  how we 
read what it is to value something and what being a value entails, the nature of our encounters and 
dealings with others, and what “the situation” means in the ethical context. Clarifying these three 
aspects with respect to the Sartrean picture we have built up over the last four chapters before 
returning to the ASJ master statement will lead to a much clearer picture, and one in which the 
subjectivism claim does not hold up – even in ASJ itself.380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
380 Anderson, in Sartre’s Two Ethics, held that the subjectivism criticism is valid in ASJ but not in the other 
ethical works: “… if a mass murderer like Jeffrey Dahmer … had a true and lucid consciousness of the situation 
[in which he] lured to his apartment, killed, and dismembered over a score of gay males … He would fit Anti-
Semite and Jew’s definition of authenticity!” (Sartre’s Two Ethics, p.55). 
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Section Two: Value, Situation, and Freedom. 
 
So what, in the full description, is the relevant sense of “situation”? Firstly, and before getting into 
anything else, being in situation means and reveals that we are a [value creating] consciousness.  
What this injects into the master statement is that reasons-responsive, goal oriented consciousness 
generates all values381 under consideration as we apply the description of authenticity to any actual 
case. This comes straight out of the definition of free consciousness we saw in Chapter Two, above, 
and indirectly out of consciousness’s neverending attempts to extinguish lack in itself. Accordingly, 
we can show it follows that the authentic attitude must value freedom itself in some sense.  
 
This point was made well by Barnes in her An Existentialist Ethics: all consciousness must value 
freedom, if only implicitly. She invites us to learn from Dostoyevsky’s “Underground Man”, who is 
permanently engaged in acting against his own (utilitarian) best interest, against all rational 
calculation: “No matter how stupid the caprice, even if it is certain to harm the man who acts by it, 
the Underground Man argues that it may still be more advantageous than all other advantages”.382 
Yet in the broader perspective, he is not just opposing the naïve, utilitarian liberalism of his century. 
According to Barnes his project cashes out into a wider opposition to any ethical system whatsoever: 
“he deliberately rejects the opportunity to justify his life; he deliberately chooses the nonethical as 
the higher value”.383 The question raised by this case is whether an individual (consciousness) can 
coherently value the unethical, whatever it turns out to be. On the face of it, The Underground Man 
opposes his conception of the ethical384 because it will lead to a non/inhuman series of regulations 
on human freedom, a set of diktats that leave no space for genuine human life. The basic problem 
with this attitude is that he values something: a world where he and others are free to act in 
capricious ways. He sees that either there is no space for the (vision of) freedom he desires, and 
wants to make it possible, or desires to protect it before it is crushed by Enlightenment ideals. This 
means he experiences it, or its future continuation, as lacking, and making demands on him.  As soon 
as he avows anything as valuable, sees any choice as coming with an “ought” or a demand to be 
realised, then he has shown himself to be valuing freedom (and with it, existential lack).385 His 
awareness of a demand to destroy the ethical is itself an awareness of value; it regulates human life 
                                                          
381 i.e. a consciousness which generates its world in response to its goals. 
382 Barnes, Hazel E., An Existentialist Ethics, University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1978. p.4. 
383 Ibid., p. 10, emphasis mine 
384 Broadly, a bourgeois classical liberalism. 
385 Ibid., pp.23/4 
 
 135 
 
because it has normative force. Claiming, or avowing, that he does not follow any normative guide is 
a classic case of bad faith here, an outright mismatch between the avowed and implicit/actual 
project.386 387  
 
So given that we cannot consistently fail to value freedom– if we always value freedom in some 
sense- what distinguishes the ethical and the unethical modes of valuing it? Does the fact that we 
are dependent on existential lack entail, after all, that we can will it and take responsibility for it in a 
relevantly ethical mode? In the last chapter we saw how Santoni, attempting to show that bad faith 
is possible intrasubjectively, referred to our dependence on existential lack as being an original, 
inescapable form of bad faith. In brief, his argument ran that because existential lack can never be 
fulfilled, we are always in bad faith because our avowed goals are founded on a deeper and 
permanent project of attaining to object-like being, which is incoherent and impossible. We end up 
with two related questions here. Firstly, what does it look like when we value our freedom as part of 
authentically valuing a true and lucid consciousness of the situation, whilst assuming the 
responsibilities and risks that it involves? Secondly, does entering this state somehow mean that we 
have to abandon the project to become God altogether, possibly even finding a new motor or core 
dependency for human freedom?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
386 Which is also, as we saw, a classically irrational act on Moran’s definition of irrationality. 
387 As an aside, when Dostoyevsky cuts his story short, he concludes that “[The Underground Man] could not 
help going on. But to us too it seems that this will be a good place to stop”. Again, this reinforces that his 
attitude is one of bad faith – we can predict that the adverse conditions of his life can and will repeat because 
they are effected by his bad faith attitude, which exists as a durable way of life. 
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Section Three: Responsibility and Solidarity with the Future. 
 
With respect to the first question, we can find the clearest (early) picture of authentic living in the 
Notebooks, in the form of “willing to will” our freedom, which is the result of a “thematic grasping of 
our freedom, of gratuity, of unjustifiability”.388 In what follows, we will take a closer look at the 
section of the Notebooks for an Ethics surrounding this concept.389  
 
Sartre begins by effectively restating some earlier points about bad faith and identity: It is thanks to 
freedom and existential lack that “it is false that I am courageous and false that I am not so”, and so 
any non-contradictory attitude towards freedom must honour that fact, must accept that any state 
or property such as courage can always be transcended and never adheres to us as a fixed, 
permanent being.390  In fact, attributing any quality or state to ourselves, or attempting to be 
courageous, cowardly, etc has been shown repeatedly391 to be inherently doomed to failure. Any 
kind of argument over which state I am in, or which qualities I possess, implies that we can have that 
state for our being. It implies an appeal in bad faith either to a possible future or a definite past 
which is extended and taken to describe us forever. It doesn’t matter whether we are trying to be 
courageous or a coward; what matters is that in bad faith we attempt to be something, we attempt 
to adopt an identity. The choice of cowardice and courage here is unlikely to be a coincidence, and 
probably calls back to Garcin in No Exit. Whether he is trying to avoid being a coward, constantly 
defeated by Inez, or using her to fix himself down as one,392 is ultimately irrelevant: avowing having 
an essence or specific, permanent being is the trap. Hence, “[a]uthenticity therefore leads to 
renouncing every project of being courageous (cowardly), noble (vile), etc. Because they are not 
realisable and because they all lead in any case to alienation”.393 So what is the alternative? 
 
Absent being able to ever achieve a genuine, permanent nobility, vileness, etc., we end up losing the 
                                                          
388 Notebooks, p. 474. 
389 It should be noted that the popular Existentialism and Humanism (Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism and 
Humanism. Translated by Philip Mairet. Methuen: London, 1973.) is also concerned with ethics, although for 
reasons I will enumerate later it makes a much worse primary source than the Notebooks or Truth and 
Existence. 
390 This much was implied by bad faith appealing to fixed (human) essences. 
391 See the discussion of states and qualities in TE, pp. 20-28. 
392 I.e. if we take the unorthodox and insightful reading offered by Webber in Webber, Jonathan, “There’s 
something about Inez” in Think Vol. 10 no. 27 (2011) pp.45-56. 
393 Notebooks, p.475. 
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right to (claim we have) continued states and identities, and each of these properties and the goals 
that instantiate them “becomes an undertaking”.394 For a goal to be an “undertaking” minimally 
indicates that it will take time, is vulnerable to interruption from outside or abandonment from 
within, and that it is only after the process is complete (or I am dead!) that we can judge its success. 
It should be apparent that this attitude takes permanent essence away from us, but still allows for 
character if we take the Morris reading – nothing about it removes the ability for character to accrue 
through our acts, but an understanding of character as permanent and unassailable is out. Instead, 
we must accept that a project such as having/maintaining a friendship has to unfold over time, 
“where an intuitive certitude will correspond to each particular time of this undertaking”.395 I take 
this to mean that, once we have committed to a long-lasting project,396 the demands it makes of us 
should be apparent to us as they emerge, as necessary conditions for the project continuing – we 
commit in the undertaking to respond to any circumstances that could threaten it in the future.  
 
This does not mean having a definitive schedule/roadmap for all of our projects, since that would 
mean having literally decided in advance what all our actions will be. Apart from being impossible, 
this would amount to denying a) that complications could affect the execution of my projects, and b) 
that I might abandon the project thanks to a conversion. Conversely, if we understand from this that 
we have to decide whether or not to carry on repeatedly, we also fail to commit to the project – this 
is potentially a picture of unconnected moments of reverting back and forth on our projects. This, 
argues Sartre, is the same thing as not endorsing the project at all, since it is supposing that the first 
commitment we make is non-binding, or not binding enough to stand on its own. 
 
Instead, we should see a project as unfolding over time and becoming increasingly concrete as it 
does so – when we initially start a project, at the stage of its being an intention to X, it is necessarily 
vague or abstract for one of two reasons.397 It might not be fleshed out with the specific, concrete 
means to its end - I might decide to work for a company, not really knowing what my job role 
amounts to. Or the abstractness can come purely because the project is not realised yet – because 
any plan can and will encounter obstacles, the final project might be unrecognisable compared to 
the original intent. I could adopt a wholly different style of conduct or attitude toward the project 
                                                          
394 Ibid., p.476. 
395 Ibid. 
396 And, in practice, most of the high-level projects we have are of this type. 
397 Ibid, pp.477-8. 
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without sacrificing the fact I am embarked on it. There is a meta-aspect to this uncertainty: it is 
uncertain both what material obstacles will emerge and how I will reply to them. As a result, an 
intention or project of this type is only ever seen in its fullness when it is complete: “the total 
intention coincides with the total work and it is the total work that reveals the total intention”398. In 
short, it is concrete engagements with the world and their results that really matter when it comes 
to adopting projects: an authentic attitude to a project is only concerned with producing the result, 
not with being cowardly, brave, etc: it is only concerned with the immediate demand to jump on a 
grenade or run for one’s life.  
 
All of this amounts to an advance commitment to see through the results of one’s projects, it is a 
kind of solidarity with one’s future and past self to see that the goal, whether lofty like building a 
hospital or mundane like good pet ownership, is achieved. Insofar as it is open to the fragility of our 
projects, it is an acceptance of responsibility, and a lucid understanding of the situation, whatever 
the situation is, as one that demands effort from us and the maintenance and protection of a set of 
affairs in the world. Rather than supposing, implicitly or explicitly, that the work is destined to 
happen, and that my destiny is to make it come to pass, it acknowledges that concrete tasks, and so 
our projects, have a life of their own.   This is why “[p]ure, authentic reflection399 is a willing of what I 
will. It is the refusal to define myself by what I am (Ego) but instead by what I will (that is, by my very 
undertaking … insofar as it turns its subjective face toward me)”.400  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
398 Ibid. 
399 Readers of Sartre will know that, in the full picture, the notion of pure reflection is vital to authenticity, 
although we are only addressing its effects or upshot here, pure reflection itself will be covered later.  
400 Ibid., p. 479. 
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Section Four: Play as a Model for Authenticity. 
 
The second question raised above was, does an authentic attitude require us to abandon the original 
quest for completeness?  If we see the original project as both synonymous with existential lack and 
a basic, unavoidable project of bad faith (I am always attempting to become God) then we end up 
undermining an authenticity based on BN. Either we end up claiming that we are always, on some 
level, in bad faith (as Santoni has argued),401 or we undermine the ontology of Being and 
Nothingness. Neither of these options (at least, without a positive picture of what an alternative 
ontology looks like) is desirable, so it is worth working past them. 
 
When it comes to authenticity demanding a fundamentally different configuration of consciousness, 
we can sidestep the issue. Since the existing Sartrean picture purports to describe how 
consciousness must be structured to be consciousness at all, an argument that consciousness can be 
structured differently needs to tear down the argument to get off the ground. At the very least, it 
would need to show how it is possible for something which has one set of conditions of possibility to 
transition toward having another set of conditions of possibility, which on the face of it is extremely 
implausible. Nonetheless, Anderson appeals to textual evidence that there has to be a separate 
ontology of authenticity and inauthenticity: “In fact, Sartre stated explicitly in Being and Nothingness 
that he was dealing there only with descriptions on the level of impure, or accessory, reflection”.402 
Commentators such as Zheng have shown in detail how his specific textual evidence does not hold 
up403 when taken into wider context,404 but I do not think we need to go that far. If the ontology of 
BN were incorrect, or worse, incorrect because it is generated by a project of bad faith, then the text 
would be self-defeating and ultimately pointless. Without an accompanying text that shows a 
different ontology and gives us a good reason why we should study a purposefully inaccurate text, 
writing BN would have been an exercise in futility. This is not to mention how the literary projects in 
Nausea, and The Roads to Freedom foreshadow or depend on the descriptions given in BN. Why 
would Sartre go to the trouble of creating an oeuvre that is basically worthless except as a warning, 
without pointing out that fact – if only for pedagogical reasons? And why, moved by his experiences 
and his conversion to the Marxist cause, would he maintain an ontology he knew to be flawed in 
                                                          
401 See Santoni, Ronald E., Good Faith, Bad Faith, and Authenticity. Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 
1995. Chapter Three deals with this issue. 
402 Sartre’s Two Ethics, p.54. 
403 E.g. the comments on Notebooks p.6 where BN is described as an “ontology before conversion”. 
404 See Yiwei, Zheng, “Sartre on Authenticity” in Sartre Studies International, vol. 8 no. 2 (2002), pp. 127-40. pp. 
129-31. 
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order to write the Critique(s) of Dialectical Reason? All of this means there is a burden on anyone 
pushing an alternative ontology to create it, rather than being able to support it in abstraction from 
its actual content. As a result, the issue can be safely avoided unless there seems to be good reason 
to cast out the system as a whole, which is not obviously the case. 
 
So turning to the other challenge:  how is it possible for us to value something other than identity 
and completeness if all our action depends on existential lack? The idea is, since all projects point to 
the goal of completion, by transitivity completion is the ultimate value endorsed by all of them. 
Since valuing completion leads to bad faith, we are able to talk about an original project of bad faith 
which is never overcome, even if we have projects that are authentic in the sense outlined above. 
The most promising way out of this comes out of insisting on separating the ethical and ontological 
spheres; even though ethics might be grounded in ontology for Sartre, that does not have to mean 
that there is an ethical value inherent to ontology. An analogy would be that, although winning a 
game is grounded in its rules, you cannot win or lose at the rules of a game. Moreover, if we were 
locked into bad faith by our most basic structure, Sartre would not be able to talk about an ethics at 
all – if bad faith leads necessarily to the unethical, then we should be able to formulate an ethics 
purely within ontology, something Sartre denies: “[o]ntology itself cannot formulate ethical 
precepts”.405 He would also be unable to make the following comment: “one begins with flight and 
inauthenticity. But the question is whether this nature is universal or historical.”406 If Sartre saw the 
ontological constitution of consciousness as either necessarily instantiating bad faith or having bad 
faith for its being, there would be no room to ask in the first place – and in what follows, he is 
emphatic about the importance of history: “Ethics must be historical”.407 Were the god-project 
relevantly identical with existential lack, it would be analytically, uninterestingly true that we are in 
bad faith. 
 
If we can talk separately about a project to become God and existential lack providing a motor for all 
action, what does that look like in practice? The most promising picture comes to us through Zheng’s 
interpretation of Sartre on play. Take running a race as an analogy: the whole notion of a race only 
makes sense because the runners are attempting to win. The conditions of possibility of calling an 
event a race include the fact that someone will win and everyone involved is trying to win; if it 
                                                          
405 BN, p.645. 
406 Notebooks, p.6. 
407 Ibid. 
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doesn’t matter which order the racers finish in (or if nobody wholeheartedly tries to win), it simply 
isn’t a race.408 However, it would be a mistake to say that the only possible good motivation to race 
is to win – and it isn’t even intuitive for most people that you’d only compete out of wanting to win. 
Whilst winning can be the whole point, with everything you do subordinated under the desire to 
win, it is also possible to subordinate winning under some other, higher goal like honour or 
sportsmanship. If I am competing to participate in some kind of honourable tradition of sport, 
winning stops being the primary end – it doesn’t matter if I lose, because losing is not a failure 
condition. (Conversely, if I aim to win every race without fail, a loss is going to be a hammer blow.) 
Nonetheless, even if I am trying to participate in this sportsmanlike tradition, I have not given up on 
winning. A goal of sportsmanship is absolutely compatible with trying to win, and crucially does not 
have to diminish the effort I make to win. Although it is only possible for me to will sportsmanship 
because of races having to be won, winning the race is not my overall goal – in practice, it is a 
subordinate or instrumental part of the overall whole. 
 
By analogy, in authenticity we can adopt a (coherent) project other than becoming god as our core 
project – even though getting rid of ontological lack is still the core dependency of our projects. The 
ontological necessity of existential lack is never removed, but on the plane of our willed projects we 
adopt a stance of responsibility for our situation. We understand our projects as undertakings which 
are fragile, and do not try to get a fixed identity (i.e., symbolic existential completion) from them. 
This attitude is not unprecedented in Sartre’s own writings; as Zheng points out,409 the description of 
play in BN is intimately connected to the ethical, since it is suggestive of “a particular type of project, 
which has freedom for its foundation and its goal” which “…belongs [rather] to an ethics”.410 In fact, 
the lines between the two are blurred from the start, since “[a]s soon as a man apprehends himself 
as free and wishes to use his freedom … then his activity is play”.411 The key connection between 
play and authenticity as “willing to will” is that the player “himself sets the value and rules for his 
acts and consents to play only according to the rules which he has established”,412 i.e., the player 
establishes the parameters for his free project, in order “to attain himself as a certain being, 
precisely the being which is in question in his being”. The rules of a game are invented, sustained, 
and willed by us, and can reveal our freedom to us insofar as they are context-dependent and can 
highlight the context-dependency of projects we have.  If, in play, we have the ability to set an 
                                                          
408 See Zheng, Sartre on Authenticity, p.133. 
409 Ibid., p.135. 
410 BN, p.602. 
411 Ibid., p.601. 
412 Ibid. 
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undertaking as our goal without primarily willing completion or the permanent loss of existential 
lack, then we have a working prototype of authenticity running under the ontology of BN.413 
 
Zheng’s own opposition to play as a prototype of authenticity is telling. He claims that a life lived on 
the model of play would be too unstable to sustain a viable, ethical life: “if one adopts a playful 
attitude (whether unreflectively or reflectively) across the board, it is quite likely that she will lose all 
her securities and that she cannot satisfy her basic needs. If I play at my job, the result of my work is 
at best unstable, which is likely to cause me to lose my job”.414 Simplistically, the problem is that if 
we play at life, we will not take it seriously enough to sustain basic physical needs and social 
connections; our institutions will crumble if everyone acts in this way.  This isn’t a deep objection by 
itself, since it assumes that an ethical life has to resemble a vision of our current, average or 
“normal” lifestyles, but it does point toward a deeper problem. The reason why a playful attitude 
would cause these problems is that individuals adopting it are free to stop “playing” at whatever 
attitude or project they are adopting at any time, making social relations unstable at best. This kind 
of play, where we drop out of commitments at any time and for whatever purely internal reasons, is 
childlike and untenable within a social context. Whilst the above has cashed out a lot of the 
intrasubjective content of authenticity, it is only by including the social context that the picture can 
be completed.  
 
So far, despite the added detail, the original problem is not deflected: an authentic torturer could 
see his vile deeds as a part of an undertaking that needs effort, that effort being mandated by the 
lack at the heart of his being, and will to will the concrete projects that keep his wider project alive. 
It is no coincidence that bad faith cashes out concretely into the search for identity and, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, these identities depend on the intercession of the Other.415 Minimally, this 
suggests that a change in our relationship to the other is entailed in the authentic attitude, but it will 
prove impossible not to value the freedom of others as we value our own. Factoring this in will 
defeat the subjectivism charge once and for all. 
 
                                                          
413 Although claiming a direct identity between the two is impossible for reasons to do with the nature of 
reflection; authenticity has to operate on a (the) reflective plane whereas play is pre-reflective. 
414 Zheng, Sartre on Authenticity, p.138. 
415 This is made explicit in the Notebooks: “the quality of being courageous can be conferred upon one only by 
others in light of certain forms of behaviour … Others will hang an objective label on you that will then 
internalise in the form of an in-itself-for-itself. Notebooks, p. 474. 
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Section Five: Intersubjectivity and Authenticity. 
 
This necessity of the other in authenticity, although a reconstruction in the context of Being and 
Nothingness, runs through the early works. From Roquentin’s doomed relationship with Anny, 
through almost all of Mathieu’s relationships with others, to Sartre’s discussions of the war and its 
impact on those fighting in it, the Other is everywhere in his early accounts of inauthenticity.  In the 
War Diaries416 this influences his early thoughts on what it is to be authentic at all - he imagines 
someone who, before the war, “used to live highly inauthentically in all the various social situations 
into which he was thrown – family, job, etc”417 and who is shaken out of his complacency by being 
called up. As a soldier, he acts completely authentically – he is authentic, at least with respect to his 
situation on the front.  Something about the shock of being called up has changed his attitude, yet 
when his wife comes to visit, there is the risk that his authenticity will be shattered – “presumably, a 
being who expects the inauthentic of us will freeze us to the marrow with inauthenticity … an 
imposed inauthenticity, against which it is easy but painful to defend oneself”.  
 
For one thing, this strongly implies that authenticity has to be achieved by an entire community to 
be stable, which tallies with a later remark in the Notebooks: “ethics is not possible unless everyone 
is ethical”.418 As we have seen, above, inauthenticity is a way of life; by corollary, authenticity has to 
also build up behind it a consistent character, give or take a few errors or stumbles. So, one 
(admittedly weak) way we can defend a necessarily social authenticity is practically - if we are 
affected by others, directly forced or transformed into inauthenticity by being with them, it would 
be impossible to sustain authenticity in an inauthentic world.  Even if we take the most optimistically 
naïve reading of resistance being “easy but painful”, the sheer amount of contact we have with 
others seems to prohibit authenticity. On this simplistic reading, easy means just that – minimal 
effort is required to resist each attempt on our authenticity, and this resistance is always easily 
available to us.  Yet given the sheer number of social interactions most of us enter into, and 
assuming a largely inauthentic general population for the sake of argument, the slide into 
inauthenticity would seem to be a matter of statistics. If we are 99% effective at resisting having 
inauthenticity foisted on us, the 1% of interactions that get through to us in some way are still 
                                                          
416 War Diaries, pp. 219 – 23. 
417 Ibid., p. 221. 
418 Notebooks, p.9. 
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damning. Our attitude might only be changed with respect to some part of our lives, but if we slide 
into a regional inauthenticity, we are still inauthentic: “authenticity is achieved en bloc: one either is 
or is not authentic”.419  On this reading, one reason authenticity must take stock of others is 
organisational: it is impossible to sustain a personal authenticity without at least an implicit pact or 
agreement with those around you to help each other sustain it.  This paints the grim picture of an 
ethical cold war, where destruction is mutually assured – If I condemn others to inauthenticity, I 
condemn myself.  
 
Although it passes a first, casual inspection, we can still force a subjectivity charge in. If we grant that 
there are, or might be, individuals who are contingently more capable of resisting the influence of 
the other than most, they would have no stake in agreeing to mutually defend the project of 
authenticity.  Equipped with an iron resolve not to be turned from his undertakings, the Andersonian 
torturer can carry on unabated. The root of the problem is, this kind of picture is still basically 
intrasubjective:  it treats the presence of the other as accidental to authenticity, as something that 
might intrude or interfere.  Yet, if we are attempting to construct an ethics that reflects our social 
lives, we have to investigate it on the level of the human, as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
The key idea that can turn this around is that freedom and consciousness are relevantly generic. By 
this I mean that the consciousness, qua consciousness, of any one individual (associated with any 
one self or ego, and embodied in any one body) has no priority over any others, and can demand no 
rights over and above any other consciousness.  If we accept our prior analysis of the “look”, there 
are experiences in which others are immediately given to us as a free consciousness, exactly like our 
own in that regard.  Above, we saw how all consciousness must value its own freedom.420 This is not 
an instrumental necessity, but a structural part of any act that generates value, so Anderson’s 
objection (“Surely I can will a goal, e.g., a healthy body, and yet not will the means to it, e.g., daily 
exercise or a low cholesterol diet. People do this all the time. It may be illogical or stupid to will ends 
without willing the means to them, but we can in fact do so”)421 does not apply. Even at the limit 
where we value nothing at all, we have to implicitly value the consciousness that allows us to 
instantiate the disvalue of the world, or the positive value that holds our ambivalence in being. If we 
accept that, absent distortion, the consciousness of the Other is given to us as a source of value 
                                                          
419 War Diaries, p.219. 
420 To recap, since all value is generated by free consciousness, and we cannot consistently fail to value 
something, by transitivity we must value free consciousness as long as we exist. 
421 Zheng, Sartre on Authenticity, pp. 62-3. 
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exactly like our own, we see that that consciousness is given as innately valuable just like our own.  If 
we must value free consciousness as an absolute, primary value, we must value all free 
consciousness as such.422 
 
The classic objection to this picture is that it is impossible to cash out the notion of valuing freedom 
as one’s ultimate end in a way that is either philosophically coherent, interesting, or of practical use 
to those attempting to live an ethical life. What does it mean to value freedom if we are always free? 
Merleau-Ponty was among the first to make this criticism when he said: “if indeed it is the case that 
our freedom is the same in all our actions, and even in our passions, if it is not to be measured in 
terms of our conduct, and if the slave displays freedom as much by living in fear as by breaking his 
chains, then it cannot be held that there is such a thing as free action, freedom being anterior to all 
actions.”423 If the torture victim is potentially able to transcend his current situation and change his 
attitude to being tortured, he is still free, and the torturer could claim his freedom is being valued, as 
the victim’s radical freedom is not impinged.  This should not be seen as an unusual view of Sartre 
on freedom and impingement – Warnock held it a long time ago in The Philosophy of Sartre: “Even if 
our choices are entirely restricted … we may choose how to conceive the possibility of escape or 
release, and above all we may choose how to evaluate it. This is what Sartre refers to as the For-
itself, or consciousness, ‘choosing itself’”.424 
 
Against this picture, we can invoke both Detmer’s distinction between ontological and practical 
freedom in early Sartre, and later comments made in his Notebooks.  On Detmer’s scheme,425 
“ontological” freedom refers to our ability to revise our projects within the constraint of the 
objective conditions around us. When we change our attitude towards the world, we exercise our 
ontological freedom; we are always ontologically free. No use of our ontological freedom has to (be 
able to) change the objective world to count as such. Conversely, practical freedom is measured by 
the concrete possibility of success and failure. It is freedom “in the sense of freedom of obtaining”, 
the concrete freedom to effect changes in the objective world.  Since the argument about the 
absolute value of consciousness refers to the structure of ontological freedom, on the face of it the 
                                                          
422 For an alternative derivation of this point focusing on the experience of value, see Poellner, Peter. “Early 
Sartre on Freedom and Ethics”, European Journal of Philosophy vol. 23 no. 2 (2015), pp. 221-247. 
423 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception, Translated by Donald A. Landes. Routledge: 
Abingdon, 2014. pp. 436-7. 
424 Warnock, Mary, The Philosophy of Sartre. Hutchinson & Co.: London, 1972.  p.125. 
425 Freedom as a Value, p. 62. 
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demand that we value the freedom of the Other only applies to their freedom of choice. Given the 
two senses of freedom are ostensibly logically separate, we can reformulate the problem: since the 
Other’s ontological freedom is not harmed if we harm their practical freedom, then agents can still 
decide their actions are moral by fiat, and we are still stuck in a subjectivism.  
 
How are we to overcome this? A solution opens up if we examine what happens when we influence 
the practical freedom of another. Recall how, in Chapter Two, we saw that the motif, the mobile, 
and the end are ultimately ways of approaching the same thing.  This is a theme that is picked up in 
the Notebooks, in the discussions surrounding the “elasticity” of ends and projects. He says: 
 
I learn my ends in the world, that is, I learn my ends by their means. This bunch of grapes is given me 
in passing as something to be picked. Is it end or means? One cannot tell. End: It has awakened my 
thirst, it posits itself as desirable. But is it not a means of satisfying my thirst? Would I think of my 
thirst again if I didn’t want to satisfy if by just this means?426 
 
All projects, it turns out, ultimately hinge on specific ends. There is no such thing as a realisable 
project that is completely abstract: “to eat is not just unconditionally to posit an end that any food 
can satisfy, it is to like this meat, that dish”.427 As Sartre reiterates on Notebooks pp.477-8, a purely 
abstract project or purely abstract intention to carry out some action has almost nothing in common 
with the actually realised project, which allows us to make sense of what he calls the limit case, 
“where my end is posited with no means in sight”428 – which is most of them if I am strapped to a 
torture rack. In this case, “my desire appears in terms of the collapse of my situations”. As long as 
there is an alternative to fill the gap, projects can have a certain elasticity or changeability; if I want 
to eat my packed lunch and it spoils, the general project of eating can be salvaged by buying more 
food. Yet there is always a limit to how much can be changed without destroying the project; by 
making the ends distant enough, we make them sufficiently abstract that they are destroyed.429  In 
destroying the means, in other words, we destroy the ends, and in so doing we (can) destroy the 
project. By limiting the practical freedom of another, we can force the use of their ontological 
                                                          
426 Notebooks, p. 241. 
427 Ibid., p. 242. 
428 Ibid., p.241. 
429 Ibid., p.423. 
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freedom.  Whilst we have changed their concrete project, we have not changed their ability to 
generate projects. 
 
However, if every project430 depends for its existence either on having a success criterion or referring 
to a project with a success criterion, we can make headway. Those projects which prevent the Other 
from getting their way must have objective success criteria – whether or not the smear article is 
published, whether the prison is effective, and so on. Exercising our ontological freedom to work 
past obstacles is all very well, but there is no compelling reason why we should have to do so. In 
order to be motivated to sabotage the Other,431 I must disvalue the expression of their freedom and 
value the expression of my own, with the net result of valuing the exercise of my freedom on the 
objective world above theirs.  However, in the most abstract case, there is nothing that can possibly 
justify this difference, so there is nothing that can possibly justify such courses of action.  
 
There is also a related, Kierkegaardian432 objection about the concrete application of this picture: If 
there are multiple different social and/or ethical systems which meet these criteria, we might be lost 
without any motivation to stick with one configuration. Since any potential social structure that 
meets these demands is as good as any other, then there is nothing to keep any one of them stable.  
However, we can beat this objection quite easily if we demand a reason why the alternative system 
should be positively favoured, and why the current system, apparently good, is to be taken as 
disvaluable. In the Notebooks, Sartre’s position is even stronger when he says “what is necessary has 
to be done. Hence one has to choose, from two equally efficacious ways, the easiest one … if one 
does choose the more difficult path it is because, in a roundabout way, he wants to be”,433 i.e., the 
only motivation to choose between two authentic paths is found in and through a project of bad 
faith. Having to spontaneously decide between two equally good projects, as unlikely as that is, 
would not be troubling: one simply and pragmatically does what has to be done. 
 
In closing, one final set of questions: what is the relation between prereflective good and bad faith 
and an authenticity that lies on a moral level? How are we to preserve the appreciation that projects 
                                                          
430 Apart from, of course, the fundamental project to become God. 
431 As against negligent damage or accidents. 
432 See Kierkegaard, Soren. Either/Or. Translated by Alastair Hannay. Penguin: London, 1992. Especially p.189. 
433 Notebooks, p. 474. 
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are “undertakings”, and what does it mean to do so? To answer these questions, we need to make 
explicit something that might seem obvious: authenticity is a sustained way of life. In several places 
in the War Diaries, including one quoted above, Sartre talks about himself and others being more or 
less authentic over time and at different times: “I was authentic before my leave … in Paris, I was not 
authentic”.434 If we take this seriously, we can understand authenticity as a special type of character, 
a paradoxical one born out of not being concerned with character at all. In other words, it is, and has 
to be a way of life.435  
 
This becomes apparent when we look at the relationship between good faith, bad faith, and 
authenticity. In his landmark examination of the topic, Santoni argues436 that “whereas good faith, at 
the ontological level, is to be viewed as one's unreflective "choice" of, or attitude toward, one's 
freedom” is separate from “authenticity, as a lucid recognition, acceptance, and living of one's 
ontological freedom”, which “requires, as prerequisite, a reflective radical choice to convert from 
the bad faith to which one is ‘naturally’ inclined and in which one is living.” This claim came only 
shortly after Catalano said that “if a genuine antithesis to bad faith exists, it is to be found in the 
concept of authenticity rather than in the concept of good faith”.437 Here I wish to defend a line that 
is closer to Santoni’s, making a sharp division between the pre-reflective and reflective rather than 
the “ontological” and a “way of life” per se. To be explicit about it, we need to distinguish three 
levels: the pre-reflective attitudes of good and bad faith; the level of impure and pure reflection; and 
the ethical/unethical life. We have already distinguished good and bad faith, so I will move right 
along to a definition of pure and impure reflection. 
 
In one Notebooks section quoted above,438 Sartre described authenticity as reflectively seeing 
projects as undertakings, with the caveat that this is only possible through an undistorted, or 
“purified”, reflection. “Pure” reflection, as an idea, is present right at the start of Sartre’s work, as 
early as The Transcendence of the Ego.439 The description he gives there, that “pure reflection … 
stays with the given without making claims about the future” might be puzzling given that the 
                                                          
434 War Diaries, p.219. 
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authentic individual sees their projects as undertakings which stretch out into the future. However, 
we can easily make this early definition compatible with that account: this pure reflection does not 
make specific claims about the future, and the fact that there is a future at all has to be immediately 
given to a temporalising consciousness.440 Rather, this ties into the claim we saw in Chapter Four, 
above, that consciousness in bad faith appeals to specific futures,441 which appeal takes significant 
liberties with available (objective) facts about the world.  Of course, we mean to distinguish pure 
and impure reflection, not bad and good faith, but this overlap reminds us of something important – 
that pure and impure reflection each have to be grounded on a pre-reflective self-awareness. If this 
were not the case, we would break Sartre’s pre-reflective cogito and leave his system entirely. When 
it comes to a reflection, in this case an impure one, making an avowal (about states, etc442), that 
avowal has to be motivated. It has to draw on what, in both Being and Nothingness and Truth and 
Existence,443 we saw as the presence of the objective world to us, mediated through our projects. If 
the resources available to reflection are distorted, it stands to reason that that reflection will be 
erroneous.444 This also ties into Sartre’s remark that “when I deliberate, the chips are down”,445 i.e., 
before we reflectively make a decision, the set of decisions that can be made has already been 
determined.446 The resources handed to reflection here overwhelmingly favour a distorted vision of 
the world. 
 
The inverse of this holds true: In order to produce a clear, undistorted reflective picture of the world, 
an undistorted or minimally distorted version of the world must be present to us to begin with. In 
the terms we pulled from Truth and Existence, above, if our intuitive knowledge is gathered in good 
faith, we are far more likely to produce a robust set of truths via reflection. At base, there is some 
description of our experience that is always indisputable: right now, I am typing, voting, feeding the 
cat, etc. The arguable part comes after: I am showing my appreciation in the thank you note, I am 
trying to defeat a political bloc, I love my cat. This is how Williford’s insightful description of pure 
reflection gets off the ground: “On the one hand, if one merely reports what is currently unfolding in 
                                                          
440 See Chapter Two, above. 
441 On my reading, bad faith and sincerity both involve appeals to virtual futures. Either the projected future 
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442 See TE, pp.23/4. 
443 See Chapter Three, above. 
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a rather minimally conceptual and neutral vocabulary, one is not necessarily involved in impure 
reflection. You seem to yourself to be reading right now and probably have so seemed for a while 
(only you know). Interpreted neutrally, this is not an impure reflective judgment. It is even 
apodictic”.447 This minimal description, or some minimal description, is going to remain constant in 
what bad and good faith pass up the line, but is far, far more prominent in the content that good 
faith offers up to reflection. Whether we are seeing ourselves as a petty criminal or a heroic rebel 
makes no difference to our appreciation that we are in prison; even the most obstinate bad faith 
depends on objective facts about the world to get going. If we see truths, in the special sense 
outlined previously, as capable of shaping how we conceptualise our immediate experience, then 
they can have a regulatory function on how distorted our reflection is.  
 
When Williford goes on to describe the process of gaining precision in our (neutral) descriptions, he 
is describing the collision of our (currently held) truths with new (intuitive) evidence: 
 
 [w]e absorbed the language used for naming and describing these gross contours of types of 
conscious experiences from infancy, and in manifold special contexts. (Can you tell me where it 
hurts? How intense is the pain? Is it a stabbing or a burning pain?) We long ago learned about the 
plexus of causal and behavioral relations associated with each type of experience and the set of 
analogies used to describe them, and the dynamic profile associated with them.448  
 
If I hold, on whatever level, that this pain is all hell and defies description, being asked if it burns or 
stings or stabs put that description to rest when one of those options fits. As a description and/or 
the project it relies on is tested, eventually it tends toward a solid, durable form, and becomes 
available to us as a dependable truth. At this point, it has been refined to the point where there is no 
possibility of error “as long as the experience judged continues to unfold”.449 450 Although Williford 
himself draws a distinction between neutral concepts available to reflection like “I am reading” and 
those available to an advanced, “cathartic”, reflection, I do not think his distinction is strictly 
necessary; his interpretative point stands either way. When he claims that  
 
                                                          
447 Williford, “Degrees of Self-Presence”, p.86. 
448 Ibid. 
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450 This qualification is necessary because, as we saw above, verification (of a truth) is necessarily an ongoing 
process. The only way a truth can be tested in an ongoing fashion is by a sustained contact with the intuitive 
experience that it supposedly rules over. 
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one must develop appropriate concepts and, by a process of consulting and re-consulting lived 
experience over years, become familiar with the contours and saliences, the patterns and flows, 
statics and dynamics, layers and ranges of types of experience451  
 
he is describing a natural process of maturation of our truths. What this maturation does is make 
more of our truths and/or concepts almost unassailable, and that unassailability comes exactly from 
their ability to survive challenges that others would not. Put simply, it’s a process of getting better at 
living morally (authentically) through gaining life experience. 
 
Of course, given Sartre’s commitments about consciousness, he intends these nearly unassailable 
truths to lead to the understanding of authenticity given above: seeing projects as undertakings, 
responsibility for ourselves and our situation, and so on. These reflectively held attitudes, in other 
words, are what make us act authentically, and they only exist in and through those authentic 
acts.452 However, if we are motivated to act authentically, we have (also had) reveal(ed) to ourselves 
the basic structure of consciousness and value; the genie is out of the bottle, and any truly authentic 
action should demand that the actions which come after it are similarly authentic. This is why 
Sartre’s imaginary war-convert is “led to think about [his home life], to make resolutions for the 
future, and to establish guidelines for keeping authenticity as he moves on to other events” and 
hence we see that “[t]he desire to acquire authenticity is only a desire to see things more clearly and 
not lose it”.453 The truths which are conducive to pure reflection stay with us by being tested and 
reaffirmed, and the opposite is also true: those that make us reflect impurely are destroyed if they 
are challenged honestly. So one must “adapt one’s life to one’s authenticity”,454 in a process of 
ensuring that our lives reinforce the truths that regulate the purity of our reflection.   
 
Pure reflection, then, becomes a skill that is practiced over time. It is, in fact, a meta-skill that rides 
on top of all of our other projects, which might mean the ability to hyperfocus the world into the 
most relevant aspects for our current goal. By most relevant, I mean the effective parts of our 
action, like finding the best way to defuse an argument. If we are committed only to ending an 
argument, we will describe and approach that argument very differently to if we have my own 
scores to settle. Let’s say I promised my partner I would pick up cat food on the way home, but 
forgot. Bringing up old scores (“you forgot to feed the dog!”) would be pointless because it would 
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452 See above, this chapter. 
453 War Diaries, pp.220 – 21. 
454 Ibid., p. 221. 
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only inflame tension: the halo of resentments or past slights that sits around the current 
disagreement is useless to ending it. Going beyond the bare minimum need to apologise or to rush 
out and buy the food anyway is asking for trouble, and in the long run will only make things worse. 
How do we learn to avoid arguments and how to make things right? Unless someone teaches us 
(and a lot of the time, even if they try) it is by getting into disagreements, making mistakes, and 
trying to recover the situation. Being able to limit ourselves to the salient parts of any problem helps 
us immeasurably in solving it; letting go of (affective traces of) other projects and being able to 
understand where we stand and where to go is a key part of completing any project. The sooner I 
understand any problems clearly, and the need to approach them efficiently, the sooner I will be 
able to understand them in the most objective and focused way possible, and the more skilful I will 
be in engaging with them. 
 
To readers of Transcendence of the Ego, this account may seem unusual, if not downright troubling. 
This picture, of pure reflection as a skill or an undertaking, directly contradicts Sartre’s comments in 
the conclusion of that work. Speaking of Husserl’s view in the Cartesian Meditations, Sartre claims 
that the epoche, as a conceptual forerunner to pure reflection, is gratuitous in the sense that he 
does not understand why Husserl would ever be adequately motivated to engage in it: 
 
Husserl himself … makes a very vague allusion to certain psychological motives which might lead one 
to effect the reduction. But these motives do not seem adequate and above all the reduction does not 
seem able to operate except after a long period of study; it thus appears as a skilled operation, which 
confers a sort of gratuitousness to it.455 
 
instead, Sartre claims there that the epoche/ pure reflection are entered into as “an anguish that 
imposes itself on us and which we cannot avoid, it is at one and the same time a pure event of 
transcendental origin and an accident that is always possible in our daily lives”. Pure reflection is the 
aftermath, in other words, of a pseudo-Heideggerian anxiety and equipmental breakdown, rather 
than a skilled technique which we practice over time. Moati has supplied an excellent description of 
the status of this reduction: “[o]n Sartre’s account, we are, sometimes and by accident, exposed and 
condemned to the reduction … it is no more a philosophical act, but an existential ordeal”.456 
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So why, given that Sartre directly contradicts the skilled procedure view, would we want to return to 
it? The main reason is, this is in line with the understanding of knowledge and truth we find in Being 
and Nothingness and which is continued on and expanded by Truth and Existence. The concept of 
constant verification of projects alongside every single action we take demotes refinement of our 
concepts for exploring the world from something taking a long period of study to something we are 
always already engaged in. I take the implicit parts of the Husserl criticism in TE’s conclusion to go 
something like this: 
 
1) Pure reflection/epoche seems to require lots of study to reach. 
2) Most individuals do not put in much work, if any, towards achieving pure reflection/epoche. 
3) But, the experiences associated with pure reflection are near universal. 
4) Hence, pure reflection cannot be a technique or a skill that we practice. 
 
If every action carries with it the demand to re-evaluate our projects and implies a refinement of our 
knowledge towards (but not necessarily converging on) apodictic truth, we always have the 
opportunity to purify our reflection, in the sense of make it as close to given experience as possible. 
While revision of our projects might be the most obvious and (metaphorically) eye catching in 
response to anxiety, the process is going on all the time and, unless we are in extreme bad faith, 
always making our reflective concepts work better on the next occasion.  
 
With his presence based account of knowledge, Sartre gives us the resources to see pure reflection 
as giving us higher quality (more reliable) knowledge over time, as something which we always have 
the opportunity to practice. Rather than it being exceptional or basically miraculous for us to revisit 
our construction of the world, every action provides an opportunity to do so. In that connection, the 
threshold for the world motivating me to change my mode of reflection becomes very low indeed. 
Although we will return to this when taking about the “pain” of project shifts, the idea that some 
and only specially major kinds of events gain the power to provoke anguish by themselves is also 
deeply suspect, whether it comes from Sartre or Heidegger. 
In fact, the bar to entering pure reflection it is even lower on this model than implied above. 
Deploying a Husserlian epoche or adopting Sartre’s phenomenological attitude is distinct from 
employing pure reflection (although pure reflection is a prerequisite for the phenomenological 
attitude). When defining pure reflection at the start of TE, Sartre notes that “[p]ure reflection (which 
is, however, not necessarily phenomenological reflection) stays with the given without making any 
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claims about the future”.457 Using pure reflection as a skill does not even imply theoretical 
understanding of phenomenology, however obscure or dim, it does not imply a major theoretical 
awakening as a barrier to entry. There is, in other words, nothing that makes a halting first or 
impaired attempt to use pure reflection less of a case of pure reflection, or outright a failure. As 
Williford puts it: “one can attend to the details of experience, whether or not one has concepts for 
all the data one singles out. Indeed, initially one will not have very good concepts, if any, as any 
experienced teacher of phenomenology and philosophy of mind will know”.458  
Seeing pure reflection in this way thus breaks with Transcendence of the Ego in a way suggested by 
Sartre himself, i.e., in a way supported by both the main thread of Truth and Existence and the 
account of presence and knowledge in Being and Nothingness. The skill and catharsis approach also 
preserves the notion that impure reflection (and through it inauthenticity) hinges on going beyond 
what is given to us in presence, e.g., when we go past an instantaneous revulsion to hatred.  
 
The overall point of this chapter can be said very simply. Authenticity should be seen as an ethical 
way of life which inherently respects others, shored up by a constant and lively engagement with 
ourselves, others, and the world. In this chapter, we have finally seen that authenticity has the 
following salient features: it can normatively regulate our actions and our relations with others, as 
well as referring to the material and objective. Insofar as this was shown in context of the first four 
chapters, this was developed systematically. Therefore, the objective of this thesis, as stated in the 
introduction, has been met. In order to drive the point home, the next chapter will consider the 
abstract shape of some ways that this can translate into actual life. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
457 TE, p. 23. 
458 Williford, “Degrees of Self-Presence”, p. 85. 
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Chapter Six – Loose Ends: The Pain of 
Inauthenticity, and Concrete 
Motivations to Self-Deception. 
 
In this chapter, we will tie up some loose ends around authenticity being something that addresses 
the social and the practical. We will look at why, based on Anti-Semite and Jew, appealing to mass 
psychoanalysis as a way to make substantive ethical points can backfire. More positively, the chapter 
will then reinforce the ideas that a) Others can force (rather than invite) us to be in bad faith, and b) 
that bad faith can genuinely rule over the material as well as abstract elements of the objective 
world. This is based on two naïve criticisms: that anguish isn’t enough by itself to provoke us into 
bad faith, and that the account of authenticity ruling over the material, above, simply doesn’t ring 
true. It will also consider how the ways we can assist others in good faith are vulnerable to 
(epistemic) interference from others, reaffirming the importance of knowledge in the present 
account. 
 
Combining an expansion of the remark that (authentic) conversion is “easy but painful”459 with the 
epistemological content of Truth and Existence will demonstrate how an unusually toxic form of bad 
faith can be socially generated. Building on that, and the earlier claim that respecting the freedom of 
others requires respecting the concrete, material aspects of their lives, we will also see how the 
Sartrean account of possession allows us to talk about (in)authenticity as addressing material 
possessions. Although the prior chapters have already shown how we can be motivated to bad faith, 
and that the ethical necessarily involves the other, reinforcing these points should make the overall 
picture more plausible. Combined with a picture of how our attempts to relate to others in good 
faith are possible and can be thwarted (at an ontological- “psychological” level) by external 
                                                          
459 See the discussion of War Diaries in Chapter Five, above. 
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influence, we will also see how the overall account can guarantee the possibility of genuine 
regulatory principles but is very weak at providing them by itself. 
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Section One: Uncertain Diagnoses of Inauthenticity. 
 
Anti-Semite and Jew was Sartre’s first sustained social commentary after Being and Nothingness, 
published in the immediate postwar years; since it is his most famous early work of social criticism, it 
is an ideal place to look at how the (early) ethics works out less abstractly. Sartre’s method in it is 
simple: he identifies, based on the conduct of anti-Semites, that their avowed reasons for being anti-
Semitic are incoherent, and belie a deeper bad faith which is structured like any other. The anti-
Semite’s antsemitism, it turns out, has more to do with their own self-perception than anything else. 
Sartre effectively works by cases, drawing from a series of anecdotes about anti-Semitic behaviour 
to show us the generic form of anti-Semitism. He draws a common thread between several 
examples such as a woman cheated out of her furs who latches onto the Jewishness of the furrier,460 
and the student who feels cheated out of his grades by the Jews,461 since these anti-Semites claim a 
harm has been done to them, a harm that does not stand up to scrutiny.  If Bretons and not Jews 
took the student’s place on the lists, we have to ask why the student still blames the Jews. Sartre 
holds that the anti-Semite does not fear the actual, specific truth about Jewish history and conduct, 
but instead fears truth in general: “they wish to exist all at once and right away. They do not want 
any acquired opinions, they want them all to be innate … they wish to have … the kind of life where 
one becomes only what he already was”,462 This is completely consistent with our discussion of bad 
faith earlier, insofar as it is the identification of the future with a perfect, monolithic identity in the 
past which proceeds by disregarding evidence. By identifying Jews as absolute evil, anti-Semites are 
able to cast themselves as the “Knight-errant of the Good” insofar as “Good consists above all in the 
destruction of Evil”.463  Hatred for the Jews, to the point of wishing violence upon them, proves to 
the Anti-Semite that they are good, in a viciously circular syllogism: If I find I hate Jews, then Jews 
must be evil, and if Jews are evil, then I must be good. Therefore, I am good. 
 
One huge flaw in this argument is revealed by Sartre’s own comments – he says of the anti-Semite 
that “The Jew only serves him as a pretext; elsewhere his counterpart will make use of the Negro or 
the man of yellow skin”.464 This an admission that he is still describing bad faith in very abstract 
terms, that are so vague as to barely pick out and explain antisemitism at all. Whilst the account he 
                                                          
460 ASJ, p.7. 
461 Ibid., p.8. 
462 Ibid., p.13. 
463 Ibid., p.30. 
464 Ibid., p.38. 
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gives is a well-supported possible framework for antisemitism, Sartre’s reliance on anecdotal 
evidence makes the case extremely weak. An exasperated George Orwell had this to say when 
reviewing ASJ:  
 
At the beginning, M. Sartre informs us that antisemitism has no rational basis: at the end, that it will 
not exist in a classless society, and that in the meantime it can perhaps be combated to some extent 
by education and propaganda. These conclusions would hardly be worth stating for their own sake, 
and in between them there is, in spite of much cerebration, little real discussion of the subject, and no 
factual evidence worth mentioning.465 
As Michael Walzer notes in his preface to the 1995 edition, when it came to actually existing 
antisemitism Sartre “did no research”.466 We should be clear here that there are two relevant types 
of missing evidence: to begin with, actual historical facts like how the Warsaw ghetto operated,467 or 
how the Dreyfus Affair played out and rippled into later events, are missing. We are also lacking any 
evidence that the anti-Semites he described ever existed, and that they are in any way 
representative of anti-Semitism as it existed around Sartre. We might create an intellectually 
sparkling account of a form of antisemitism, its structure and its genesis whilst completely missing 
the point about what is happening on the ground. This is the essence of the “cerebration” Orwell 
describes; it is the risk of creating a verbose, obsessively thought-over account of a situation and 
people that never really existed, which opens up no real possibility of change. 
 
This isn’t to say that there is no value at all to the ASJ account, or to discredit the system as a whole. 
Rather, we have to acknowledge the limits of what was done by Being and Nothingness and the 
surrounding early works; they are, and are only intended to be, schematic. It isn’t until much later, 
until 1957 and the Search for a Method, that we see a major, published, and systematic justification 
of the engagement of anthropology and/or sociology with existentialism. Rather, it is the first 
completed, published work that properly justifies how existentialism can come to deal with specific, 
concrete moral issues. 
 
                                                          
465 Review in The Observer, November 1948, reproduced in Orwell, George. It is what I think. Secker: London, 
2002. pp 464-9. 
466 ASJ, vi. 
467 See ASJ, pp.9-11. 
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 Although, as Orwell’s review points out, it is too vague to effect an actual critique, perhaps the 
problem in context here is that it is not vague enough. An account of the conditions under which 
socially mediated bad faith is possible is valuable, so long as we were above board that it is still 
abstract and theoretical. Rather than trying to fix the account or offer an involved social-
anthropological study of current culture,468 here it might be useful to take a step back. Over time I 
have come across two criticisms of the account from laypeople again and again; to address them, I 
will show in greater detail than before why we would give in to (socially mediated bad faith) in the 
first place, and suggest a more relatable way in which (in)authenticity can preside over the 
objective/material. In addition, it is useful to see how Sartre is entitled to talk about the positive 
assistance we (should) give others. So far, the examples we have considered focus 
disproportionately on the inauthentic, on how not to act. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
468 This would require an account of its possibility on par in complexity and length with the Search For a 
Method.  
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Section Two: The Pain (and Difficulty) of Project Shifts. 
 
Here I would like to start addressing an external critique: why would we enter into shared delusions, 
often harming others and ourselves, in defiance of a pre-reflective awareness that this is the case? Is 
anguish really so bad that we would be prepared to constantly endure a low-level awareness of a 
problem, rather than fixing it? This, to many laypeople I have spoken to about authenticity, is the 
weakest point of the abstract story. So why, if we doubt that everyone feels anguish to be a 
significant threat, would be give into bad faith and the inauthentic life? 
One answer is that it can be the only way to keep a coherent self in existence at all, under threat of a 
total disintegration which goes beyond anguish. In the usual case of bad faith, although other selves 
are available to us, it is merely painful for us to switch to or adopt them and avoid anguish.  In 
Catalano’s example of the struggling rower with his date,469 for instance, he stays with a grandiose 
self-image since it is less painful to endure the suppressed sting of anguish than to abruptly realise 
he is out of shape, that he is not suave, and that his date is laughing at him. In this case it is 
reasonably safe to describe the problem as one of self-honesty. The evidence is there and clear-cut; 
does the rower listen? This is straightforwardly a matter of personal responsibility, of the kind 
captured by the naïve reading of the ASJ authenticity definition.  Moreover, there is a readily 
available path out of bad faith; the only thing stopping us from taking it is ourselves. 
 
To see how we could face a stronger motivation to bad faith, we have to make sense of the idea that 
it can be “painful but not difficult” to effect a change in our projects. Earlier we glossed the 
difference between the two as being a difference between describing our experience of the 
transition as valuable or disvaluable and describing the underpinning structure of our projects as 
such, but this needs unpacking to be useful. Recall to begin with that projects cause there to be 
values in the world at all, and those values are of the form of a demand. This demand is, either that 
some unrealised state of affairs should come to be, or that something which already is should either 
continue to exist or stop existing.  As we saw, our overall set of projects is, or can be, immensely 
complex, and together these disparate parts form “the organic totality of the projects which I 
am”;470 every project we have is linked back to this totality since “the possible under consideration 
refers to other possibles, these to still others, and so on to the ultimate possibility which I am”.471 If 
                                                          
469 See Chapter Four, above, for my discussion of this example. 
470 BN, p.476. 
471 Ibid., p.482. 
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the objective circumstances a project needs are threatened, we will experience a normative pull on 
us to remove the threat or replace/repair them. For instance, my project to stay dry will be 
threatened if the roof leaks, so I experience the leak as disvaluable. As we also saw above,472 when 
projects are destroyed or defeated this can happen without us experiencing a value associated with 
that change. If I go to the builder’s merchant expecting to buy slate rooftiles and find they only have 
terracotta, the project “get slate tiles” loses its validity473 and is replaced immediately by “get 
terracotta tiles”. If (since) they both service the project “repair the roof as soon as possible” equally 
well, there is no problem. However, there are cases where a project shift does evoke the experience 
of value, and it is there we can find the source of the “pain” in a project shift. 
 
In the simple case above, the two projects are functionally indistinguishable in the support they 
provide for an overarching goal; it does not matter whether the tiles are slate or terracotta if we 
only care about whether there is a watertight roof or not, so the shift carries no positive or negative 
value. Yet if we imagine a more complex case where there is a tension between two alternatives, we 
can see how the pain of making a choice comes about. Imagine a committed carnivore whose choice 
to eat meat has become integral to their life. They have learned to cook all kinds of meats with skill, 
spending huge amounts of time studying butchery and acquiring expensive equipment like smokers, 
outdoor barbecues, high quality knives etc for this purpose. Imagine they then read a philosophy 
paper which shows, beyond their ability to deny it, that eating meat is irredeemably immoral. Yet 
their meat-eating does not stop; they find themselves wracked with guilt and doubt about their 
behaviour but continue. Let’s further assume that they are authentic but they still feel this pain.474 
One way to explain this situation is in terms of a normal protection mechanism for valid projects and 
the sheer number of projects that vegetarianism touches on. If our projects manifest threats to their 
realisation as disvalues, then abandoning the project has to be a danger itself. My deciding to give 
up is just as much a threat to a project as missing the objective prerequisites (e.g. tools, materials). A 
vague disillusionment and lapsing, i.e. a faltering of my mobiles, is a threat to my vegetarianism as 
much as an objective consideration like having to eat meat or starve. Yet, if our projects are simply 
annihiliated when they are no longer valid,475 how can we hold and sustain a wrongheaded project 
outside of inauthenticity (bad faith)? 
                                                          
472 In the sections on truth and knowledge in Chapter Four. 
473 i.e. since fetching slate tiles is no longer an option, the motif relating to slate is not available so a full project 
structure of motif-mobile-end is denied to us. 
474 I.e., they don’t have a bad faith project like an inferiority project that demands they try and fail at 
something and which latches onto meat eating as moral failure to sustain it. 
475 For context, see the discussion of knowledge and presence in Chapter Four. 
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One answer comes from looking at the (subjective) validity of our projects as dependent on an 
equilibrium between those projects, and asking what causes that equilibrium to be disturbed. If they 
do not rule each other out absolutely, or all mutually reinforce each other, the equilibrium is 
maintained; if a project or set of projects conflicts with the others, there is an imbalance that must 
be corrected; we can recreate a stable configuration again at the cost of giving up some projects or 
committing to new ones.476 This is what is meant by the “fundamental modification of my original 
choice of myself”477 that we discussed earlier with reference to freedom more generally. However, 
there is and has to be a certain tolerance for sustaining projects where it is unclear if they fit 
together. This tolerance is a function of the ambiguity of our projects, and of the ambiguities of 
possible engagements with the world. The inauthentic character (and ignorance as a form of bad 
faith) exploits this ambiguity, which is unavoidable. In Truth and Existence, we see the tubercular T. 
ignoring the symptoms of her disease,478 the cough, blood in the phlegm, etc. She avoids treatment 
by ignoring the possibility that they are unrelated; in her case it is clear to anyone, especially to her, 
that they ought to mean she has a serious problem. We could imagine more borderline cases than 
hers – an intermittent cough, exhaustion which starts at the same time as the in-laws arrive in town, 
etc. What makes it alright to ignore coughing three times a day (or more precisely, not to assimilate 
it into a “tubercular reality”) is that the other symptoms are missing, and the severity of the cough is 
exceptionally mild. The question has to be, what makes the isolated cough fine to ignore, but a 
persistent one a genuine problem? 
 
An answer comes from a basic Sartrean point, which was implicitly there in his essay on 
intentionality: our projects are not given to us all at once and immediately; they evolve over time. 
Whilst we are infallibly aware of the current479 and past phases of a project insofar as we are that 
project, we are not aware of all the twists and turns of chance that will influence it, nor are we 
always perfectly aware of all the other (sub) projects that we will be required to adopt along the 
way. I might form a project to buy cat food, but until I encounter the blocked road on the way to the 
shop that project does not explicitly contain a sub-project to follow a diversion. Avoiding obstacles 
on the way to the shop, an ambiguous and loose (sub) project, is the most specific commitment I 
                                                          
476 See the discussion of the project of fatigue and the “price” of resisting fatigue at BN 476 – 86. 
477 BN, p.486. 
478 T&E, p. 33 onwards. 
479 We have to be aware of the current dimension of a project because that awareness is the same as being 
aware of any value whatsoever. 
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had when I set off. So long as any current threat to our projects is necessary but not sufficient to 
collapse a project, we can keep our old commitments. Coughing a few times might be necessary but 
not sufficient to incorporate a tubercular element to my character, for instance. It ambiguously 
points to irritants in the air, to eating too quickly, to the flu, and to tuberculosis – to a horizon of 
things so wide it barely counts as evidence for any of them. This horizon of possibilities is a horizon 
of possible/virtual futures where I ambiguously might be fine after some water, better when the 
pollen count goes down, or where my life is in grave danger. All of these things are given as possible 
by the project, but none of them are definitive.  
 
 It is only as a part of a constellation of related symptoms that a cough makes tuberculosis a live 
possibility or a certainty.  As the evidence accumulates, the number of healthy futures the present 
can refer to goes down, until the possibility of good health collapses around us. The same general 
point is true for any project we might want to have, even in spite of certain projects where it seems 
like one piece of weak evidence settles an issue.480 Apparently glimpsing enemy soldiers in the 
brush, even just seeing something glint a mile away, might definitively warrant hiding more deeply, 
readying weapons, signalling reinforcements, etc. These cases are unusual and don’t hurt the overall 
point. Staying alive in war might involve a subproject like “avoid false negatives at all costs”; there’s 
a special, non-bad faith, consideration there about the nature of evidence since even one enemy 
patrol will kill you. Nonetheless, it’s still ambiguous if the enemy is about; I am just committed to 
acting in spite of that ambiguity because of potential practical consequences of inaction. 
 
In sum, there has to be a well-formed motivational structure under these more ambiguous cases; 
there isn’t either total random chaos or Buradin’s ass. Unless a certain state of affairs is completely 
pushed out of the horizon of possibility, our related projects will exert normative force on us, they 
will always “demand” to keep going and for that state of affairs to be realised or preserved. In the 
bad faith case, someone like Sartre’s tubercular woman can organise their life around never being 
(reflectively and thematically) aware of their condition, but in that instance there is no genuine 
ambiguity about the situation – they are well (pre-reflectively) aware that all their healthy futures 
have collapsed. However, we can experience ambiguity in good faith simply because it isn’t clear 
what will happen in the future, what demands will be placed on us, or whether our projects are 
really coherent. Preserving an uncertain engagement with the world is legitimate insofar as we 
might still verify it later. We can hold two or more contradictory projects at once without a problem 
                                                          
480 Ibid., p.29: “All intuition is not instantaneous; all intuition temporalizes itself”. 
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so long as they are all provisional, so long as they are all waiting to be proven to fit the objective 
world or dissolved. This makes the nature of the “pain” in project shifts so common-sense as to 
beggar belief: if projects conflict, whichever way I act will be resisted by the other projects, for as 
long as all are held in being. This resistance manifests as feelings like being conflicted, torn by 
indecision, or troubled by a choice we are sure we must make but which we still despise. 
 
Of course, we all know that some project shifts are more painful than others; deciding whether to 
buy shares in Boeing or Activision is nothing like deciding whether to end a formerly close 
relationship. One way of looking at why is by imagining us as having a soup of hypothetical minimal 
projects which all exert one quantum of normative force. Two projects which co-depend effectively 
exert twice their valuative weight, since challenging one is effectively the same as challenging both. 
One threatened project which is intimately bound up with a hundred other projects will punch at a 
hundred times above its weight, and so on. The only hard constraint here is that, in line with our 
conclusions about authenticity, the value of freedom itself remains absolute. Whilst Sartre himself 
would doubtless be appalled by this quasi-utilitarian schema, it lets us explain why some projects are 
harder to defeat than others since we have to push through a greater mass of disvalue to open up 
the space for their collapse. When we claim we have become vegetarian yet still feel conflicted, it 
would be more accurate to say we are actively clearing the ground for full-fledged vegetarianism to 
take place but are currently in limbo, waiting for our projects to grow into forms that can come into 
conflict with the established equilibrium. How do the projects solidify? By exposing ourselves and 
the new, nascent project to the world, testing the truths it supplies us with, verifying that it works by 
actively trying to engage with the world through it.481 Contact with the world shrinks the horizon of 
possible futures until our projects become certain; it makes our available motifs more certain and 
workable. Once we have verified our projects (knowledge), the pain or disvalue coming from 
alternative projects (knowledge) will dissipate. 
 
Why does Sartre claim that this process is not difficult even though it can be immensely painful? I 
understand this to mean something simple: we can always freely choose to start down any path that 
is within the horizon of our possibilities, and the only thing stopping us from following through on a 
valid project is the pain, the resistance our prior projects throw up to the tipping of the balance. In 
this wide sense, it is easy to change projects, and does not require any fundamental, structural 
                                                          
481 Ibid., p.14: “[t]ruth reveals itself to action. All action is knowledge”. 
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change to consciousness. One added benefit of this reading is that it contributes to and explains the 
experienced stability of our projects without removing the threats that provoke anguish; it allows 
some of our projects to become entrenched but leaves the strangeness of action untouched.  
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Section Three: Inauthenticity and the Threat of Destruction. 
 
The important consequence of this analysis is that it shows how the bad faith of others (and/or a 
kind of structural bad faith in a community) can have horrifying, toxic effects on us. Other thinkers 
gave this a much deeper analysis than the early Sartre; in the latter chapters of Self and Others, Laing 
described a distinction between “false” and “untenable” situations which is illuminating.   
 
Adopting, or being put in, a false situation is extremely similar being in bad faith: Laing contrasts a 
false or “counterfeit” situation from a genuine one by saying “[w]hen a man’s words, gestures, acts 
disclose his real intentions, one says they are genuine and not counterfeit as coin is genuine and not 
counterfeit”.482 In context, we can read this as meaning a false situation is one where our avowed 
intentions/projects/actions do not correspond to our actual intentions/projects/actions. By the 
same token, this makes the false situation an irrational one, which helps explain why being in it is 
dangerous. Much as in bad faith, nothing done within a false situation can resolve the conflicts 
posed by/in it: “[t]rue conflict is clarifying. False conflict is muddling. When the issue is false and 
confused, the real or true conflict cannot come into focus, true choices are not available”.483 
However, the false position is generally local and limited, it is whether the date on the lake is going 
well, whether it matters that my hand has been taken, and so on. A false situation might be an 
episode of bad faith or a localised piece of inauthenticity. 
 
By contrast, an untenable position describes a wide, even global situation; someone within it can 
expect that “no matter how he feels or how he acts, or what meaning the situation has, his feelings 
are denuded of validity, his acts are stripped of their motives, intentions, and consequences, the 
situation is robbed of its meaning.” Left unaddressed, this kind of situation leads to a radical 
breakdown of our agency, since neither the resources we have to draw on, nor the ends that might 
be up for grabs, can be relied on. Without room for an adequate motif or end, the world is 
disrupted; whatever I do will be uncertain and painful, with no possible resolution to or productive 
issue from that pain. At the extreme, a coherent world becomes impossible and yet consciousness 
remains, our projects only barely coherent enough to count as such and under permanent threat. On 
the face of it, this situation looks like it includes the experience of full-strength anguish. It is the 
radical destruction of all possible futures since all possible meaning has been collapsed in advance. 
 
                                                          
482 Laing, Self and Others, p.130. 
483 Ibid., p.143. 
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How is a completely untenable situation possible? As Laing points out, it can be the result of bad 
faith, on my part or on the part of others, since “[t]hose who deceive themselves are obliged to 
deceive others. It is impossible for me to maintain a false picture of myself unless I falsify your 
picture of yourself and me”. One way of surviving objectification under bad faith is, as we have seen 
several times, to enter into a collective bad faith which is stable.484 However, this is only possible 
where the motivations of the other are relatively stable and/or predictable – if there is nothing 
stable to conform to, not even a straightforward bad faith is possible; we are worse off since 
constant adaptation of our bad faith makes each subproject of bad faith that much flimsier – since it 
can and will be destroyed constantly. If we live under the conditions of the “double bind”, then that 
constant destruction of our projects becomes a reality for us. What makes a situation a double bind? 
To begin with, it has to involve more than one person, and has to be made up of repeated episodes 
that follow a pattern – it is, as Laing quotes Bateson, “such repeated experience that the double bind 
situation comes to be an habitual expectation”.485 There must then be an overt command which 
threatens severe, if not existential danger if it is disobeyed. This is counterbalanced by a second 
command, implicit or explicit, which carries the same level of threat but contradicts the first. 
Depending on which prong of the dilemma is being directly levelled at us, we can adopt a position 
that fails against the other; eventually, since we are confronted all the time with the inadequacies of 
our positions (otherwise, why would we be motivated to swap between them?), we will make the 
switch perpetually. Eventually, designing our projects to fail efficiently and be replaced/rebuilt 
quickly becomes a survival mechanism. 
 
This condition is worse than an ordinary encounter with anguish, since the other is effectively forcing 
us to experience an anguish-like breakdown of our projects which is nightmarishly difficult to 
counter, either in bad faith or through our authenticity.  The problem here is that the intermediate, 
limbo state our projects (can) enter and which is responsible for the pain of project transitions 
becomes semi-permanent, or even permanent. Laing shows us how this can come about through 
“the presence of numerous disclaimed, unavowed, contradictory and paradoxical implications”486 in 
a situation which make it a double bind. In a small-group situation, the ostensive statement “it’s 
cold” can really mean the injunction “put on the fire”; at the obviously malicious end, offers of help 
like “we’ll arrange a nice change for you” can really be a threat: “If you don’t stop behaving like this, 
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we’ll send you away”. Once we spot these patterns, it should be easy to point them out, but if there 
really is an existential threat487 then we add an extra pole to the internal conflict which is so painful. 
Moreover, if the originators close ranks, or are simply forceful enough in their denials, the process 
can continue: “Jack will deny that he has implied anything, and moreover imply that Jill is wrong, 
mad, or bad to think anything is implied. This implication in turn is made and disavowed. The next 
time a plain statement is made, and Jill reacts to it as a plain statement, she will be accused of being 
insensitive, or of wilfully refusing to ‘know perfectly well’ what is meant”.  If our lives in general are 
governed by this kind of structure, it is impossible to stabilise the equilibrium of our projects, since 
that restabilisation requires a (relatively) coherent amount of evidence to come from the (objective) 
world and from others. At any given time, the essence of being in an impossible double bind like this 
is that we can neither be sure we are about to act appropriately, nor are we sure whether we have 
done so in the past. We constantly feel on edge, since a huge number of our projects seem under 
threat at all times. By comparison, being in garden variety bad faith, suffering a low level awareness 
that our projects are inconsistent but never having to confront them, is a release. Bad faith, in the 
worst case, is enforced on us because the alternative is absolutely nuclear. 
 
If the threat forcing us into bad faith really can be this severe, the (strands of) bad faith offered (or 
spontaneously developed) as an alternative have to be powerful as well. It must be true that, in the 
words of Erich Fromm, “the culture provides patterns which enable them to live with a defect 
without becoming ill”,488 i.e. without being exposed to full-strength nausea or anguish, or else other-
relations would be in serious danger of breaking down.  In his words, 
If a person fails to attain freedom, spontaneity, a genuine expression of self, he may be considered to 
have a severe defect, provided we assume that freedom and spontaneity are the objective goals to 
be attained by every human being. If such a goal is not met by the majority of members of any given 
society, we deal with the phenomenon of the socially patterned defect. The individual shares it with 
many others, and his security is not threatened.489  
 
 
                                                          
487 “Existential” in the sense of threatening our existence and/or a complete destruction of everything we hold 
dear. 
488 Fromm, Erich. The Sane Society. Routledge: London, 1956. p.16. 
489 Ibid., p.15. 
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Section Four: Material and Objective aids to Bad Faith. 
 
How does this abstract picture, which we might want to call purely psychological if that wasn’t so 
anti-Sartrean, allow us to talk about and critique our actual relations with material things, and not 
just our abstract projects related to them? An example might help. Above (Chapter Five) we saw 
how we have to respect the objective conditions of others’ projects to respect those projects, but it 
is useful to spell out at least one possible mechanism of our relation to objects in bad faith. 
Otherwise, we can imagine a simple, devastating class of criticism: if we can’t describe a connection 
to the objective/material even in outline, what stops our system being Orwell’s “cerebration”? 
 
For Sartre, the objects we possess can be intimately bound up with our character, since they can be 
both the material condition of our actions and also create or signify a certain style of action that 
defines us. He says: “[m]y lamp is not only that electric bulb, that shade, that wrought iron stand, it 
is a certain power of lighting this desk, these books, this table, a certain luminous nuance of my work 
at night in connection with my habits of reading or working late; it is animated, coloured, defined by 
the use I make of it; it is that use and exists only through it.”490 This is a simple point: the specific 
objects in our possession, and the specific way we use them, are a vital part of constructing our 
habits and our way of going about things. We are never just people who read, we read for pleasure 
or for academic purposes; we read in a garden in daylight or on a lunch break under a fluorescent 
bulb; we read secondhand classics or new releases from the bestseller lists - all of these things 
create and reflect vastly different patterns of life. When I make my possessions exist, i.e. when I 
hang values onto them, I shape them in the light of the projects I have: “[t]he totality of my 
possessions reflects the totality of my being. I am what I have. It is myself which I touch in this cup, 
this trinket.”491 If my projects are visible in my possessions, over time those possessions can become 
a record of my character, since “everything which is mine … all this informs me of my choice”.492 
 
In the best case, we can take our possessions’ meaning and those of others at face value: I have this 
high-grade bow, well-kept in some ways, worn in others, because I am a match-grade archer. There’s 
no affectation here, every single piece of my equipment is chosen and maintained to certain 
standards because I fully endorse the demands of that lifestyle and those projects. Or we might have 
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possessions which promise a certain future which has yet to be realised, but which we are making 
every good faith and authentic effort to bring about. Say I buy a series of books on a certain political 
topic because I am convinced everyone should learn about it – it would be inaccurate, all other 
things being equal, to say that I am lacking the proper interest. Yet that’s only the first step in living 
up to that project’s demands; it’s still ambiguous whether or not I am going to meet them.  My 
purchase, or rather, my acquisition, of those books owes everything it contributes to my character to 
a future that is still in question. Asserting that I am politically active just because I have them 
becomes a classic act of bad faith by the definition we saw earlier – it is an appeal to the future 
which justifies an identity claim in the present. Whilst possession will always be appropriative in the 
sense that it is involved in the “project to become God”, there is clearly a difference between merely 
using objects to project identity, and subsuming the possession of those objects under a higher goal. 
This is why Fromm made the quasi-Marxist observation that “[t]he human [i.e., the authentically 
human] way of acquiring would be to make an effort qualitatively commensurate with what I 
acquire … the acquisition of books and paintings [would depend] on my effort to understand them 
and my ability to use them”.493 Without our making the effort to understand them, they cannot 
authentically contribute to the quenching of existential lack. 
 
All of this becomes more complicated when we consider mostly or entirely artificial associations 
between objects and experiences, many of them created by advertisers. When the Coca-Cola 
company started associating itself with images of smiling young people enjoying themselves, or with 
the spirit of Christmas, or with friendship when they recently put common names on their bottles, 
they did not, and could not have, create a real connection with their product and the 
lifestyles/characters they were promoting. If anything, the slim, smiling, healthy individuals which 
appeared on their vending machines up to the 2000s would have their figures jeopardised by 
drinking flavoured sugar solution regularly. This point was already a commonplace before Sartre’s 
time: Fromm observed that “[w]ith a bottle of Coca-Cola we drink the picture of the pretty boy and 
girl who drink it in the advertisement, we drink the slogan of ‘the pause that refreshes’”.494 The 
connection is tenuous at best and normally nothing short of magical – simply drinking the same 
products as someone who lives up to an ideal is supposed to signify that we are the same as them, 
by affirming the consequent. For the sake of consistency we also have to see this as an appeal to the 
timelessness of my character: today, I am consuming this product like the courageous types in the 
adverts, and either this completes a courageous character or shows that I, infallibly, will adopt one. 
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Tracing this kind of association past the obvious connections gets incredibly convoluted, very quickly, 
but the basic structure is there. 
 
Like any form of bad faith, the appeal to my possessions is unstable and needs to be reinforced. 
Where we own objects that straightforwardly try to confer identity, that identity is incredibly fragile. 
Let’s say I own a complete set of expensive cookware but never put it to use, and in fact have 
atrocious to middling skill with it on the few occasions I do. The identity claim will stand up to only 
light scrutiny; whilst I might be able to explain what the gear does, I won’t be able to produce 
evidence I am a good cook because I just won’t be able to make good food on it. Nor will I be able to 
appeal to past episodes of good cooking to establish a pattern; the relevant character evidence is 
missing. If I try and fail to produce that evidence, I can either double down on my bad faith, 
experiencing a stronger and hence more painful feeling of awareness it will collapse, or be forced to 
give up. Yet given an abundance of resources, it is possible and easy to try the same manoeuvre with 
another identity rather than having to confront why I was pretending to be, e.g., a cook. I can 
plausibly say something like, whilst I had to give up cooking, it turns out that I am actually a 
musician, or that I have discovered a new passion for rowing. Unless my wider motivations to keep 
on pretending at roles get challenged, the unpleasant feeling of my projects leaving equilibrium can 
be banished immediately every time, by a cure that is always close at hand.  
 
Assuming there is an available abundance of products and services, Sartre’s own analysis of money 
shows how it becomes a key feature of this magical wish-fulfilment through ownership of property.  
He says that where the relation between labour and producing goods is obscured, both the 
relationship between property and character and our relationship to the labourers is “hidden but 
not suppressed”495 since “[m]oney represents my strength; it is less a possession in itself than an 
instrument for possessing”. Money, in bad faith, becomes a measure of my power to acquire 
character, to have money or credit is worth nothing in itself but allows us to continue “acquiring 
character” through possessions for as long as possible. This also extends to the trend of acquiring 
“experiences”, because learning for one day how to forge a dagger does not make you a blacksmith 
any more than seeing whales in an afternoon’s boat ride makes you a marine biologist or an 
explorer. Fromm was well aware of this when he said that the alienated consumer “consumes ball 
games, moving pictures, newspapers and magazines, books, lectures, natural scenery, social 
gatherings, in the same alienated and abstracted way in which he consumes the commodities he has 
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bought”.496 Despite the actual inadequacy of acquiring and consuming these things in satisfying our 
desires, the ability to buy symbolic things outright “suppresses the technical connection of subject 
and object and renders the desire immediately operative, like the magic wishes of fairy tales”.497  
This is exactly what makes a painless switch between identities possible through consumption, 
potentially removing the sting of those identities being hollow and false. 
 
We might think that, if all of this is pointed out, we can be liberated from our bad faith. Since our 
failed appeals to identity through possession and consumption will repeat themselves, over and over 
again, there must be a limit to the number of times we can go on making them. Unfortunately, this 
does not necessarily lead to an escape from the problem. Recall how, following Webber’s reading, it 
doesn’t ultimately matter whether Garcin is attempting to make himself brave or cowardly in No Exit 
– whichever move he is making, he is in bad faith. If I am repeatedly failing to achieve identity 
through my consumptive/possessive conducts, I can make this very failure to achieve identity an 
identity. I can actively become a loser, unhappily stuck in the lack of character my half-baked, 
magical conducts give me. Because this result traces out a consistent narrative, it can be picked out 
and identified, and I can appeal to it as my destiny, either in a past that shapes my future 
unavoidably or in a future which shows I was never anything else. In other words, I can use the 
failure of all my previous projects in bad faith as the foundation of a new life in bad faith. This is a 
classic inferiority project as Sartre conceives of it, “nothing other than the organised totality of my 
failure behaviour, as a projected plan, as a general device of my being”.498 It also follows that to 
sustain this, the societal structures supporting it have to deny that they support an inferiority 
project. After all, an inferiority project requires that we avow (and are allowed to avow) attempt(s) 
at success. Irrespective of the actual, historical details required, it should be apparent now that the 
early Sartre can be entitled to this kind of analysis and that through it can produce an ethics – even if 
the loose analyses that prove this are a jumping-off point at best. 
 
By being entitled to or having the resources for an ethics, I mean that Sartre’s ethical system, as I 
have set it out, can (and has to) provide actionable, concrete demands that regulate our behaviour 
and our relations with others in meaningful ways. If knowledge is gained through action, action is 
mediated by the objective world,499 and we have to respect the objective situation of the other, 
demands on knowledge are (in part) demands on how we alter the objective world. These demands 
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499 See Chapter Two and Chapter Three, above. 
 173 
 
include not disrupting the other’s projects as much as they include valuing (our own) freedom, and 
that lack of interference includes not disrupting the body or the personal effects of the other. 
Something concrete like a wall is not just an assemblage of stuff; it carries within it the other’s desire 
for safety, forms part of the bed they need to grow food, keeps their flock in check and assures their 
livelihood. Insofar as nothing gives me the inherent right to interfere with those projects, I similarly 
cannot justify harming their means to those projects – including their person. Hence Sartre’s claims 
such as: 
 
There is no abstract ethics. There is only ethics in a situation and therefore it is concrete … Ethics is 
the theory of action. But action is abstract if it is not work and struggle. For example: to save an 
infant who has drowned. Absurd. Concrete problems: Should Luther have abandoned the peasants 
during the peasant war?500 
 
Ethics depends on its historical context, on the projects that we illuminate, call back to, and interfere 
with when we act. In the spirit of showing how this Sartrean account really can rule over our 
interactions with others, it is useful to consider how good or desirable actions are to be understood 
and promoted – and to understand how the untenable, impossible situation interfaces and 
interferes directly with our attempts to respect the other’s freedom. 
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Section Five: Assisting the Other: The Appeal. 
 
So how are we to develop a positive understanding of the duty to respect the other’s freedom and 
the constant demand to improve our picture of the world? Mainly, by seeing how these two 
demands intersect in what Sartre calls the “appeal”. The “appeal” is a request for assistance, the 
analysis of which takes us beyond simply not harming others as in the Andersonian torturer 
example. 
The (in)authentic torturer, recall, was ultimately impossible because of his (likely pre-reflective) 
necessary understanding of the other’s abstract freedom and the nature of value. If we imagine an 
abstract inauthentic torturer realising that his actions are unsupportable, we do not get past what 
Sartre calls “help”, a gratuitous, disinterested aid-giving which is not interested in the specifics of the 
other’s life or circumstances. “Help” in this technical sense is a pure urge to assist, which does not 
recognise the other in their full freedom.501 Another example of help would be seeing someone at 
the station struggle to carry a bag and rushing to assist, without asking what is in the bag and why 
they are carrying it. For all I know, there could be anything inside – from a holiday’s worth of clean 
clothes to a shipment of weapons bound for evildoers. Helpfulness of this kind does not go past 
Sartre’s basic Schelerian points about value – the formal character of the end as an end is all that 
matters here. Valuing the other’s end, even valuing it absolutely, does not imply an understanding or 
comprehension of the end at all – all it implies is that I see another’s (valued) goal is at stake. It 
includes a “refusal to transcend”502 this purely formal position. The properly ethical position, by 
contrast, implies an “appeal”, which Sartre initially defines as “a request made by someone to 
someone in the name of something”503 In other words, it’s a request for assistance with a particular, 
concrete goal. Once the goal aimed at is concrete and not formal, we reach the level of “recognition 
of a personal freedom in situation by a personal freedom in situation, transcending the purely formal 
value of an end”.504 So what are the salient features of this recognition? 
 
Firstly, an appeal builds the relation between the petitioner and their assistant through the course of 
the (shared) goal – they do not depend on a “given solidarity”505 but instead construct that solidarity 
in and through the appeal and the giving of assistance. In simpler terms, asking for assistance and 
getting it creates the relationship between the pair. The appeal also implies that the project is 
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communicated; it is not (only) intuited like when I see someone who needs help with their luggage - 
it is explicitly given to me by the other. The difference, at least to begin with, is between seeing 
someone holding an end, and being asked “please help me with this end”: this luggage, this illness, 
etc.  Why is this significant? Because it points to the importance of freedom being in (a) situation. 
Since conscious freedom can only exist (can only create its world) in light of the objective world it is 
in, it makes no sense to talk about a purely abstract freedom or consciousness except as an initial 
tool for understanding and explaining the system. By the time we are asking about the world of the 
for-itself as the reality of a human freedom, that ship has well and truly sailed. The torturer tortures 
someone who opposes a political party, who wants freedom for their people, they torture their 
(bosses’) opponents. A real, concrete appeal to a torturer to renounce torture entirely might be the 
appeal to stop interfering with freedom, to stop supporting oppressive regimes as well as to stop 
devaluing the freedom of the specific captive. 
 
Any ethics which deals with a purely abstract freedom cannot be compatible with an ethics which 
makes the appeal significant. Existentialism and Humanism fails this test in spectacular fashion when 
Sartre deploys a universalizability argument to create an intrasubjective ethics. Summarising his 
argument, Sartre paraphrases (part of) the basic Schelerian thesis on value: “[t]o choose between 
this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to 
choose the worse”. So far, so uncontroversial. Yet he goes on: “if, moreover, existence precedes 
essence and we will to exist at the same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and 
for the entire epoch in which we find ourselves”.506  This is patently false if we take the idea that 
consciousness is always (already) in situation seriously. Unless we are in exactly the same situation 
as another, or a very close approximation, it is outright impossible for us to push our goals and 
values on others without treating them as a merely formal consciousness. If I, for instance, desire to 
have children, I cannot also will that someone carrying the genes for cystic fibrosis and terrified of 
passing it on should have children unless I completely ignore their circumstances and wishes.  
 
This is why, by the time of the Notebooks, Sartre denies the possibility that our holding values 
contains the idea that only those values are valuable, or that only those values ought to be valuable. 
Implicitly, the naïve universalisation formula of Existentialism and Humanism, read strongly, is this 
exact claim. Hence Sartre’s denial of that idea: “[t]o say ‘in his place I would have done the same 
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thing’ is purely formal, since I am not, nor will I be, in his place”.507 By extension, any implicit 
assertion to that effect is also involved in a purely formal understanding of the other, an 
understanding which does not go past seeing the formal value of their ends as the ends of (free) 
consciousness. This is not to deny the basic thesis that freedom, and all that it projects, is valuable, 
but it is to reaffirm that we can only value freedom in the abstract in and through valuing a concrete, 
embodied freedom in situation. The inauthentic torturer, remember, is incapable of valuing his 
prisoner’s abstract freedom whilst concretely denying him free rein to act and mortifying his flesh.508 
Moreover, the idea that our values (can) formally suggest the other’s values should be overridden 
does not entail that we have to act on that possibility, since the conflict is not the only possible 
mode of intersubjective relations.  
 
The appeal, insofar as it is an appeal to another concrete, embodied freedom, takes into account the 
other’s projects – it recognises that the other has neither an identical freedom nor one they share 
with us. Per the above discussion, appeals are not based on an imaginary other, identical to us, and 
placed into the same situation. Instead they acknowledge that the other has different goals to us, 
and stands in a different relation to the world. This is a completely everyday part of our lives, and 
Sartre’s example of an appeal is likewise everyday: “[i]f I ask for information from a shopkeeper, I 
take account of her preoccupations, I have to be quick and precise, and my attitude warns her that I 
know in advance that I have interrupted her in her preoccupations”.509 Being conciliatory, trying to 
be quick and efficient, these are ways Sartre is trying to respect her goals which he might interrupt. 
Knowing that those goals are important to her means that “[f]rom the beginning, I conceive that this 
very situation may be one that prevents her from answering me”. Accepting that the other might not 
drop their projects to assist me means I accept their projects are as valid as mine, even if “this in no 
way signifies that I accept them for me, otherwise they would be obligatory”. Recognising this 
diversity, however, also means that I have a certain minimal level of understanding of their goals. 
For Sartre to acknowledge the shopkeeper as busy he has to have a decent comprehension of what 
she is trying to do – her need to stock-take, the need to serve other customers, etc. Comprehension 
of the other brings us back into the epistemological dimension of ethics. 
 
Insofar as I gain knowledge by engaging with the world, knowledge of the other originally comes 
from interacting with them. Even if I have never met a certain shopkeeper before, my assumptions 
about how to act are driven by prior interactions of a similar type, or by others telling me what to 
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expect who have had dealings with people in similar roles or circumstances. In order for the other’s 
goals to be revealed to me, I have to interact with them – I have to attempt a project which involves 
them, and acquire knowledge from the successes and failures of those projects. This is why Sartre 
says that “[t]he other’s end can appear to me as an end only in and through the indication of my 
adopting that end. This is what gives a meaning to the other’s operation, but reciprocally is what 
gets unveiled in that operation”.510 Only by engaging with the other’s action can I meaningfully 
comprehend their projects; I must either make an appeal to them or respond to their appeal to do 
this in good faith.511 The necessity of engaging with the other’s project in order to comprehend it, 
even though that might seem like an obvious point, becomes important later – it suggests and 
predicts that there are limits to appeals. 
 
Sufficient512 comprehension of the other’s projects, considered in itself, rules out at least three 
states of affairs between myself and the other. Firstly, it rules out that the other’s position is 
completely incomprehensible to me.513 This might be because of prior circumstances and 
unreflective of bad faith on either of our parts – military service and battle, winning a major sports 
event, or major traumas like torture or rape are all outlier events that are difficult (if not impossible) 
to understand without experiencing them directly. Likewise, we must rule out a deliberate failure to 
understand, a kind of contempt that understands what the other wants in order to reject it. If I know 
the other is interested in something I disapprove of or find boring, like stamp collecting or watching 
science fiction, that disapproval is always (or at least very often) predicated on knowing what is 
involved. If I say I “do not understand why” someone would go to trade fairs for rare and old stamps, 
that entails an understanding of the practical steps – e.g., the time and money taken, and at least a 
theoretical understanding of the drive that pushes them to do it. Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, 
the “failure to understand” is actually the wish for them to place the same value on something I do 
approve of. I understand very well the strong, overriding valuational pull to acquiring a 1918 Curtiss 
Jenny but see it as a waste of affect that could be “spent” on more useful things. This failure to 
comprehend is doubly in bad faith: neither do I relevantly misunderstand the other, nor am I 
treating them as a free consciousness. Lastly and relatedly, it rules out what Sartre, in delightful 
Yiddish, calls kibitzing:514 backseat driving or quarterbacking.  In this context, it means disregarding 
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the freedom of the other entirely, which is a straightforward relation of and in bad faith. Which 
makes perfect sense – transcending the other’s wishes to achieve their project515 for them denies us 
insight into their actual wishes. 
 
The latter blocks to understanding, kibitzing and a self-important failure-but-not-failure to 
understand, should seem par for the course by now. They both treat the other as unimportant in 
straightforward ways, respectively not trusting them to execute their projects and disregarding 
those projects entirely. The idea that ordinary people can’t understand what it’s like to develop Gulf 
War syndrome or win a world cup is obvious, but using these major examples to explain a 
knowledge barrier is somewhat unhelpful or even disingenuous; they do not represent the biggest 
sources of (absolute) failure to comprehend the other. Instead, we should see the untenable 
situation as both a leading cause of these failures and comorbid with other reasons why untenable 
situations come about. The untenable situation can be part of an absolutely banal life. 
 
Remember how, per Laing’s definition,516 an untenable situation exists where: 
 
A) An agent lives under at least two expectations, one of which is explicit and the other implicit. 
B) These expectations are in tension/contradiction. 
And 
C) Attempting to point out the contradiction or leave those (perceived) expectations (appears) to be 
impossible, usually due to existential threat.517 
 
Recall, too, that the easiest responses to these situations is bad faith, the alternative being outright 
anguish and all the problems that brings. I want to suggest here that the example of the flirt, with a 
few added details, is an example of someone in bad faith as a response to an untenable situation. 
Let’s imagine, borrowing the extra detail Eshleman adds,518 and giving her and her date the same 
names he does (Claudette and Pierre), that the major source of her apparent coquettishness is a 
strong Catholic faith (or at least, the need to keep up Catholic appearances). This faith carries with it 
the requirement to suppress her sexuality; to sleep with her date immediately would be sinful and 
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an affront to others in the Catholic community and God. However, let’s also imagine that her society 
tells her she must enjoy herself and indulge desires of all sorts, or else live a boring (and hence bad) 
life. So in her case we have the following injunctions: 
 
Explicitly: Claudette must be a good catholic and not have sex on a first date or she is a sinner and 
will be ostracised. 
 
Implicitly: She must indulge her desires (of all kinds) or else be dull, not worthy of befriending, and 
so suffer a soft form of ostracism. 
 
(In fact, it’s inessential which is implicit and which is explicit, and just like she can reverse the polarity 
of the bad faith shielding her from the situation, the two demands can swap between being explicit 
and implicit without destroying the problem as a whole.) 
 
The existential threats she faces come from the dual threats of ostracism: whichever perceived 
threat she responds to or deals with, she always stands to lose her social standing and any projects 
which hinge on it. 
 
Coming back to comprehension and things that block it, her problem can only be explained properly 
as a whole and in context.  Lacking that context, someone hearing Claudette complain about her 
faith’s demands might say something like “go ahead, just enjoy yourself”, completely failing to 
understand her. Equally if she talks about how hard it is to maintain her faith in spite of the dating 
culture she lives in, she might expect to be told she is a sinner, or weak, and so on. The fear of being 
called out in either way might have a chilling effect on her even trying to describe these problems to 
another; if she can’t expect a coherent response or for her problem to be addressed, why would she 
even try? Even if the other has the urge to help, the formal understanding that her projects are 
threatened but valuable, there is no guarantee that they can comprehend Claudette’s problem or 
projects. It’s true that if I rule out passing judgment on her behaviour/projects, and/or 
quarterbacking her to a solution, I can still attempt to understand. I can still listen to her experiences 
and take them at face value. That response gets very close to Laing’s empathetic response to 
schizophrenics and the schizotypal,519 it means that I try to draw her experience out by taking her 
seriously as a freedom and not as an object. Yet this minimally freedom-respecting attitude still does 
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not entail I can make use of what I learn, or even that I can internalise what I am being told in the 
way it is meant or in some other useful form. Even worse, it does not entail that the other 
understands where the problem originally comes from or that there is an untenable situation in 
effect. Claudette might simply experience her problems as a sense of unhappiness, even profound 
misery. What’s worse, an apparently untenable situation is just as limiting to our actions: even if the 
other would respond well to our appeals, our past experiences can poison the ability to understand 
the threat has passed.  
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Section Six: Ignorance and Blocked Appeals. 
 
Why, apart from the properly random effects of destiny,520 might I lack the relevant knowledge to 
respond to an appeal? Firstly, even if we do not act in bad faith, there might be relatively innocent 
reasons for my ignorance. The development of cliques and, on the macro scale, classes and castes 
causes incommunicability of ideas, for instance. Even if every individual appeal is more or less made 
in good faith, the logic of the appeal tends to produce tightknit communities who are not well 
equipped to help/assist others. If I have the option to appeal to those who need time and effort to 
comprehend my projects, or someone who can comprehend them immediately, the choice is easy. 
Asking X who would find dealing with the problem a pain is inconsiderate if I can ask Y instead, who 
finds it a breeze and would be delighted to help. In the longer term, this will only concentrate the 
difficulty of comprehension; any barrier to comprehension is likely to be built on and not eroded if 
we favour those who already have experience and are naturally willing to help. This is something 
Sartre alludes to when he says that “[o]ne appeals to one’s equal and in a society of castes or 
classes, this appeal tends to reinforce the ties of caste or class”.521 Conversely, the creation of 
stupidity or socially generated and conditioned ignorance is very different to an accidental, and likely 
transitory, imbalance in roles and knowledge or collective lack of knowledge; it implies an 
oppression, most likely conditioned by untenable situations: “stupidity refers us to oppression and a 
society divided into classes, just as the suppression of stupidity refers us to a classless society”.522  
Understanding Sartre’s conception of stupidity in the Notebooks lets us see how untenable 
situations can flow from divides in a population. 
 
To understand how appeals between people can be blocked by an epistemic form of oppression, we 
have to reconsider how knowledge (and the absence of knowledge) works in the intrasubjective 
context. Recall how, when we lack knowledge inside ourselves, parts of the objective world can be 
completely missing from the value-laden space our projects work in. The log in front of me, when I 
am totally unaware of it, does not feature at all in my understanding of the world and project of 
running until I trip over it. There are also large parts of the world which are vague because I do not 
need them to be detailed, which are “both determined and undetermined”.523 Vast swathes of the 
                                                          
520 T&E, p. 39. 
521 Notebooks, p.285. 
522 Ibid., p. 325. 
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world, about which I could have knowledge do not harm my projects if I lack certainty about them. 
Bad information how many ears of corn there are in a wheat field would in no way overturn an 
acting career, although an actor might still be aware that one could count the number of grains out 
there. So the field becomes determined, insofar as it is something I could count if my projects were 
switched, but undetermined since I have no idea what the actual count is. Since nothing turns on it 
(for me) this vagueness is not harmful, and does not put any demands on me to get more or better 
information. Where my projects do engage with areas of the world where I am missing knowledge, 
those projects demand that the world is unveiled. This is bound up with Sartre’s claim in Truth and 
Existence that all projects demand an unveiling of the world, that to act is to reveal and unveil the 
world. Above, we saw similar remarks about presence automatically involving knowledge, as per 
Being and Nothingness’s temporality chapter. So intrasubjectively, missing knowledge falls into three 
major categories: the completely missing and unfelt, the vague but unthreatening, and that which 
demands we seek it out, which exerts a pull on us. We hold empty intentions, to be sure, but they 
are not something negative about us or our character. 
 
Conversely, if the Other knows something we do not, the gap in our knowledge takes on a different 
cast. When we are alone, or when the Other does not interact with our projects, the world is 
something that opens up over time as we interact with it and learn. Our projects, which demand we 
act in certain ways, also promise to expand themselves and with that to expand our understanding 
of the world. There is no suggestion that something is missing, but instead the sense that things will 
come with time and with application. Yet if someone else is ahead of us, our knowledge becomes 
incomplete or deficient, instead of promising a future (of) discovery. As Sartre puts it: “[a] thought 
can be incomplete only in relation to another, already existing thought”.524 Since I lack knowledge for 
the other, they can constitute my entire life as lacking, they can start inferring and/or picking up on 
character evidence that makes me deficient. Not knowing the content of, say, an untranslated 
Husserl text, might imply a history where I never learned to read German. Whatever positive reasons 
there might be for this are immediately made into a negative; if I was taught Mandarin as a third 
language, any benefits or other consequences are irrelevant with respect to my ignorance of 
Husserl. It does not matter that I can read The Heroes of the Water Margin in the original or that I 
excel in my work handling international manufacturing; insofar as someone constitutes me ignorant 
of the Husserl all of these things I have done fade behind the things I have not, i.e. the way I never 
read the untranslated text. 
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This  does not have to be problematic if our ignorance is reciprocal, if we each specialise into 
different areas of knowledge and willingly assist each other where assistance is needed. If a 
philosopher knows little of medicine and a medical doctor knows little about philosophy, this does 
not entail a necessary problem.525 There are plenty of complex systems of co-operation that do not 
need to imply oppression; the fisherman who knows nothing of growing grain and the farmer-baker 
who knows nothing about fish can happily co-operate to keep their community in food. The 
fisherman going to get grain can recognise the freedom and the concrete situation of the farmer by 
trading fairly, not being an imposition during crucial and laborious tasks like threshing-winnowing, 
and so on – they can appeal to the farmer as a full freedom and be receive assistance with respect to 
their own full freedom.  
 
The problem starts when my ignorance is combined with both a lack of appropriate, reciprocal 
assistance, and (the sense) that it is definitive. My ignorance can be, or feel definitive, for plenty of 
reasons. We might live under oppressive circumstances, where it is overtly forbidden to discuss 
certain things or ideas. If it is illegal to discuss past revolutions and the intellectual history of 
revolution, I might be incapable of learning that radical political change is possible at all, much less 
how to enact it. Low-quality education, in a wide sense which includes both schooling and public 
discourse, might keep me from ever asking pertinent questions about my problems or those of 
society, keeping any and all effective political discourse locked away – and for commentators like 
Lasch,526 this is exactly what has happened in modern liberal democracies. Even this little is getting 
ahead of ourselves, but it is enough to remind us that a definitive kind of ignorance is possible and 
can be conditioned from outside. If our ignorance of some fact or set of facts is (experienced as) 
definitive, it is experienced as a limit to our freedom; there will be parts of the world which we, by 
ourselves, will never be able to adapt to and incorporate into our projects. Whilst being definitively 
ignorant of minor things like the best way to catch pike or spin a skein of wool is possible, in what 
follows we should imagine the relevant knowledge is significant and could easily pose an existential 
threat to many projects.  
 
Where my ignorance is definitive, my projects are always under threat. With respect to my projects, 
I am suddenly “[i]nstalled in truth or error without being able to distinguish between them”.527 I 
                                                          
525 See Notebooks, p. 299. 
526 This is one of the central theses of Revolt of the Elites. 
527 Notebooks, p. 301. 
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cannot make progress on those projects at all, since I am cut off from any reasonable feedback 
about whether my efforts are working or not. This produces something very similar to the untenable 
situation, except instead of being faced with unpredictable outcomes I am faced with unreadable 
outcomes – I flat out do not know what I have really achieved or am likely to do if I keep going down 
a certain path. This, like the classic untenable situation, seriously harms my ability to form and 
execute projects, and threatens a destabilisation of my agency. This is also extremely painful in the 
sense that it constantly tugs on many of other related projects without the promise of creating a 
successful project shift. It creates a constant second-guessing in the one who is ignorant; the 
immediate perception they have of the world is indubitable, but always undermined as soon as it is 
made by the other. They have knowledge just as much as anyone else, on the Truth and Existence 
definition, but never come to form a dependable, stable truth. Their truths come with a provisional 
nature that they simply can’t shake.528 
 
If you cannot fix the problem by learning more, by acting on the world, then the only way out of this 
pain and uncertainty is to rely completely on the other to secure your projects. Note that, if your 
ignorance is definitive, they do not share knowledge with you.529 Rather, they provide reassurance 
that there is some relevant knowledge guiding your projects; since only projects generate 
knowledge, this means they put you in service of their ends. If I offer certainties about what people 
ought to be paid, won through the pursuit of capital, and you are definitively ignorant about the 
movement of capital, you are in serious danger if you rely on me. Any economic truth I have to offer, 
whether I reflectively acknowledge this or not, is tied to my project of generating capital – it is not 
tied to your projects about meeting your basic needs or living a flourishing life!  If your project is not 
to produce as much capital as possible for me, then I will be misleading you every step of the way, 
and via a means that is extremely hard to grasp or act against. It is not hyperbole to say that, if 
effected on purpose, this manipulation is “the most subtle and most fundamental form of 
violence”.530 Reliance on the other does not give us knowledge – it gives us a dependence on their 
projects, makes us an accessory to them and their goals. 
 
Why would we (or Sartre) call this violence if there is no actual bloodshed involved? Firstly because 
my projects, if I am definitively ignorant, are disrespected and my freedom is not accorded its value. 
It’s a classic intrasubjective bad faith: I am being treated as an instrument of someone else’s 
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projects, and whether that’s because I am a dupe or in chains is irrelevant to the violence done to 
my projects. Sustaining this kind of ignorance is out of the question for an authentic agent, since 
“[i]gnorance comes to me by way of the other as negation of my freedom. … knowledge creates the 
obligation to teach”.531 This point is hugely important – since definitive ignorance can limit my 
freedom just as badly as being thrown in chains, authenticity and the authentic society demands 
that it is destroyed wherever it is found. Ignorance is destroyed in and through sharing knowledge; if 
it is not, the ignorant are made complicit in being incomplete, in remaining fools or dupes. The ways 
they respond to their situation, Sartre argues, help engender and reinforce it, as well as oppressing 
others. They risk not only acting out against others who are not oppressing them, but through 
“counter-oppression” becoming complicit in their own ignorance and intellectual subjugation. In 
other words, they are not only caused to suffer, but also made to make things worse in an attempt 
to regain their ontological stability. This might come about straightforwardly through anger as the 
awareness that something is wrong which they cannot possibly fix. Just as in the Sketch and the fable 
of the sour grapes,532 our anger conditioned by ignorance might make us lash out at the world, trying 
to negate the problem by magically destroying it. Since our anger is caused by a lack of knowledge 
about how to fix a problem, any violence that comes out of it will inevitably target the wrong thing. 
An ontological insecurity ultimately caused by the contradictions of globalising capital, for instance, 
might earth itself as anger at immigration. 
 
Less dramatically, another solution to the ontological insecurity of ignorance might be an unhealthy 
adherence to common knowledge or ritual, a fall into a Heideggerian “they”.  Here is where 
untenable situations are bred the easiest. Paradoxically, one way to defeat the awareness that our 
projects are always transcended is to completely, totally throw ourselves into being transcended. 
Habits, customs, a shared stock of cultural references, all of these let us make our projects into a 
matter of “generalities and repetitions”,533 which can by an act of magic destroy our agency, our 
freedom, and our troubling responsibility for ourselves and others. Remember how, above, a key 
part of understanding bad faith was the appeal to a timeless character. To recap, either we take our 
past and project that it will and cannot change in the future, or we take an imagined future and 
reinterpret the past as evidence for its inevitably. The repetitive and the ritual carries with it the idea 
that everything will be the same forever; the truths of common wisdom promise to be eternal. If I 
give in entirely to common wisdom, or something like it, and act in a repetitive way that motions 
towards things always being the same, symbolically I destroy the possibility for change implied by 
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the advancement of time; with that, my freedom becomes inert and untroubling. 
 
The thing about these commonplaces is they also create incommunicability problems between 
groups, which are very hard if not apparently impossible to resolve. If I am committed to, e.g., right-
wing social Darwinist tropes but also prepared to concede the value of lives here and there when 
challenged, any serious discussion I am involved in is likely to run around in circles. I can make these 
concessions only because I am not playing to uncover a stable truth or to win the ostensible 
argument; my ontological security is all that I stake (and can stake). This is doubly true if my 
opponent is relying on an opposing set of tropes rather than a coherent system of knowledge; 
neither of us can seize on a genuinely satisfying argument because at base neither of us is capable of 
proving anything relevant whatsoever – we lack a piece of the puzzle, whether that means 
intellectual tools, systems of reason, empirical evidence, or historical proof.  
In fact, the relevant knowledge becomes inert, taken out of the whole circuit of my oppressor, 
myself, and any non-debate. If some demagogue (or collection of them) holds my world together for 
me, and they outstrip me totally in their (claimed) knowledge, I could hardly understand them even 
if they did tell me the foundations of their system. “[T]o the extent that he is limited, the dumb fool 
cannot comprehend me past some point … those truths that he cannot comprehend he has to make 
use of if he wants to live and act. Therefore he has to adopt them out of confidence in my 
freedom”.534 In the end, Sartre observes, from the demagogue’s perspective “I can no longer be 
believed because of what I demonstrate, which in the end would hardly flatter me … but because I 
am me. In a word, I realize the human dream of being believed for irrational reasons”.535 Under 
intellectual oppression, we can believe in our sources implicitly, without reference to whether or not 
they continue to understand what we do not know. Our belief that they have knowledge is sufficient 
to let them oppress us; they do not need to hold any of the knowledge we believe they do to 
subjugate us. Simply being convincing when I am in a period of sufficient doubt (i.e. when the pain of 
project shifts is high enough) will get that job done.  
 
In that event, whether or not the oppressor originally held the keys to any useful knowledge, the 
discourse surrounding them and the projects of those believing them will be obscenely distorted, 
and yet remain stable. The first, and ontologically the only significant, thing that the oppressors have 
us believe is that our characters are stable and we have projects which are not under threat. 
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Everything else, even though we ostensibly came to them for their understanding of, e.g., 
economics, ethics, the causes of our society’s ills, and so on, is secondary. Incommunicability of our 
projects and our knowledge comes about because, at root, we don’t have a project we can 
communicate in the first place, and the mechanism of oppression has turned us into the intellectual 
living dead. Our ideas, which under any normal circumstances ought to have died on exposure to 
evidence, remain standing and take on a life of their own. If I appeal to you for help with my 
problems, but cannot even formulate what those problems are, there is no chance at all you can 
comprehend them.  An unarticulated (and inarticulable!) problem has no answer. 
 
We can add to this problem something more benign but still restrictive: If the other puts me in my 
place in the world, whether explicitly or implicitly telling me to become a manufacturing worker, an 
agricultural worker, etc, the rhythms of that life will also breed incommunicability. The routine of an 
agricultural life is completely different to one of a watchmaker or factory worker, and involves 
shared annoyances, joys, and opportunities for bonding that are again completely different.  The 
acts of farming, of watchmaking, etc contain repetitive and unique aspects which, as they recur, 
“harden into generalities and repetitions, and these calluses will affect our ends which have an 
aspect of generality”.536  Our lives become routine even if we are not stripped, per Adam Smith or 
Marx,537 of any intellectual benefit of our work by its industrialised form. The challenges we face, the 
metaphors we are likely to use, drop out of universality as we all deal with different parts of the 
world. Being a watchmaker involves an entirely different type of time management to growing 
finnicky crops; Sartre’s own naïve and patronising description of the life of peasantry as (merely) 
waiting for things to grow538 shows how different worlds can fall out of communication. 
 
The overall point is, on top of the relatively innocent sources that block us from assisting one 
another, both a profound uncertainty in ignorance and the possibility of anger or violence on the 
part of the ignorant can restrict us into untenable situations.  Of course, an adherence to routine or 
a railing anger are not the only attitudes we could take to this uncertainty. Sartre himself suggests 
that we might either adopt an attitude of (quasi) religious zeal to the knowledge we are given, 
helping squash dissent, or become some kind of prophet/standard bearer for the ideas we are made 
to espouse.539 We could also add the example of socially mediated bad faith from earlier: we could 
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plunge ourselves into coincidental identities, or into our total failure to adopt an identity as an 
identity in and of itself. All of these attitudes are a bad faith which we have adopted because of the 
uncertainty of ignorance, and our desire to avoid the disintegration it threatens, and they are by no 
means exhaustive. 
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Section Seven: Ignorance, Untenable Situations, and the Limits of this Early Account. 
 
So how does this help confirm that Sartre has the resources for an ethics? For one thing, it suggests 
both an outline of how we can positively provide aid to others and ways in which that aid can be 
blocked. It shows that we can describe some properly intersubjective ethical patterns using the 
system we have been building up. So why, given references to recognisable features of life like 
control by ignorance and the way people like Claudette might find themselves in a bind, is all of this 
still on the level of resources for an ethics? 
 
Firstly, looking at the appeal and the impact of ignorance reaffirms the inseparability of respecting 
the other from a historically located, specific situation. Any knowledge that is missing and preventing 
us from making or responding to an appeal is not knowledge as such. It is a specific knowledge, the 
knowledge that something is thus-and-so. I might be aware the factory does not pay me enough to 
experience a flourishing life, but blocked off from being able to explain how things could be 
otherwise. The missing knowledge (truth) I need (or tools that let me reach that knowledge) would 
be determinate knowledge about the state of the industry, the cost of living, the logics of capital and 
production, and so on. Conversely, the ones imposing ignorance on others cannot make them 
abstractly ignorant: they have to instil an ignorance of something particular, or some constellation of 
particular ignorances. My ignorance of particular facts also traces back to the history of my life; I 
might not understand some facet of economics because I have never studied the subject, and I never 
studied it because wage earning work and family obligations took up too much time, because … and 
so on until a complete psychoanalysis of my life is implied. All of these things relate to concrete facts 
like the cost of education, the cost of rent, social ideas about who does and doesn’t deserve my 
support, and so on. In fact, they relate to my specific job, the specific profit margin of my employer – 
they relate to the specific manifestation of those concrete facts within my life. I cannot rail against 
abstract disrespect for my well-being or the rights of others; I must rail against 14 hour work days in 
the cotton factory.  
 
We can see Sartre understands this clearly at the end of Being and Nothingness, where he comes at 
the point from the other way: “ontology and existential psychoanalysis (or the spontaneous and 
empirical application which men have always made of these disciplines) must reveal to the moral 
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agent that he is the being by whom values exist”.540 Why would we submit to existential 
psychoanalysis in the first place? Surely because we have something we see as a problem, threat or 
failure in our lives, something like Claudette or Pierre consistently making mistakes in dating, 
something concrete that we cannot achieve or make peace with. Even if I decide to analyse someone 
without their consent or knowledge (say through a journal, letters, published work), I have to have a 
reason to do this, I have to be trying to diagnose an apparent problem or understand how another is 
free from my own problems. Whatever new projects we take on, most likely having learned to 
appreciate and embrace ambiguity, are still new concrete goals. If Pierre figures out that he is 
treating his dates as objects and decides to change, that will come out in objective behaviours such 
as trying not to pressure them, picking up on discomfort and backing off, and so on. Since our 
projects are inseparable from action, any decisive awareness of the need to change (the way we 
approach) our projects must be manifest in action, is and has to be coextensive with trying 
something new (and hopefully better). At the risk of belabouring the point, this means that our 
abstract awareness of the absolute value of freedom has to come out as and through regulating 
principles about our actions and interpersonal relations. 
 
In cases like Claudette and Pierre’s, or the unhappy consumerist’s, figuring out a concrete course of 
action which fits Sartre’s system is superficially easy. Ideas such as respecting the other’s freedom by 
making sure they want to be at the café, by not trying to leverage social expectations to get your 
own desires met, are simple to come up with almost to the point of vacuity. Partially this is because 
these examples, even with extra detail, were spun to explain and elucidate the Sartrean system; if 
Claudette and Pierre were invented to explain bad faith, it makes sense that the instance of bad faith 
they are in is simplistic. The second we make them anywhere near realistic, however, the option to 
be blasé about giving them advice expires. Suppose Claudette really exists and is reflectively aware 
of her situation, as I expanded it above. She is aware of, and reflects on, an extreme difficulty in 
explaining the restrictions on her actions and the pressures it puts her under. Simply telling her not 
to pay attention to others judging her, to not go on bad dates, to trust her gut when someone seems 
like a loser – none of this will be helpful, none of it implies comprehension of her situation or the 
ability to assist if she appeals for aid in getting out of it. 
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Assisting her, in the long term, implies a much wider understanding of why her situation is possible, 
of religious and patriarchal and generally controlling influences in the society she lives in. Her 
project, perhaps as basic as “make this nonsense stop”, itself might demand and imply all kinds of 
revisions, some or many of which would require a lifetime worth of study if nobody else has put in 
the required work – or if she cannot access it. A specific understanding, say, of the exact power 
relations and historical-political currents that made her society possible, is by no means contained in 
or derivable from the ontological conditions that set out how her position is possible. Neither is a 
definite idea about how to change things at a level bigger than herself. We might be able to talk 
about the preconditions underlying her situation fluently, but the actual social and behavioural 
trends that enable them are far beyond the scope of the account so far. Her situation is untenable 
precisely because it is made up of a Gordian knot of objective circumstances and the ways the 
projects of others interfere with her life. Expecting the mere revelation that the knot was first tied in 
the name of ontological security to set her free is lunacy. 
 
Sartre is, in the contexts we have been discussing, only ever talking about the ontological conditions 
of a potential authenticity or inauthenticity even if he has to dip into real examples or examples that 
scream for unpacking to make those points. Discussing the oppression of ignorance, as seen above, 
Sartre notes that “[i]t is not yet a question of economic and social oppression but of its ontological 
conditions”541 even as he moves on to talk about the benefits of “full employment” and makes quasi-
empirical claims such as “[s]tupidity is most frequently found in the bourgeoisie because the son of 
the factory owner has the right to run the factory even though he is incapable of doing so”. While we 
can trace out how something like classes comes about through the mechanics and limits of 
comprehension,542 Sartre is not (yet) entitled to talk about class in any substantial (historical) 
context. The claim that the classless society is authentic543 or likely to lead its members to 
authenticity is, at best, suggestive. Ideas like the natural tendency for people to form pockets of 
mutual incomprehensibility, and the possibility of oppression and violence through ignorance, 
gesture at the possibility of diagnosing the reasons why we are (treated) in bad faith but they do not 
constitute that diagnosis. Mixing in talk about heredity and inheritance of property and managerial 
rights is already saying too much about education and competence in specific cases. If Sartre had 
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polished and published that section of the Notebooks as a standalone text, Orwell would have been 
utterly justified in giving it the same savage reviewing as ASJ. 
 
Nor does added pseudo-practical, theoretical detail like the simple derivation of economic principles 
get us any further towards providing practicable concrete advice to others. For instance, showing 
that the difference between use value and exchange value544 can be explained by building up from 
an ontological level does not tell us anything practical about how to upset the prevailing system, 
even though Sartre asserts that, as a result of that distinction “[w]hat we can and must do is fight for 
a society that will give labor a determined value (e.g., for a classless society)”. Remember that the 
charge of “cerebration” Orwell made was that in ASJ Sartre ends up explaining simple or obvious 
ideas in obtuse language. To anyone in a culture with access to even a whistlestop summary of 
Capital I and the ideas in it, the use value/exchange value distinction is not novel; Sartre, in the 
Notebooks, does not offer anything new and interesting on the matter and certainly not in an easy 
to understand way. In terms of giving practical advice on how to change things, it has nothing to say 
at all. It is, in that sense, fairly useless as a regulator of our behaviour, and doubly so since it appears 
as a fragment rather than as a part of a completed narrative. It is, in other words, “cerebration”. This 
is not to deny that Sartre the man held such beliefs for good reasons. Nor does it say that in other, 
later work he was unable to give an adequate account of (the need for) a classless society. Yet, at 
best, these sorts of accounts remain suggestive. 
 
This is not to say the idea is wrong or that there are no problems with class structures in Sartre’s 
time or ours. The issue is that skipping right ahead to those points, having only just established the 
possibility of an ethics, would be dangerous. The value of something like the “classless society” is, on 
my reading, a reflection of the value of avoiding ignorance and the duty to reveal and share 
knowledge with others, a reflection of the way that knowledge carries with it the duty to either 
teach others or at least enter reciprocal relations of ignorance with others in good faith. Classes, 
insofar as they fit into the model of ignorance and violence given above, might be unethical insofar 
as they are vectors of an imposed ignorance. In Chapter Five, above,545 we saw a related 
fragmentary claim that ethics has to be achieved by all in order to be achieved by anyone: “ethics is 
not possible unless everyone is ethical”.546 Perhaps the claim translates into a demand for 
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classlessness like this: 
 
Ignorance should be avoided 
 
Classes and class-like structures foster ignorance 
 
Therefore, classes and other structures which promote ignorance should be eliminated. 
 
Such an argument, apart from being basically unactionable, misses the way pockets of 
incommunicability form naturally even in good faith, and misses the way reciprocal ignorance and 
division of labour does not have to lend itself to inauthenticity. Addressing whether a given division 
of labour is conducive to inauthenticity would have to be a practical, concrete question which needs 
all sorts of detail we can’t get from the structure of consciousness alone.547 As far as talk of classless 
societies and the like goes, we have to treat them as promissory for other investigations; what the 
account we have here tells us is that those investigations can, in principle, deliver moral instruction. 
The form of what has to be done, and the question of whether it is practically achievable or not, 
comes down to other disciplines like political economy, rhetoric, logistics, practical understanding of 
the current state of culture/ideology, and so on.  All we know from the nature of value, 
consciousness and freedom is that we have the need to investigate the world and bring about 
improvement where possible. In that sense Sartre is almost a classical Enlightenment thinker, but in 
practical terms, in terms of telling us what we should be doing and whether a particular vision of the 
ethical can be carried out in a given environment, these early works can only be suggestive. 
 
This suggestiveness is why early readings of Sartre on ethics can seem unsatisfying. Jeanson, writing 
in 1947, tells us that “[t]he question is whether men should let themselves be shunted about 
indefinitely on a sea of unforeseeable reactions or whether they should call on all their resources in 
order to take hold of a determinate current that has some chance of restoring to them the human 
meaning of their action”.548 Without considering which “determinate current” this is, i.e. which 
authentic project the desire to become God is subsumed under, this tells us absolutely nothing 
about what has to be done or about the actual, concrete process of refining our attitudes to the 
                                                          
547 Even in Sartre’s later work, we should note that it takes him 671(!) pages of the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason to say “[t]his enables us to reach the concrete at last”. 
548 Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, p.225. 
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world. This is why the key Existentialism is a Humanism example of the student deciding to care for 
his mother or go to war549 is so significant. The whole point of that example is that only by acting on 
it can an ethical problem be resolved – and finding we were wrong or experiencing tragic choices is a 
perfectly natural part of moral experimentation and action. For a provincial young adult with little 
life experience, being put on the spot to perform a utilitarian calculus or fathom out the 
deontological demands on the situation is no worse than the demand to trust one’s moral instincts 
and be ready to deal with the consequences. All we are really guaranteed by (this) Sartre is that 
there are better and worse ways to act, around the guiding star of the absolute value of 
consciousness, but it is up to us to experiment in our concrete situation and discover the ethical. In 
that sense we learn from Sartre that the ethical is possible, but also that understanding the source of 
ethics and locating its practical demands on us are two completely separate things.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
549 EH, p.36. 
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Concluding Remarks.                                                  
 
The account of Sartrean ethics I have given is mostly abstract and technical, far more oriented at 
showing an ethics is possible than where it ought to go.  We saw how, from the most minimal points 
about consciousness, we can derive an ethics of responsibility which regulates our actions, and 
neither ignores the Other, nor lacks purchase on the physical/material or objective. The question has 
to be where to go from here: since an ethics is possible, and the world demands ethical decisions 
from us all the time, what can we take away from this account? Historically, of course, Sartre moved 
towards Marxism, reflected in his writings through the Search for a Method and the Critique(s) of 
Dialectical Reason, the second of which was never finished.  His interest later shifted to colonialism 
and imperialism550, although he grew frustrated by the incompetence of the leftwing political 
movements he engaged with. 
In terms of an alternate progression from the early ethics, we can see a therapeutic angle reflected 
in Sartre’s influence on R.D. Laing. Laing’s Reason and Violence551 contains a foreword by Sartre, 
attesting that Laing’s understanding of mental illness is broadly right. We can also see a lineage of 
allied thought in the work of Erich Fromm; although written before Being and Nothingness his 
seminal Fear of Freedom552 dealt, as the title suggests, with individuals’ desire for less freedom (not 
more) helping open the door to fascism. Insofar as Being and Nothingness has the resources to 
explain inferiority projects and the like, this historical development was somewhat predictable. In 
more modern context, Zheng’s emphasis553 on catharsis through pure reflection might also suggest a 
cross between a self-cultivational and therapeutic ethics derived from authenticity.  
We are not without dedicated works spelling out concretely where the ethics will go; Barnes’ An 
Existentialist Ethics is notable for having been written before the Notebooks were available. It 
impressively covers how Sartre’s existentialism stands compared to, and vis-à-vis engaging with, 
political movements as diverse as Zen Buddhism, Marxism, Tillich’s theology and Randian 
Objectivism.  More recently, T. Storm Heter has proposed a reading of authenticity which stresses 
                                                          
550 See Arthur, Paige Unfinished Projects. Verso: London, 2010 for an enlightening description of how this 
mapped onto his substantive work.  
551 Laing, R.D., Reason and Violence (with D.G. Cooper). Tavistock: London, 1959. p.7.  Note, however, that this 
comment appears in context of a work on the Critique of Dialectical Reason.  
552 Fromm, Erich, Fear of Freedom. Routledge: London, 1942. 
553 See Zheng, Yiwei, Ontology and Ethics in Sartre’s Early Philosophy. Lexington Books: Lanham, MD., 2005. 
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the significance of recognition in other-relations and the possibility of existentialist virtues, drawing 
on a wider canon than Sartre alone.554 
 
Having drawn on the Sartrean account of knowledge more than usual, I would like to sketch what an 
ethics of ignorance, of avoiding ignorance, would tell us about how to explore a concrete, real ethics. 
In a minimal form, our awareness of the world demands that we explore it world and our lives to 
find out what the ethical looks like. As we saw, we are always and forever interrogating the world; 
every time the world is made present to us our knowledge is tested and challenged in some way. 
Moreover, our projects form and disperse along rational lines, which is (empirically) visible due to 
the formation of our characters behind us. The creation and disruption of our projects, seeing which 
projects can lock or cohere and which can’t, is genuinely revelatory about the structure of value 
since that structure is its condition of possibility. We can, and do, learn about value and the ethical 
by seeing what works in our lives and what doesn’t; we are immediately aware, at least on some 
level, when we are wide of the mark. The best thing we can do, if we want to discover a concretely 
ethical life, is to allow our knowledge and received truths to be tested as often as possible, and 
genuinely tested at that. This continual testing applies both on a small and a large level, in our daily 
routines and the way we go through life as a whole. It does not, and should not, apply only to big-
ticket moral questions but to the frameworks of action that contextualise them and make them 
possible; there is a reciprocal relationship between the small-scale problems which we face and the 
larger commitments which ground them. Every (accurate) revision improves our truths, it gives us a 
more adaptive picture of the world which will allow us to prosecute our goals. One route to finding 
what authenticity concretely means is simple but arduous: to open ourselves to experience (and to 
the experiences of others) and try to learn from them as much as possible in good faith.  
 
Maintaining a lifestyle of genuine responsibility, moreover, would be a test of faith. A test of our 
faith in ourselves to deliver that future, and of faith that destiny will not interfere. There is nothing 
which can compel us to do anything, except actually doing what has to be done. Yet those actions 
occupy a basically mysterious space, a present which has no reality except as something that will 
come or which has happened. The best and only defence is to accept that our (major) projects are all 
“undertakings”, that they require time to execute and will be challenged over and over again. We 
can look at the past with a critical eye and see how we or others were successful in the past, 
whether we really acted coherently or not. Nonetheless there is always scope to be afraid of a future 
                                                          
554 Heter, T Storm, Sartre’s Ethics of Engagement: Authenticity and Civic Virtue. Continuum: London: 2006. 
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where we make mistakes; there will be, as a matter of empirical certainty, a time when we make 
them.  All we can do against destiny is prepare, and be ready to ask what went wrong afterward, no 
matter how painful the process is.  
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